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Freedom for Activists Requested From Gorbachev
46050026b Montreal HORIZON in Armenian
17 Apr 89 pp 1, 5

[Appeal by the Soviet Armenian "Public Defense Council" to CPSU [Communist Party of the Soviet Union] Central Committee General Secretary Mikhail S. Gorbachev]

[Text] To Comrade M. S. Gorbachev, General Secretary of the Central Committee of the CPSU, Chairman of the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet:

The appeals some representatives of the Armenian intelligentsia have addressed to you remain unanswered, and we take the liberty to once again express our regret with regard to the growing wave of persecution and the arrest of the leaders of the popular Karabakh movement at a time when the pain of the horrible earthquake that shocked the entire world has not yet faded away.

The Armenian people have faith in the members of the Committee who have been nominated and elected by the people and who are working before the people and with the people's will.

From the day of the earthquake, the members of the Committee appealed to the people to fully devote themselves to the rescue work. Trying to cooperate with the government, they gave numerous examples of organized and selfless action. Exploiting the tragic circumstances created by the fateful disaster, some leaders of the Republic, allied with the regressive forces of the Union, mounted a vicious persecution of a genuinely popular and democratic movement by spreading repugnant falsehoods through the mass media, thus misleading the public and the country's leadership.

We believe that the people who are responsible for the arrest of the members of the Karabakh movement are those who misguidedly you out of fear and desperation seeing the threat that the movement's socialist orientation posed to them. Because this movement challenged the omnipotence of the most powerful reactionary forces. For that reason, we are convinced that the Committee members' arrests were induced by arbitrary and emotional judgments and not by the reasoning of restructuring. This represents a concession to anti-restructuring forces and is inadmissible. We cannot allow a political-moral disaster to follow the natural disaster. Our people cannot withstand this second terrifying blow. Instead of having a renaissance, [our nation] was thrown back by decades from the moral and spiritual heights it achieved thanks to the genuine democratic movement which remained strictly within constitutional bounds thanks to the sensible, restrained and politically balanced activities of the Committee despite the events in the Nagorno Karabakh and the inflamed emotions resulting from the Sumgait massacres.

The nobility and altruism of the leaders of the Committee remain beyond doubt. They represent the entire people, and we are all prepared to fully share all responsibility and blame with them. For this reason, trying them is equivalent to trying the entire Armenian people. We consider the sentence to be handed down on them, whatever it may be, as a sentence delivered on us.

We, the representatives of the Armenian public, demand the release of the Committee's members without delay, an end to the persecution of the activists of the Karabakh movement and the reinstatement of their good name.

It is impossible to build a just state and to elicit the active participation of the masses in public life by treading the path of persecution, by sticking "nationalist," "political" and other labels on people and by exploiting one-sided publicity.

Public Defense Council, 10 March 1989.

Signatories: Maro Margaryan, Razmik Davoyan, Ruben Hovsepyan, Karen Simonyan, Grant Matevosyan, Silva Kaputikyan, Perj Zeytuntsyan, Sos Sargsyan, Garnik Manasyan, Tigran Akhambekyan, Samuel Pokhosyan, Bella Arutyunyan-Kozak, Ayk Khazaryan, Arutyun Panosyan, Levon Sahinyan, Armen Martirosyan, Albert Kirakosyan, Ashot Tabakhyan, Tados Akobyan, Lutvik Khachatryan, Albert Ordyan, Grachya Tamrazyan, Lusine Aleksanyan, Gevorg Pakhtasaryan, Gagik Pakhtasaryan, Aris Melkumyan, Levon Grigoryan, Ashot Sargsyan, Mkrtich Matevosyan, Artak Vardazaryan, Armen Shekoyan, Nikolay Gevorgyan, Sero Khanzadyan, Anahit Sahinyan.

Stance of Diaspora Party on Karabakh Committee Scored

46050026a Montreal HORIZON in Armenian
17 Apr 89 pp 1, 3

[Text] The following statement was received from Yerevan by telephone. At the request of the presidency of the Association for the Defense of Armenian Cause [ADAC], we passed it on to the editors of the weekly, ABAKA.

The presidency of ADAC declares:

The [Beirut] daily, ZARTONK, published in its 18 January 1989 edition an article entitled: "The 18 November General Strike in Yerevan; Conversation With the Young Men of ADAC: Impressions." In the said article the author, Antranik Daghlilian, writes in elaborate detail about his impressions of Yerevan in November 1988 and his conversation with members of ADAC. The said conversation held in November 1988 was published in ZARTONK 2 months later. Another 2 months later, in mid-March, the weekly, ABAKA, also published the same article.

In the first half of January 1989, a few days before the said article on that conversation appeared, ZARTONK published an editorial entitled "Let Us not Lionize Unnecessarily" which criticized the Karabakh Committee's by then already outdated activities. Had the said editorial and article been published in November, when the incidents they examined were still current and the people they evaluated were still vigorously active, it would have been very hard to suspect ABAKA and ZARTONK, which represent the Ramgavar [Democratic Liberal] Party, of any ulterior motives.

But given that they were published 1 to 3 months after the Karabakh Committee's members were arrested and the movement was suppressed by government and police means, at a time when criticism of the Karabakh Committee's mistakes could not have been leveled with the purpose of correcting them, a natural question arises: What were the motivations of the publishers?

It is obvious that after the said events and the radical transformation of the situation, ADAC could not make a similar assessment of the activities of the Karabakh Committee, firstly because it would be meaningless and secondly because of basic ethical reasons. One would expect that ABAKA and ZARTONK would take these considerations into account if they had the interests of the movement in mind.

By publishing the conversation with "the young men of ADAC" 2 to 4 months late (incidentally, Mr Daghljan did not present himself to the "young men of ADAC" as a member of the Ramgavar Party and did not say

anything about publishing the conversation), ABAKA and ZARTONK dealt another blow to the already bludgeoned and jailed participants of the Artsakh movement as well as ADAC, thus shooting two birds with one stone.

By publishing articles belatedly, ABAKA and ZARTONK impede the movement in Armenia and the Diaspora to have the detainees released and at the same time discredit ADAC. Although ADAC adamantly criticized and exposed the mistakes of the Karabakh Committee at the peak of their activities when they had the maximum influence on the people, it stopped criticizing them after the arrests and expressed neutrality with regard to demands for their freedom.

However, the course of events has impelled us to review our position of neutrality and to join the movement for the release of all the participants of the Artsakh movement based on the reasoning that one may disagree with or criticize only those who have similar opportunities, not those who are deprived of those rights.

This statement is made in behalf of the presidency of ADAC with the request that mass media in the Diaspora as well as at home disseminate it to broad masses of people.

[Signed] Hovik Vasilyan, Shirak Gunashyan, Shokhik Asoyan, Albert Khubasaryan, Andranik Arutyunyan, Amlet Gasbaryan, Ashot Martirosyan.

[Date] 6 April 1989.

REGIONAL AFFAIRS

Kuwaiti-Saudi Agreement on "Divided Territory"

44040294 Kuwait AL-SIYASAH in Arabic
13 Feb 89 p 4

[Text] Statute No 7 of 1989, in accordance with the agreement ratified between the State of Kuwait and the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia regarding the property of citizens of the two states in the divided territory, was published in the official newspaper, KUWAIT AL-YAWM.

The agreement was signed in Riyadh on 7 November 1988. The following is the text of the agreement:

The Government of the State of Kuwait and the Government of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, based on a spirit of Arab brotherhood, with the aim of deepening bonds of good neighborliness and strengthening ties of cooperation between them, and based on the agreement on the division of the neutral territory between the two states signed on 7 July 1965, and subsequent agreements, and out of the desire of the two parties to end outstanding problems between them regarding the property of citizens of both states in the divided territory, and to solve all matters with a final, binding solution, agreed to the following:

Paragraph 1: The Government of Kuwait pledges to pay the Government of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia the total sum of 8 million Kuwaiti dinars. The latter assumes responsibility for compensating its citizens for their property, including land, houses, stores, workshops, and farms located in the northern part of the divided territory, and contained in the registers prepared by the Joint Kuwaiti-Saudi Inspection and Examination Committee. Saudi citizens shall have no subsequent right to demand any other indemnifications from the Government of Kuwait for their property in that territory.

Paragraph 2: The Government of Kuwait assumes responsibility for compensating its citizens for their farms in the southern part of the divided territory. These farms revert to the Government of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia as of the effective date of this agreement, and those citizens are not entitled to demand any indemnifications from the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia.

1. The Government of Kuwait is obliged to hand over to claimants housing (allotments) numbering 1,280 in accordance with the registers prepared by the Joint Inspection and Examination Committee without breaching other general rules and conditions contained in other previous (minutes) and agreements concluded between the two parties.

2. The pertinent authorities in the Government of Kuwait, in the presence of a representative from the Government of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, who represents claimants during the period terminating at the

end of May 1989, conducts a lottery among Saudi citizens claiming (allotments) in order to determine the (allotment) of each claimant and the location of each (allotment) on the plan, and to deliver to the claimant the portion allotted to him after receiving what he has in the way of deeds, on the basis of which his name is entered on the aforementioned registers.

3. Saudi owners of stores and workshops, whose property was expropriated, are entitled to receive one store or workshop per owner in the new territory, regardless of the number of stores or workshops owned by each owner, in accordance with a standard agreement concluded with each of them based on the model applied to Kuwaiti citizens.

Paragraph 3: If a Saudi citizen entitled to an (allotment) does not wish to obtain the portion allotted to him, he forfeits his right to that portion.

Paragraph 4: Regarding Saudi citizens, the property of an allotment is recorded in the name of the owner whose name is contained in the agreed upon registers.

Paragraph 5: Every Saudi citizen entitled to an allotment must evacuate his old property and hand it over to the pertinent Kuwaiti authorities during a period not to exceed 2 years from the date of his surrender of the document of ownership of the claimed allotment. The period is 2 years from the effective date of this agreement if the property is occupied by a tenant.

If evacuation and delivery does not occur at the designated times, the pertinent Kuwaiti authorities shall evacuate the property and surrender it by means of administrative procedures without being obliged to make any restitution.

Paragraph 6: The Government of Kuwait has the first right to purchase an allotment if a Saudi citizen desires to sell it. In this case, Saudi citizens are subject in their actions to that which Kuwaiti citizens are subject.

Paragraph 7: Farms owned by Saudi citizens in the northern divided territory revert to the Kuwaiti Government, and Saudi citizens must hand over these farms within 6 months of the date on which the Government of Kuwait delivers the sum stipulated in Paragraph 1.

Stores and workshops shall also be handed over to the pertinent Kuwaiti authorities within 6 months of the date of the allotment of the property mentioned in the third clause of Paragraph 2 of this agreement.

Paragraph 8: This agreement, including what it contains in the way of amendments and additions to provisions of the aforementioned previous agreements, is considered final and binding on the two parties.

It also settles all matters pertaining to the property of Saudis in the northern part of the divided territory, and to the property of Kuwaitis in the southern part of it.

Paragraph 9: The Government of the State of Kuwait and the Government of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia pledge to take internal measures to issue laws and implementing regulations for the purpose of carrying out this agreement.

Paragraph 10: This agreement is subject to the ratification of the two parties to it, each according to the methods followed in its country, and is considered to be in effect from the date of the exchange of its ratification documents.

Two copies of this agreement were written in the Arabic language, both of which were signed by the two parties on 7 November 1988.

The agreement was signed on behalf of the Government of the State of Kuwait by Salim Sabah al-Salim Al Sabah, the minister of interior, and for the Government of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, by Nayif Ibn-'Abd-al-'Aziz Al Su'ud, the minister of interior.

Statute No 6 of 1989 was issued in KUWAIT AL-YAWM in accordance with the international agreement regarding the use of (land operations stations) for ships inside the range of regional waters and ports.

Kuwait signed this agreement on 26 September 1986.

Statute No 8 of 1989 was also issued in the official newspaper, in accordance with the Arab cooperation agreement regarding the organization and facilitation of Arab aid activities, which was enacted by Arab League Council Resolution No 4740, issued on 22 September 1987.

Peace With Israel Described as "Between Governments" Only

45040294b London AL-DUSTUR in Arabic
3 Apr 89 p 51

[Article by Shafiq Maqar]

[Excerpts] [Passage omitted]

The British Broadcasting Organization sent the "Kilroy" program to Egypt and Israel. In Cairo, the program conducted a televised meeting that was broadcast on the morning of 21 March in London from the Mena House Hotel and was attended by 'Ezer Weizman, Dr Mustafa Khalil, Butrus Ghali, a number of Egyptian journalists, businessmen, opposition politicians and youths, and a number of Israelis. [passage omitted]

On the program, Dr Mustafa Khalil stated to all that the problem has two sides: One side is "a solution to the Palestinian problem," and the other is Israel's acceptance of talks with the PLO. Since the program was organized to examine the effect of the Israeli withdrawal from Taba, Dr Khalil, with all the deliberateness of a wise statesman, stated to all that those who say that it has taken many years for Israel to relinquish that square kilometer are forgetting that border conflicts are complicated problems whose solution requires years and years. He added that border disputes occur between neighbors and there are mutual border disputes between many Arab states; all of these problems occur, and solving them requires time, just as solving the Palestinian problem requires time. [passage omitted]

The Egyptians participating in the program, especially the women and girls, were given a chance to speak. The general gist of remarks made by Egyptians in attendance—even the Egyptian businessman who sat next to the Israeli businessman, and said that he is "smuggling his goods into Israel"—was that the peace which was discussed is a "peace" between governments. The Egyptian people, in its emotional life and national reality, is not experiencing peace with those in Israel when they have taken to killing our Palestinian brothers—our Palestinian people, as several Egyptians stated, including a fiery Egyptian youth, who exploded, saying "our Palestinian people".

In response to what Dr Mustafa continued to repeat, a woman identifying herself as being "from the opposition," interjected to discredit the possibility of peace. Another woman, identifying herself as an Egyptian visual artist, said that she had believed in peace so much that she invited all Israeli visual artists to hold a joint exhibition in Cairo; however, she was suddenly surprised by Israel's invasion of Lebanon on the following morning of her joint exhibition. A young Egyptian woman, in the prime of her life, stated that there is a long history of blood, which says "no", and that it is a history which is deepened every day that Palestinian blood is shed.

At that point, Kilroy, the moderator of the program, attempted to bring the Egyptians back to the main topic, as did Dr Ghali, who told them that "we are not talking about old stories, but about the significance of the settlement of the Taba conflict through civilized negotiations." However, the Egyptians participating in the program persisted stubbornly—doubtlessly annoying Dr Ghali and Dr Khalil—in speaking about the conflict and not about that square kilometer. They were determined not to speak of the conflict as "the Palestinian problem," but as the conflict of our people—the conflict of the Egyptians, inasmuch as our Palestinian people is an inseparable part of us. A young Egyptian woman also stated that "no one likes war, no one wants war, but..."

The program made clear that this was not the view of all of the Egyptians who participated.

Gulf Air Reported to Double Fleet

44000511 Manama GULF DAILY NEWS in English
11 Apr 89 p 1

[Excerpt] Gulf Air is poised to make the biggest investment in its history by spending \$1 billion (BD377 million) on 18 new aircraft.

The airline will almost double the size of its fleet with the acquisition of 12 Airbus A-320s and six Boeing 767-300s.

It will also [be] spending money on new uniforms for its staff.

"It will be our biggest investment ever," public relations manager Mr 'Abdallah Karim, said yesterday.

Gulf Air is expected to make a profit of between BD2 million and BD3 million for last year, compared to losses of BD2.9 million in 1987 and BD2.1 million in 1986.

The expansion plans were passed at an extraordinary meeting of Gulf Air's board of directors in Doha.

President and chief executive 'Ali al-Malki, said afterwards that the investment in aircraft would increase the airline's fleet to 40 by 1994.

Mr Yusuf al-Shirawi, Development and Industry Minister and acting Minister of State for Cabinet Affairs, also attended the meeting.

He praised Gulf Air's good reputation, saying it had helped in negotiating loans from international banks and financial establishments, to fund the investment.

Gulf Air recently bought four Boeing 767-300s, while two ageing Tristars are to be withdrawn between April and June.

It has also taken out an option on six Airbus A-320s and 12 Boeing 767-300s. [passage omitted]

PALESTINIAN AFFAIRS

PLO, Israeli, U.S. Views on Election Proposals Discussed

44040422a Nicosia FILASTIN AL-THAWRAH in Arabic 23 Apr 89 pp 14-15

[Article: "King Husayn Visited Washington After Receiving 'Arafat as Head of State; Initial Palestinian Election Plan"]

[Text] Shamir has presented to President Bush a vague Israeli 4-point plan for holding elections in the bank and the strip. King Husayn has carried to Washington a more specific Palestinian counter plan, also consisting of 4 points. Washington and the PLO will discuss the Palestinian vision in the third round of dialogue.

A more effective and dynamic mini-formula of the content of the call Palestinian President Yasir 'Arafat issued a few weeks ago for holding meetings between the Arab frontline states—Egypt, Jordan, Palestine, Syria and Lebanon—to coordinate their positions on the political solutions proposed in the region, especially to develop a common vision of the international conference formula, is being realistically accomplished now. But Damascus' position (and its seizure of Beirut) obstructed achievement of the original Palestinian formula which has been replaced by the Palestinian-Egyptian-Jordanian coordination and by constant consultation with Baghdad. This condition peaked in the Isma'iliyah 3-man 'Arafat-Mubarak-Husayn summit which was held on 25 March 1989 a few days before the Egyptian president made his trip to Washington at the beginning of this month, carrying with him the Arab position and his concept of the solution.

Prior to Jordanian King Husayn's trip to Washington via Paris, the Palestinian president arrived in Amman from Cairo for a quick visit, accompanied by Usamah al-Baz, the director of President Mubarak's political affairs office. King Husayn was at the airport to receive the president of the state of Palestine in accordance with official protocol. A Palestinian-Jordanian summit was held immediately and was followed by 3-party meetings attended by al-Baz. The Jordanian monarch was acquainted with the outcome of the Palestinian-Jordanian summit and the Egyptian-U.S. summit. Opinions were exchanged on coordinating the position to be carried by King Husayn to Washington which had already heard Egyptian President Husni Mubarak and Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhaq Shamir. The Palestinian side submitted to the Jordanian side its views on the plan for holding elections in the occupied bank and strip, considering that the United States had already welcomed the election idea and had declared its intention to explore the opinions of the PLO and of the Arab countries concerned.

Informed sources in the Jordanian capital say that the king's eagerness to receive the Palestinian leader at the airport with full protocol ceremonies has its political indications, the least of which is not the reaffirmation of Jordan's constancy in dealing with the PLO as the people's sole legitimate representative and, consequently, lending credibility to Jordan's recognition of the State of Palestine, especially since the PLO believes that the proposed confederacy can be achieved [only] between two sovereign states.

The Palestinian leader had also arrived in Cairo on 15 April 1989 for a short visit after an official several-day visit to Baghdad. Iraqi President Saddam Husayn received him at the airport and a 21-gun salute was given in honor of the head of the state of Palestine.

In Cairo, Egyptian President Mubarak acquainted Palestinian President 'Arafat with the outcome of his visit to Washington. Another expanded round of talks was

held in the presence of the two official delegations at a breakfast banquet given by the Egyptian president in honor of his guest. When the plan for election in the occupied territories was discussed, the two sides agreed that this proposal can be implemented under international auspices and after Israel withdraws from these territories.

Upon concluding the official talks, the Palestinian and Egyptian presidents held a press conference in which they reviewed their vision and their conclusions regarding the issues discussed. The Palestinian president said: "Based on our democratic traditions, we fully welcome any elections among the Palestinian people's ranks. But there can be no elections under the occupation's canopy. Let the elections take place after the occupation forces withdraw and under international or UN supervision, as happened in Namibia." The Palestinian president asked: "Why does the U.S. administration use two criteria?"

The Egyptian president said: "We agree to what the PLO agrees to... Ninety nine percent of the objectives of my visit to the United States concerned the Palestinian issue. The objectives of these efforts is to achieve peace." He stressed that achieving peace requires all to cooperate and that Cairo is making efforts to bring the two parties to the Palestinian-Israeli conflict closer to each other.

It is well known that Cairo recently invited notables from the occupied territories, led by Faysal al-Husayni, the head of Jerusalem's Arab Studies Institute, to consult with them and to familiarize them with its opinions on the Israeli prime minister's proposals for holding elections in the occupied bank and strip with the objective of developing on this plan [proposals] an Egyptian position based on the Palestinian position's principles. Sources of the Egyptian Ministry of Foreign Affairs have told FILASTIN AL-THAWRAH's reporter in Cairo that by their meetings with these Palestinian notables and in light of the official Egyptian-Palestinian contacts, Foreign Minister Dr 'Ismat 'Abd-al-Majid and Dr Usamah al-Baz crystallized their broad lines on the Palestinian position toward the Shamir plan.

Notables from the occupied territories told the Egyptian Ministry of Foreign Affairs that Shamir's allegations that he is meeting and coordinating with Palestinian notables from the bank and the strip are untrue and that the broad lines of the Palestinian counter proposals are:

1. Withdrawal of the Israeli forces from the (densely-populated) occupied territories under the supervision of multi-national international forces.
2. Holding the elections under international auspices to elect representatives from the West Bank and Gaza Strip to become PNC members.
3. The Palestinian president will nominate 5 notables from among the elected members to begin negotiations with Israel on the conditions of a 2-year transitional

period that leads to holding an international peace conference. The negotiations are to include the transitional period concerning internal security, trade, final [words presumably dropped], the occupied territories' future and their foreign relations.

These proposals offer a clear and timetabled concept of the election plan and of its objective whereas Shamir's formula lacks clarity and speaks of (nondescript) elections to elect "representatives" of the population in the occupied territories to negotiate with Israel on arrangements for a transitional period to test the possibility of coexistence between the two peoples, provided that talks on the occupied territories' final status be held 3 years after the start of the transitional period.

It goes without saying that finding an alternative representative formula (the self-rule formula according to the Camp David accords) to replace the PLO and extinguishing the intifadah [uprising] are the objectives of Shamir's formula. To make this possible for Shamir, the formula had to be intentionally vague. This [vagueness] in itself helps Shamir and his government to gain time by entering the maelstrom of seeking agreement on the form, means and scheduling of the elections with the hope that the intifadah's intensity will decrease, meaning that the Israeli plan's objective is to push the conditions toward a vicious circle that perpetuates itself.

U.S. Secretary of State James Baker believes that the "elections concept has not developed yet. Several points remain pending, including international supervision, participation by Palestinians outside the occupied territories and the degree of tranquillity that must prevail in the bank and the strip to make these elections possible." Perhaps the most interesting point in the statements Baker made on 14 April 1989 before the Senate in defense of Washington's decision to open dialogue with the PLO is the issue of the participation of Palestinians living abroad in the elections, considering that the other points are well known even though there is no agreement on them between the parties concerned.

It is most likely that Baker meant the PLO in his talk about the participation of Palestinians in exile. But this point will open the doors of controversy on how the West Bank citizens participate in these elections, then how the deported or those who have not been able to return because of security reasons or similar reasons participate. The manner in which the East Jerusalem inhabitants participate will also be one of the most controversial points.

Moreover, the occupied territories' notables hold the view that these elections should be parliamentary elections. This view determines the nature of the elections and offers a formula contrasting Shamir's concept. The Palestinian side believes that the election objective is to complete the occupied territories' representation in the

PNC [Palestine National Council], to reaffirm the people's and PLO's unity and to determine the Palestinian people's legitimate representative. Meanwhile, Washington has not spoken of its vision of the nature of these elections.

Baker has said that the United States "will ask King Husayn to maintain the largest degree of flexibility possible to study this potential and to take advantage of it, if possible." But the Jordanian monarch has repeatedly said in his public statements that the PLO is the only party capable of speaking of the occupied territories' future.

Relying on this, U.S. diplomatic circles expect the Jordanian monarch to carry to the White House the Palestinian view of this plan. Consequently, the Jordanian role may be defined in the light of Washington's balancing of Shamir's proposals with the Palestinian proposals. If it is premature to assess the dimensions of this role, then the coming weeks may clarify the picture gradually.

It is expected that the third round of the U.S.-Palestinian dialogue will be dedicated to discussing this issue, considering that the United States will have developed a clearer opinion on this plan in light of the visits made to the U.S. capital by the leaders of three countries that are parties to the conflict and in light of familiarization of the U.S. administration with the PLO's initial concepts, transmitted to it through Cairo and Amman.

The PLO realizes that the determination of its vision on holding elections in the occupied territories will pull the rug from under Shamir's feet, if this vision is united and pragmatic and if it combines the Palestinian public opinion at home and abroad. This has been done. But the Palestinian vision continues to be in need of Arab support. This has been achieved partially through the trilateral Palestinian-Egyptian-Jordanian coordination (and, consequently, coordination with Iraq and Saudi Arabia). This explains the PLO's active endeavors to convene an ordinary or special Arab summit to crystallize and itemize the 1982 Arab peace plan in light of the developments. It is in this connection that brother Abu 'Ammar visited Morocco and met with King Hassan II who had called for a special Arab summit to unify the position toward the plan Shamir has presented to U.S. President George Bush.

In any case, the most significant guarantee for the triumph of the Palestinian vision of the elections is embodied in continuation of the intifadah, in unity between home and abroad and in strengthening national unity. This is what has been reaffirmed by the bank and strip notables' visits to Cairo and by the outcome of the Central Council's meetings.

Palestinian Strategy, Response to Anti-Intifadah Measures

44040331b Nicosia *FILASTIN AL-THAWRAH* in Arabic 5 Mar 89 pp 22-23

[Article by Sa'adah Sudah: "'Intrinsic' Armed 'Initiatives' While Civil Resistance Activities Continue to Be intifadah's Main Method"]

[Text] The "disappearance" of an Israeli soldier in the Negev has released the broadest military search campaign and the death of another soldier in Nabulus has released the fiercest blockade. Even though the general commander has underlined the intifadah's [uprising] adherence to the "cold weapon," he has warned the enemies against persisting in their killings.

The fourth Israeli soldier to be killed since the comprehensive popular intifadah erupted in the occupied State of Palestine in December 1987 met his end in Nabulus on the 24th of last month when his skull was crushed by a big rock dropped from atop the roof of a home in the city's old quarter. Many may perhaps wonder at the small number of human losses in the Israeli army's ranks after 16 months of "acts of violence, disturbances and riots," according to the Israeli information media's lexicon, especially if this number is compared with the number of Palestinian martyrs felled down by occupation troops' bullets. By the 15th of last January, the number amounted to 322 martyrs in the Israeli official statistics; to 336 martyrs according to a recent U.S. State Department report on "human rights; and to 361 martyrs according to a statistical report compiled by the AFP, relying on Palestinian sources. It must be noted here that all the abovementioned figures are confined to those martyred by bullets only and do not include people martyred as a result of other means used by the Israelis.

The explanation to this phenomenon [of big Palestinian and small Israeli casualties] is nearly axiomatic when we remember that the intifadah's masses have exercised a high degree of self-restraint and that the intifadah has preserved its character as a "civil resistance" despite the ferocity of the Israeli oppression which in the second half of last December reached the limit of instructing all troops to open fire on the intifadah's demonstrators and activists whereas such orders had been previously confined to officers trained specially in this area.

However, the picture is beginning to change somewhat, and the change may be prolonged or brief. Observers interpret this change, embodied in an increasing number of cases of resistance against Israeli troops, as a logical reaction to Israeli war minister Yitzhaq Rabin's plan to tighten the "iron fist" against the intifadah masses. This plan is based essentially on permitting unrestricted killing, in addition to escalating the administrative and security arrests, home demolition and sealing, the premeditated wounding of a large number of Palestinians and other means of brutal suppression.

This Israeli escalation has led to Palestinian developments taking 2 directions:

First, the Palestinian leadership's concentration on reviewing its tendencies not to use firearms within the intifadah's framework against Israeli military targets so as to preserve the intifadah's civilized image. It is worth noting, however, that brother Yasir 'Arafat, the PLO Executive Committee chairman, told the LOS ANGELES TIMES, a U.S. newspaper, on 12 February 1989 that in the light of the increasing number of casualties among the intifadah ranks, he is considering the possibility of cancelling the order not to resort to the use of firearms.

Second, the increasing number of intrinsic initiatives taken by Palestinian citizens to use firearms and explosive charges in few cases and to take up anew the approach of targeting Israeli soldiers for stabbings, an approach which was extensively employed in the 2 years prior to the intifadah and which then declined throughout 16 months only to resurface on the 18th of last February.

The events show that the 2 weeks following this date witnessed several similar operations on which no accurate information is available, except from Israeli sources which impose a near-complete blackout on the intifadah developments. General Benny Michelson, the head of the Israeli Army's history department, acknowledged nearly 2 months ago that unit commanders and officers submit reports to the Chief of Staff Office on just about two thirds the incidents which they witness or in which they participate.

Relying on these sources, one can offer the following details on these operations:

On the 18th of last month, soldier Shlomi Cohen, 21, was stabbed at the entrance of the Jewish Quarter of Old Jerusalem while wandering around with a colleague of his. Five unidentified individuals surrounded him and one of them pulled a knife and stabbed him fatally in the heart. The exhaustive field first-aid attempts made by the doctors to save his life were to no avail.

Initially, the Israeli authorities described Cohen as a civilian. But they later acknowledged that he was a soldier studying at a Talmudic institute while performing his military service.

On the 24th of the same month, another soldier, Benjamin Meisner from a paratroopers unit, was killed when a big rock was dropped on him while he and his patrol members were pursuing teenagers in al-Qasabah Quarter (old quarter) of Nablus. The Israeli sources have not excluded the possibility that the youths dropped the rock to block an alley in the face of the soldiers and not to kill anybody.

On the 27th of last month, a third soldier was stabbed near the green market in central Ramallah. But his condition was not serious, according to an Israeli military source.

The most interesting operation occurred on the 16th of last month when all traces of Avi Sportas, 24, were lost in the Negev area, south Palestine, while he was heading for Ashdod to spend a several-hour vacation. Some of Sportas' personal belongings, including a medal carrying his name and his military boots, which Israeli security experts believe were most probably thrown from a moving vehicle, were later found in (Sedirot) area.

Despite a large-scale search campaign, described as the "biggest of its kind since Israel's foundation," in which several thousand policemen, troops, border guards and green patrols and nearly 5,000 volunteers participated and which was supervised by the security and intelligence agencies, the case continued to be a mystery until REUTERS reported on 28 February 1989 that an unidentified person contacted its office in Palestine's capital and told it that an organization calling itself the Arab Palestinian Army had kidnapped the said soldier and that it would provide a video on Sportas within 24 hours. Shortly thereafter, Radio Israel reported that it had received a similar communication from an unidentified person speaking Hebrew with an Arabic accent who demanded that the occupation authorities release 1,500 Palestinian detainees in return for releasing Sportas who would otherwise be executed. The radio further reported that the caller refused to provide any further information or to answer any questions.

On the 22d of last February, an explosive charge, described by the Israeli authorities as a remotely-controlled small charge, went off in Jerusalem near a passing police vehicle but caused no losses, according to the same sources.

Meanwhile, activities have escalated against the South Lebanon security zone which the Israeli Army controls through the South Lebanon Army, commanded by Antoine Lahd, in the wake of the operation staged by the PFLP [Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine] on 5 February 1989. After that operation, Israel asked the United States to sever its contacts with the PLO, expressing the belief that the said operation "confirms the incredibility of the PLO's renunciation of terrorism." This renunciation is one of the main bases on which Washington relied in launching a "fundamental dialogue" with the PLO. However, the U.S. Administration contented itself at the time with a statement by James Baker, the new secretary of state, which said that operations against civilian or military targets inside or outside Israel cause problems to the United States.

On 23 February 1989, the PFLP announced its responsibility for a clash with elements of the South Lebanon Army near the Lebanese village of Tayr Harfa in the security belt's western sector. On 27 February, the PFLP

said that its elements had ambushed Lahd's forces in Jazzin sector, located in the northernmost part of the said belt. On the same day, the PSF [Popular Struggle Front] and the Syrian Social National Party-Higher Council carried out a similar operation at the (Zummariya) Pass which separates the security zone from the other parts of Lebanon.

Observers refuse to "view" all these operations "equally" and express the belief that there are numerous differences that must be taken into consideration when analyzing the above operations and probing their backgrounds and their dimensions. All this can be summed up in the following:

First, the PLO leadership continues to adhere to the decision it made in the intifadah's initial days to refrain from using firearms and to be content with acknowledged "civil resistance" activities such as strikes, demonstrations, boycotting the occupation administration, stone and molotov-cocktail throwing and so forth. It is evident that the UNC's Palestinian Popular Army and Strike Forces adhere to this decision strictly.

Observers add that this decision must not mean that one should not expect "intrinsic initiatives" which may be taken by Palestinian citizens of the West Bank and Gaza Strip as a result of normal reaction to the boundless oppressive measures taken by the occupation forces and as a result of losses these citizens may suffer. Many a family has had one or more of its children martyred, many a family has had one or more of its children wounded or permanently disabled by soldiers' bullets and many a family has had its home demolished and its livelihood lost and has been left homeless and with no income to live on.

These observers remind that the Israelis themselves, including politicians, military men and experts, such as Meron Benvenisti, have expressed the belief that the wave of stabbings which preceded the intifadah was the result of personal initiatives taken by Palestinians who do not necessarily belong to a specific Palestinian faction.

Second, the activities which Israel has considered infiltration attempts have not—if one disregards the reading of intentions—gone beyond the South Lebanon security belt, as emphasized by the proven facts. The observers remind that the Joint Palestinian-Lebanese Command which was formed prior to the Palestinian leadership's departure from Lebanon nearly 3 months after the Israeli forces' invasion of Lebanon is still in existence, that nobody has proclaimed its abolition officially and that since June 1982, this command's operations have focused on the Israeli forces and the pro-Israeli forces in South Lebanon.

Regardless of this command's fate, brother 'Abdullah al-Hawrani, member of the PLO Executive Committee—who, by the way, is the number two man in the

Palestinian delegation which started the dialogue with the U.S. administration, through Ambassador Robert Pelletreau, at the end of last year in Tunis—said on 25 February 1989 in the wake of Baker's aforementioned statement that the "U.S. statements which cast doubt on the credibility of the PLO's desire for peace will not change the PLO policy, especially its policy on armed struggle."

Analysis aside, brother Faruq al-Qaddumi, the PLO's Political Department chairman, has recently asserted that the PLO is not responsible for such operations and that it is also not prepared to condemn them.

As noted by colleague Hasan al-Batal in this magazine on 19 February 1989, it is evident that "it is extremely difficult for the U.S. Administration and the PLO to agree on a definition of terrorism. There is between the two sides strategic disagreement on the means and the objective."

Thus, putting an end to the bloodbath being perpetrated by the occupation authorities in Nabulus, Ramallah, Gaza, Jerusalem and in the various camps, villages and towns of the occupied State of Palestinian and Israel's abandonment of its political intransigence and obstinacy are the only two means capable of opening another path for venting and overcoming the crisis by transporting it from the arena of brutal suppression and of action and reaction to the international conference table. The position toward this conference, which enjoys the world's unanimous support, excluding Israel's, is the yardstick of the true desire for peace.

Else, political obstinacy and "permitting murder" leave place for one equation only: Blood, which draws more blood. "Self-restraint" must not provide a canopy for more martyrs, wounded and detainees on the Palestinian side.

[Box on Page 23] In Galilee and Golan

On 27 February 1989, Israeli military sources announced: The Israeli Army has recently uncovered a fedayeen cell including 7 persons, most of them residents of the Galilee and Jerusalem, led by Bassam Mahdumi, a journalist from Nazareth. The cell also includes Nabil, Bassam's brother who was released within the framework of the exchange of Palestinian and Israeli prisoners in March 1985.

The sources also named Shaykh Muhammad Abu-Tayr, a Jerusalem area resident, as cell member.

The Israeli police reported that it arrested on 22 February 1989 two Druze youths from Majdal Shams village in the occupied Syrian Golan Heights on the charge of placing a mortar shell on a curve on the road leading to Mount Hermon with the purpose of blowing up an Israeli vehicle.

The sources said that an Israeli driver travelling on the road discovered the shell, stopped his car a few meters from it, pursued one of the youths and managed to seize him and that soon thereafter, police arrived at the site and arrested the second youth.

Election Proposal Assessed

44040423a Jerusalem AL-BAYADIR AL-SIYASI in Arabic 29 Apr 89 pp 25-26

[Article: "'Free' Election Under Occupation's Canopy! 'Arafat: Election Is Balloon Test Aimed at Obstructing Egypt's and Jordan's Efforts To Pave Way for Holding International Conference; Rabin: Good Initiative Which Throws Ball in Palestinian and Arab Court and Offers Something Tangible on How to Move From Current Position"]

[Text] Numerous predictions and great media interest had accompanied Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhaq Shamir's latest visit to Washington "before it started" and then accompanied the outcome of this visit from the moment Shamir announced the proposal for holding elections in the occupied territories until he landed at Ben Gurion Airport upon his return from his visit. These predictions and this great media interest surrounding the "election" idea continue to escalate up to this moment at various levels and will continue to do so until the idea is crystallized practically on the "real ground."

In the first moments after his return from Washington, Shamir said, just before departing Tel Aviv's Ben Gurion Airport: "My proposals can bring us closer to peace and the U.S. administration has accepted their broad lines." It is well known that the elections proposed by Shamir for the occupied territories seek to elect Palestinian representatives with whom the Israeli Government has expressed its readiness to negotiate on a provisional settlement and on self-rule.

Even though Shamir considers the elections "one of the means for moving the negotiations" between the Israeli Government and the occupied territories' inhabitants, Shimon Peres, the deputy prime minister and minister of finance, has asserted that "it will be ultimately impossible to evade dealing with the nature of the permanent settlement when negotiations with the Palestinians begin, and a permanent settlement is tied to the regional issue." Close associates of Shimon Peres have, according to Israel's YEDI'OT AHARONOT, expressed the belief that there is no great possibility of holding an election according to Shamir's presentations.

Lying in Wait

The occupied territories' inhabitants and the PLO leaders have been lying in wait to respond, rejecting the proposal to hold an election according to Shamir's plan. Moreover, U.S. Secretary of State James Baker himself

stated before the latest annual meeting of newspaper editors that elections in the West Bank and Gaza Strip cannot take place without the PLO's approval.

The media in Israel have reported in this regard that a U.S. report received by the Israeli Government recently indicates that the PLO has agreed to a general election in the occupied territories, including Jerusalem, and that PLO and U.S. administration officials are discussing "models" of supervision over this election. Israel's HA'ARETZ has said that the report deals with the contents of the talks between the PLO representatives and Robert Pelletreau, the U.S. ambassador to Tunisia.

The report says that in return for approving the holding of an election, but not an election like the one proposed by Shamir, the PLO has demanded U.S. commitments at the level of a memorandum of understanding to insure a number of conditions, most significantly:

That a general, not municipal, election be held for the entire occupied territories' population, including Jerusalem.

That the PLO role in the final settlement negotiations be secured with a U.S. commitment that as soon as agreement is reached on the transitional phase through negotiation with the occupied territories' representatives, negotiations on the final settlement will begin [immediately] with PLO participation, not according to the Camp David accords' timetable which provides for the final settlement talks to begin at a time no later than 3 years after setting up self-rule.

That the PLO will not undertake to end the intifadah [uprising] in return for Israel's agreement to hold an election.

That the PLO insists on the convocation of an international conference with the participation of the five permanent Security Council members or with the participation of the two superpowers, at least.

It has been reported that the talks between the PLO and the U.S. State Department on this issue are now at their peak.

Ideas and More Ideas

Palestinian sources have been cited as having said 2 weeks ago that there is a Palestinian two-phase plan which the PLO intends to develop with the United States shortly. The "Palestinian plan," considered the PLO's response to Yitzhaq Shamir's plan, speaks of two phases: First, holding an election under U.S. and other supervision and including the winners in a Palestinian government to be formed immediately after the election. In the second phase, negotiations will be held since the PLO agrees to hold preparatory negotiations under the auspices of the two superpowers with the participation of the representatives elected in the election. At the end of

this phase, an international conference, in which the PLO hopes to participate with Israel's approval, will be held. In a related development, informed western press sources have reported recently that a group of Palestinians from the occupied territories have proposed a new idea for holding an election in the area with the aim of breaking the deadlock between Israel and the PLO. The sources have said that the idea, which counters Shamir's proposal for holding an election in the occupied territories under Israeli supervision, was presented to prominent officials of the Egyptian Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The sources have not identified the Palestinians who made the new proposal but said that they are a group of occupied territories' intellectuals who have been promoting the Palestinian proposal which includes three phases:

In the first phase, multi-national forces will oversee withdrawal of the Israeli forces from the population centers in the occupied territories, even though the Israeli forces will maintain a presence in agreed sites.

In the second phase, an election will be held under international supervision to select members to represent the occupied territories in the PNC [Palestine National Council].

In the third phase, Palestinian Chairman Yasir 'Arafat will select 5 of the elected members to negotiate with Israel on the provisions of a two-year transitional period that leads to holding an international peace conference. The negotiations are to deal with internal security, trade and other issues pertaining to the transitional period.

Sa'id Kamal, the PLO representative in Cairo, later denied that the Palestinian delegation had proposed anything, saying: What have been characterized as proposals are tantamount to ideas floated in Tel Aviv by western diplomats. He noted that insofar as the PLO is concerned, any proposal connected with elections in the occupied territories will be presented only through the U.S.-Palestinian dialogue in Tunis.

New Meeting

Palestinian Chairman 'Arafat has said that he is awaiting new proposals from the U.S. administration in the next meeting to be held by PLO representatives with the U.S. ambassador to Tunisia at the end of this month of April. Regarding Shamir's proposal on holding elections in the occupied territories, 'Arafat has said: "This does not at all represent an initiative but rather a test balloon that aims to obstruct Egypt's and Jordan's efforts that seek to pave the way for an international conference on peace in the Middle East."

On their part, well-informed U.S. diplomatic sources have stressed that the next U.S.-Palestinian meeting will deal with the following issues in particular:

What is the PLO's view of Shamir's proposal calling for holding elections in the occupied territories to select Palestinian representatives to negotiate with Israel on the provisional status of these territories and on granting the Palestinians living in these territories expanded autonomy? What are the PLO's conditions and proposals for holding these elections?

Does the PLO agree to holding these elections under the supervision of UN observers?

Who are the Palestinians who must participate in these elections? How does the PLO envision the participation of Palestinians currently living outside the occupied territories in these elections?

What is the PLO's view and opinion on concluding a temporary and phased agreement in the occupied territories?

What are the steps that must be taken by the PLO and Israel to pacify the security conditions and to lessen the intensity of the confrontations between the Palestinians and Israelis in the occupied territories?

Egypt, whose peace efforts Israel has been particularly trying to foil by virtue of Egypt's major weight and role, recently reaffirmed its charge that the Israeli Government has not offered anything new that contributes to the process of establishing peace in the Middle East region and that proves this government's response to the positive developments that have occurred in the PLO's positions.

Inadequate Vision

Cairo's widely-circulated AL-AHRAM asserted in a recent commentary that the official Israeli vision of the sound solution to the Palestinian problem is still very inadequate, especially when measured against the Palestinian side's movement. The paper said that this issue requires a real intellectual "coup" on Tel Aviv's part to match the Palestinian "coup" in its courageous dealing with and approach to the crux of the historical reconciliation.

Thus, the paper believes that acknowledging the facts is so difficult for Israel's rulers that they cannot take it in one dose. Perhaps they prefer to take it in small doses. The Israeli logic begins from the farthest point possible in dealing with the Palestinian issue and it uses procrastination, delay and maneuvering as a basis so as to lengthen the distance that has to be covered for rapprochement and meeting in order to make the biggest gains possible or until Israel gets better negotiating chances.

AL-AHRAM said that even though the Palestinians are loyal to the PLO, the Israeli Government has refused to recognize the PLO or any PLO custodianship over the occupied territories. Despite this, Israel's rulers recently

acknowledged that it is possible to deal with Palestinian representatives produced by elections in the bank and the strip even if they are PLO supporters. This is another step with which Israel puts distance between itself and its initial positions. Moreover, this Israeli position confirms that Israel is moving very slowly or is, at least, making vibrations that have not yet brought it close enough to the crux of the issue in order to inspire real hope.

In an interview with AL-MUSAWWAR, published on 13 April 1989, Faysal al-Husayni, the director of Jerusalem's Arab Studies Association, rejected anew the holding of elections in the occupied territories, even if held under international supervision:

"It is the first time a people is asked to elect its representatives while straining under the yoke of occupation." Al-Husayni emphasized that the PLO is the only party eligible to select the representatives to negotiate in the Palestinians' name. He viewed Israeli Prime Minister Shamir's proposals on holding such elections as seeking to "plant division between the Palestinians at home and abroad." Al-Husayni characterized Shamir's proposals as a "time-bomb" and accused Shamir of seeking to deny the Palestinian people's existence. On this basis, Shamir tries to hold separate dialogue with the occupied territories' inhabitants. Al-Husayni pointed out that from this perspective, Palestinians outside the occupied territories are considered refugees who must be assimilated into the Arab countries that host them.

Rabin and Elections

The fact is that Israeli Defense Minister Rabin was several months ahead of Israeli Prime Minister Shamir in proposing elections in the occupied territories. His proposal came at the peak of the public criticism directed at his policy in the occupied territories. Rabin said at the time that his plan was not binding to the government because it represented a personal idea. He said that if a period of tranquillity ranging from 3-6 months prevailed, he would act to hold elections to select Palestinian representatives to engage in talks between Israel and the occupied territories' population with the aim of reaching a permanent settlement.

Shamir rejected Rabin's plan. The controversy among the Israelis focused on the necessity and rationality of the "idea of holding elections in the occupied territories, totally disregarding the two main parties concerned with the issue." Today, it can be said that it is difficult to know the kind of elections Shamir and Rabin seek from the statements they make. But there is one clear thing, namely that both Rabin and Shamir seek to outflank the difficulties they are facing through these elections, if the elections are actually held.

However, 16 April 1989 was the first time that an election plan for the occupied territories was officially presented to the Israeli Council of Ministers—with consideration of the fact that it was proposed by Shamir who

was able, during his latest visit to Washington, to get the new U.S. administration's blessing and approval for his plan. While submitting his proposal, Shamir was fully confident that the overwhelming majority of the Israeli Government members support him and support the proposals he had presented to Washington.

The only thing Shamir sought from his visit to Washington was reconciliation with the U.S. public opinion and administration, and he did accomplish this to a degree. So, if we consider the matter profoundly we conclude that Shamir, who submitted a number of proposals to the U.S. administration, was able to depart the United States without making any real commitment to it. Shamir wanted to gain time and it seems that his wish has been granted. However, his proposals may lead him, despite himself, to a far-reaching path. Having undertaken the elections, Shamir is obliged to clarify the powers and status of the elected body.

Now that the Israeli Government has supported Shamir's plan for elections in the occupied territories and has begun to draw up the detailed steps toward this end through a ministerial committee, we say that the single Palestinian voice made its advance decision to reject the elections since they were announced by Rabin here and later by Shamir during his visit to Washington. This rejection is not for the sake of rejection. Those who shoulder the strong, clear and gigantic peace offensive cannot allow their will to be a toy under the occupation's shadow.

Though U.S. President Bush has characterized elections in the occupied territories as a "small step" forward and though Israeli Defense Minister Rabin has said that they are a "good initiative" and that they throw the ball in the Palestinian and Arab court, because, as he put it, they "offer something tangible on how to move from the current position," there are those who stress that conditional Palestinian acceptance of the elections has kept the ball in Israel's court, especially since those who had wagered on an "immediate" PLO rejection of the elections without any justification or explanation of the reasons have been disappointed. Our people have accepted the elections and the entire world understands our conditions for holding them because there is no logic that can claim that it is possible to hold free or democratic elections under the occupation's shadow, considering that occupation itself is fully antithetical to freedom and democracy. Therefore, the elections, if they are held, will certainly not be according to the specifications or within the framework designed for them by Israel's prime minister or his defense minister. Could Israel have thus put itself in a new predicament?

Faysal Al-Husayni Interviewed on Election Proposals

44040422b Nicosia *FILASTIN AL-THAWRAH* in Arabic 23 Apr 89 pp 19-21

[Interview With Palestinian Leader Faysal al-Husayni by Mujahid Sharab, Presumably in Cairo; Date not Given; "Faysal al-Husayni: We Want Elections, But not on Shamir's Terms; Third Year of Intifadah Is Decisive"]

[Text] With Struggler Faysal al-Husayni, one feels that the homeland and the people in the homeland are a

symbol on high. Nobody disputes the Palestinian heart's strength (in every geographic, human and struggle sense). If Faysal al-Husayni is the most prominent "field leader," then the talk about the victory generation is not talk of hope but talk of the capability of the Palestinian action and intellect to put words in their place, and action in its place, and then to combine both.

With the final question and final answer, one becomes certain that the Palestinian fabric consists of Palestine, its people and the PLO.

[FILASTIN AL-THAWRAH] Why are you in Cairo?

[Al-Husayni] I have come for two reasons: First, to clarify the Palestinian position at home after Israel's attempts to distort some stances and to imply that it is holding negotiations with the Palestinian leaderships there and that there is an approving nod for the creation of an alternative Palestinian leadership. I am trying to refute these insinuations and to eliminate any ambiguity engulfing them. Fortunately, I have found that the Egyptian leadership's vision in this regard is clear and that this leadership has no ambiguity on the issue.

The second reason is to fulfill a personal yearning for Egypt in which I lived more than 18 years.

[FILASTIN AL-THAWRAH] Your meeting with Dr 'Isamat 'Abd-al-Majid was your first meeting with an Arab official on Arab soil. What is your impression of the meeting?

[Al-Husayni] The meeting was good and fruitful. We reviewed in it the region's general situation, the new U.S. position and the Shamir plan which we have seen as an attempt to obstruct the peace process. We also dealt with the conditions at home and with Egypt's role in moving the peace process forward. We hope that it will be a positive role and that Egypt will assume its place anew in the effective Arab force to achieve the Arab and Palestinian aspirations.

[FILASTIN AL-THAWRAH] Shamir speaks of "new ideas" which he thinks meet the minimum limit of the Palestinian demands or are a good basis for moving toward a political solution acceptable at the Palestinian and Arab levels. Do you think that these ideas are beneficial?

[Al-Husayni] What Shamir has offered so far continues to revolve in the same circle that has been rejected at the Palestinian level for a long time.

It is true that Shamir has moved in one form or another from one rejected position to another rejected position. However, it is "movement."

Shamir used to characterize Camp David as a "crime against the Jewish people." He is now moving to adopt the Camp David ideas.

[FILASTIN AL-THAWRAH] Rather, he is the sole defender of these ideas, followed by Arens, his foreign minister. He demands that the signatories to Camp David fulfill their commitments and support his proposals.

[Al-Husayni] This is true. His proposals are definitely rejected. However, this indicates the presence of movement on the part of the other side even though this movement has not so far offered something acceptable or fit as a basis for discussion.

[FILASTIN AL-THAWRAH] Shamir has again presented in Washington old ideas which he has termed a "new peace plan" and which call for holding elections to select representatives to negotiate with the Israelis on achieving "self-rule" on the basis of Camp David, of course. What is your assessment of this plan?

[Al-Husayni] They are old ideas which we rejected in the past and which the international community has begun to reject. But Shamir is characterized by a rigid and petrified mentality rooted in a very old era. It seems that he has discovered the Camp David issue now and has begun to offer it. As you see, he is offering "something dead" and hoping to revive it. The dead cannot be revived.

[FILASTIN AL-THAWRAH] You previously defined correct conditions for the elections, such as PLO approval of the elections, international supervision, steering clear off Camp David and holding free and democratic elections, and the Israelis are now reiterating this call. What, in your opinion, are the conditions under which the elections can be accepted?

[Al-Husayni] The fact is that the conditions are the same, but with greater clarity and definition. For example, when we say "free and democratic," we mean what we say. Therefore, I cannot imagine freedom and democracy under the occupation. We are interested not only in free and impartial elections but also in what follows the elections. Assuming that we agree to the election of a group, as they say, that participates in the negotiations and assuming that such a group is elected in impartial elections and then begins to negotiate and that during the negotiations Israel arrests or deports groups of Palestinians, not necessarily from among the negotiators and not necessarily from among their supporters but perhaps from among their rivals, what would the Palestinian negotiator's position then be? How can he carry on with the negotiations when the people he represents are exposed to persecution? The fact is that this negotiator's position will then be very miserable and he will be compelled to halt the negotiations.

Negotiations or elections must be a mandate from the voters to the elected to manage the voters' life, to get a position through which the elected can offer a practical and real service and can protect his voters, not just negotiate.

Therefore, we see no advantage in elections held under the occupation's canopy. We support elections and we want them. But we reject the conditions and circumstances engulfing these elections as spelled out by Shamir and others.

[FILASTIN AL-THAWRAH] For the sake of the argument, let us assume that the elections are held in accordance with the Palestinian conditions, that you are a winner in the elections and that the PLO appoints you a minister in the provisional government, then what would be the fate of the slogan [maqulah] of rejecting negotiation with the PLO which is raised by Shamir, Rabin and Peres. What will you tell them then?

[Al-Husayni] Neither Shamir nor others are entitled to choose those they will negotiate with. They are only entitled to select those who represent them in the negotiations. As for the Palestinian side, it, not Shamir or others, is the only party that can select and determine its negotiators.

[FILASTIN AL-THAWRAH] Prior to his visit to the United States, Shamir alleged that he had held talks with important Palestinian notables "who enjoy the required representative capacity." When asked about a statement by Peres implying that Israel is negotiating with the PLO directly or indirectly, Shamir declined to comment. What is your interpretation of this?

[Al-Husayni] The fact is that Shamir has nothing with which to comment on these issues. To date, he has had no contact whatsoever with any Palestinian circle. As you are aware, the intifadah's [uprising's] Unified National Leadership has requested that the Palestinian-Israeli meetings be confined at present to the peace forces at least until Shamir returns from the United States so that he may not try to use such meetings for propaganda purposes. There have been certain contacts between the Israelis and the Palestinians for the purpose of exposing Shamir's position.

Shamir is required to state explicitly whom he has met with and who are the leaderships or notables who have met with him because we believe that all that Shamir is saying about meeting with Palestinian leaderships or notables is a mere throwing of dust in the eyes, is untrue and has never happened.

Now that the dialogues are defined, the Israeli side is being exposed. We can ask them: Whom have you contacted and with whom have you met? We are confident that they will find no answer to this question.

[FILASTIN AL-THAWRAH] How do the Palestinian people at home confront the Israeli attempts to create an alternative leadership?

[Al-Husayni] The Palestinian people foiled in the past, are foiling now and will foil in the future all such attempts through, fundamentally, their rejection of this logic and their refusal to enter into talks or negotiations with the Israelis.

We at home are prepared to present and explain the Palestinian position to whomever wants to listen. But we reject to be a party in any form in any negotiations because the sole negotiator [party] who can select and empower his negotiators is the PLO.

[FILASTIN AL-THAWRAH] Shamir rejects increasing Israeli calls, such as the calls in the Yaffo Institute report and the military intelligence's latest report, urging him to negotiate with the PLO. What, in your opinion, are the effective means to pressure Shamir and the Israeli Government to negotiate with the PLO and participate in the peace process?

[Al-Husayni] First, our fundamental role is greater national unity, greater adherence to the struggle line currently followed by the intifadah and to the Palestinian political line and greater political support for the Palestinian peace plan—support in a clear manner and with absolutely no retreat from the plan. Then comes the supporting and assisting Arab role, followed by the U.S. and European role which is required to put more pressure on Israel, and it has the political and economic means to do so.

As for the Israeli scene and for the calls for recognizing the PLO and beginning dialogue with it, there is no doubt that the Palestinian peace plan, continuing the dialogue with the Israeli political forces and carrying on with presenting the Palestinian position and explaining it to these forces will lead to more pressure on Shamir and his allies. Ultimately, we are waging a three-front battle: The Palestinian front through the intifadah, the Arab and international front through concerted political action abroad, and the Israeli front by influencing the Israeli scene through the intifadah's pressure on the one hand and, [on the other hand], through raising the dialogue to the level that can push these Israeli elements to move from the position of audience, or theoretical protesters, to the position of influence and action on the Israeli scene against the occupation's practices.

[FILASTIN AL-THAWRAH] So you believe that the Palestinian dialogue with the Israeli peace camp, whether at home or abroad, is tantamount to a necessary preparation for creating a fundamental change in the official Israeli position?

[Al-Husayni] Definitely, yes.

[FILASTIN AL-THAWRAH] How positive are this camp's peace presentations?

[Al-Husayni] These presentations started long ago and they have been growing more positive and moving closer to the Palestinian positions throughout this period. Several more meetings are supposed to be held with elements of the Israeli Labor Party's internal opposition and with some peace supporters. The Israelis are supposed to offer a new vision of how we can push the Israeli Government to negotiate with the PLO.

[FILASTIN AL-THAWRAH] The Palestinians view the intifadah as their weapon against the occupation and as their most important element of strength when entering into any political negotiations, whether direct or through an international conference. What will the intifadah's position be in both cases?

[Al-Husayni] The intifadah will continue and by the end of the year, it will face a violent battle from the Israelis, from Shamir's government. They will try to suppress this intifadah. But we are confident of our people's ability to stand fast and to confront this suppression. Ultimately, Shamir will find himself facing one of two positions: Either respond to the Palestinian demands or let the government fall. In this [latter] case, they will be compelled to head for new elections.

[FILASTIN AL-THAWRAH] At the propaganda level, the Israelis try to separate the intifadah's underground field leadership from the PLO. What, in your opinion, are the dimensions of the relationship between the two?

[Al-Husayni] This [separation] is an Israeli illusion that is absolutely nonexistent. The Palestinian people reject this logic totally. Our relationship is the relationship of a single body. As you have noted, it is a relationship between a field leadership and a general leadership. Insofar as tactical and field affairs are concerned, the decisions are made in the field by the Unified National Leadership at home. As for the strategic decisions, they are made by the general national leadership. There is also the controversial [as published] relationship existing between the field leadership and the general leadership. In view of this, all the decisions are, God be thanked, made properly and support both the local battle and the general battle.

[FILASTIN AL-THAWRAH] In addition to its struggle dimension, the intifadah creates new concepts and new practices at the social and economic levels. Can you tell us about this aspect?

[Al-Husayni] The intifadah's most significant distinguishing features are its ability to confront and respond to the challenges and to innovate a solution to all the problems that the occupation tries to create for us.

These are the intifadah's most significant distinguishing features.

The second aspect is that this intifadah rose, continues and will continue on the principle of national unity and the principle of collective solidarity among the people's members. This is what gives us the ability to carry on and to score successive victories. The intifadah is currently waging a battle not only against the occupation forces and institutions but also to build and create institutions to replace the occupation institutions. This battle goes on and is achieving major successes in certain areas and medium or small successes in other areas. But we are fully confident that we will ultimately succeed in accomplishing this. We will soon witness the collapse of the occupation institutions and the rise of Palestinian national institutions capable of offering the alternative and able to liquidate the occupation finally.

[FILASTIN AL-THAWRAH] What is the difference between the feelings of our kinsmen now that the intifadah is entering its 17th month and their feelings in the intifadah's initial days?

[Al-Husayni] Initially, there was a feeling of wrath and a tendency to vent off this wrath. Now the feeling is that we are making accomplishments and approaching the objective and that we must carry on with our struggle and must not back down because the path we have chosen is a correct, sound and good path that leads us to our objective.

[FILASTIN AL-THAWRAH] What is your assessment of the Palestinian-U.S. dialogue in light of the dialogue's second round?

[Al-Husayni] I believe that this dialogue must continue to move to raise its level, whether in terms of the issues raised or in terms of the quality and status of the figures participating in it. We hope that this dialogue's level will rise because this will certainly lead to a greater U.S. recognition of the Palestinian role. I believe that our cause is so just that it will compel the United States to adopt our position, the Palestinian position, because it is the fairest and soundest position. All this must certainly be (built) on the intifadah's continuation and momentum and on its moving ceaselessly, as it is moving at present.

[FILASTIN AL-THAWRAH] How do you view electing brother Yasir 'Arafat as head of the state of Palestine?

[Al-Husayni] It is normal that proclamation of the state of Palestine should be followed by steps that reaffirm this proclamation and that bring the picture as close as possible to the image of the complete state of Palestine. A step such as proclaiming the head of state has become strongly required at all levels, even at the protocol level because there are invitations for meetings with the heads of other states. These meetings must be held at the same level of representative strength. This is why electing brother Abu 'Ammar is anticipated, expected and also required by the Palestinian people.

[FILASTIN AL-THAWRAH] Do you plan to meet brother Yasir 'Arafat, the head of the state of Palestine, and other Palestinian leaderships and to visit some Arab capitals or is your itinerary confined to visiting Egypt and then returning to the homeland?

[Al-Husayni] From Cairo to the homeland (with a smile of pride and joy). This question should not be asked now (and he then had a long laugh).

[FILASTIN AL-THAWRAH] How were you received at the detention camp the moment independence and establishment of the state of Palestine were proclaimed, especially since you participated in formulating the (first) Palestinian draft independence charter?

[Al-Husayni] Like any Palestinian citizen, I was joyous and felt that our people were making an accomplishment, especially since brother Abu 'Ammar's proclamation of the state of Palestine was made at the PNC [Palestine National Council] session which strengthened the Palestinian people's unity and which adopted this historic resolution that has made every Palestinian citizen feel that the intifadah's struggle, based on previous struggles waged by the entire Palestinian people, has begun to bear fruit and that this mighty political step, i.e. proclamation of the state of Palestine, is one of the fruits.

As for the independence charter, I, like any other Palestinian, have participated in the struggle for the idea of Palestinian independence. Regarding the charter itself, the fact is that I participated in reading it and that it was found in my possession while I was reading it (he pauses). I cannot bestow upon myself the honor of taking part in drafting it.

[FILASTIN AL-THAWRAH] In conclusion, what message will you address to your people's sons abroad through the PLO central magazine?

[Al-Husayni] The intifadah rose, continued and is continuing by virtue of the national unity. We hope that our brothers abroad are bent on this unity because it is our treasure and it is the means with which we can defeat the enemy. This is the first appeal.

The second appeal: Our people at home are steadfast and firm. They cannot be deceived in any way by any Israeli steps. They cannot accept an alternative leadership or negotiations with the Israelis, unless through the PLO, the Palestinian people's sole legitimate representative. Palestinians abroad must not buy the Israeli goods that allege from time to time that there are "contacts," that "there are negotiations" or that there are "possibilities of creating alternative leaderships." These words are untrue. These are damaged Israeli goods that nobody should buy because whoever buys these damaged goods will suffer damage before anybody else.

[FILASTIN AL-THAWRAH] Thanks, brother Faysal, and we hope for another meeting with you in Jerusalem.

[Al-Husayni] You are welcome, brother, and thanks to FILASTIN AL-THAWRAH.

Faysal Al-Husayni Responds to Election Proposal
44040423h Jerusalem AL-BAYADIR AL-SIYASI in Arabic 29 Apr 89 pp 29-30

[Interview With Palestinian Leader Faysal al-Husayni by Tal'at Rumayh in Cairo; Date not Given; "AL-BAYADIR Interviews Faysal al-Husayni in Cairo; These Are Our Conditions for Holding Election; Every Palestinian Is Happy With 'Arafat's Election as Head of State of Palestine"]

[Text] In Egypt, we followed his imprisonment, his release from jail and his trip to Britain and the United States. When he landed in Cairo, where he had lived for 18 years previously, we had to interview him to learn from him the issue's latest developments and the outcome of his European and U.S. tour and to find out from him the outcome and reasons of his visit to Cairo and how he assesses the Israeli and U.S. plans and projects presented in the arena.

Here is Faysal al-Husayni answering us with his tranquility and his foresight to convey to everybody abroad and at home the message he had come out to dictate.

The conversation is like an ocean, calm at times and often stormy. Why not, considering that we are dealing with the most complex issue known to the world, the Palestinian people's issue.

Here is the text of the interview with al-Husayni:

British, U.S. Visit

The visit to Britain and the United States was the object of the first question.

Al-Husayni said: The visit was for clarifying and reaffirming the Palestinian position at home, for warning these countries, for expounding the position of our masses who reject any steps [as published], and for eliminating any ambiguity engulfing the internal Palestinian position on this issue as a result of the methods employed by the Israeli and U.S. media at a certain time. The visit was also for the purpose of warning these countries against falling into the Israeli propaganda snare.

During the tour, I met with elected officials, such as the parliament or the senate, with some research and study institutes, with press establishments and, of course, with the Palestinian and Jewish communities. All the meetings were for the purpose of clarifying the same issue.

From the developments of the tour, I can say that it has accomplished its objectives well and at all three levels.

Why Cairo?

As for Cairo, Faysal al-Husayni added that the visit was for reaffirming the same issues, which are now clearer in Cairo, of course. I have made contacts with numerous official and popular circles.

The purpose of these concerted contacts in Cairo was to learn more details of the current situation. I met with Dr 'Ismat 'Abd-al-Majid, Egypt's foreign minister and deputy prime minister, and with numerous ministry officials afterwards.

My dialogues with them focused on greater details of the outcome of President Mubarak's visit to the United States and on the new U.S. projection following Shamir's presentation of his alleged election plan.

We reviewed the developments in the area during these talks.

Contacts were also made with a number of popular leaders and with all the Egyptian information media. During the contacts, numerous current questions, especially on Shamir's election plan, were answered. Numerous issues which were not clear in the period preceding my arrival and following my release have been clarified.

There is another reason, a private reason, for my visit to Cairo, namely that I had lived in Cairo for 18 years and I suffer from a special nostalgia for Egypt.

The United States and the Intifadah

[AL-BAYADIR AL-SIYASI] You went to the United States (in your capacity as one of those who live with the intifadah [uprising] at home). How do the Americans view the intifadah now?

[Al-Husayni] Smiling, he said diplomatically and adroitly: This was my first visit to the United States. I had never visited it before.

But those who had visited it before say that there is a clear change in the U.S. public opinion which has begun to comprehend the issue better. The absolute support for Israel has begun to be shaken and to be replaced by support for the Palestinian issue also. More criticism of the Israeli positions has begun to surface.

This was obvious not only in my private meetings with U.S. notables but also in what the press publishes and in the comments made, whether by Americans or even by the U.S. Jewish community.

There is a change in the public opinion's ranks. At the official level, a new movement was launched by the U.S. administration by opening a dialogue with the PLO. This movement has shown in the clear [U.S.] signal on the need to end the occupation and to give the Palestinian people their political rights, and in the allusion in one

form or another to the international conference. All these are important developments, especially since they have all been mentioned in a single statement. But there is no illusion that the U.S. administration will change its position finally. The battle goes on and the Israelis are trying to fully regain their past influence. This is a battle we have to wage. The arena there is a very tranquil arena.

What About Mubarak's U.S. Visit?

The truth is that there is nothing new to [add to] what has been published. The most significant part of my dialogues with Egyptian officials concerned the climate and the feelings that indicate the presence of a change in the U.S. position, and that stress the need to pursue this change.

During these meetings, it was noted that a vision was developed on the need to focus on political action and it was emphasized that greater Arab solidarity can greatly influence the U.S. position.

Egyptian Role Is Severely Needed

[AL-BAYADIR AL-SIYASI] On the occasion of talking of Arab solidarity, political observers note that despite the developments occurring in this area, Arab capabilities are being nearly squandered, and that this squandering is still very great. Has something new been done in this regard?

[Al-Husayni] It is obvious that there is currently a tendency toward regional Arab cooperation in this phase. This tendency was recently crowned with the four-state cooperation council between Iraq, Egypt, Yemen and Jordan. This council is a step on the path toward political and economic cooperation in this region. There is now talk of and efforts for holding an Arab summit. This would be a step in the direction of putting the Arab house in order from within. We feel that Egypt is now moving more actively than before to resume its role in this region's conflict.

We hope that Egypt will succeed in this and will take its place in comprehensive Arab action.

Egypt's role is a major role and we need this role. We cannot but express our happiness and joy with Egypt's return to resume its major role.

What Is New Is in Shamir Himself

[AL-BAYADIR AL-SIYASI] Mr Faysal, Shamir has offered what he calls a new plan which is based on holding elections and so forth. What is your assessment of this step?

[Al-Husayni] To date, I see in what Shamir has offered nothing more than what was previously offered by Camp David and self-rule, except for the presence of Shamir himself. Shamir used to view all that he is advocating now as impossible and rejected. Now, he is adopting it.

To this moment, Shamir has not taken any step to meet the Palestinian demands and he is still far from meeting the Palestinian conditions.

They Will Not Succeed; They Are Merely Maneuvering

(He added) But the question is: Why elections? And what after the elections? So far, these issues are unclear even though they are more important than the elections themselves.

How can an individual elected by the Palestinian people perform his real role when he is under occupation? This is the biggest and most important question.

The fact is that they are talking of elections to (ease the pressure) on them from the West—considering that they are a democratic country and considering that democracy and the election process are sacred in the West.

To be able to end the Israeli attempts to create confusion and ambiguity in the region, we declare that the issue is not one of rejecting elections in principle. We, as Palestinian people, support elections. All our institutions, whether professional, labor, women's, student or other institutions, are founded on the principle of election.

The problem is in the conditions that must exist in the election process. We reject the conditions that make the election take place within the framework of implementing the Camp David steps and self-rule which we have already rejected.

All these points must be made decisively clear when we turn to European and U.S. public opinion. We are not against elections in principle but against elections under these conditions. Let whoever wishes to speak of elections speak of something clear.

He [who wishes to speak of elections] must also define the elections' relationship with the citizen and the land. Will the elected control the land, will they come just to manage municipal affairs or will they come to manage the land? Will this be the end of the line or will it be part of a comprehensive plan with a well-known end?

These are questions that must be asked and for which adequate answers must be given. Then our answer to the election issue will be very clear.

Abu 'Ammar as Head of State of Palestine

[AL-BAYADIR AL-SIYASI] "Abu 'Ammar for head of State of Palestine." In your capacity as a citizen from within, what is your comment on this election?

[Al-Husayni] He said as if completing an answer to a question asked tens of times: After the step proclaiming the state, all other steps must be taken to bring the state to its complete ordinary form, including the establishment of institutions and the modification of numerous laws.

One of the important things in this regard is, of course, the election of a head for the state, especially since numerous countries have recognized the state of Palestine and since numerous heads of state have begun to address invitations to the head of the state of Palestine. Ultimately, we were completing the protocol form of the state.

Every Palestinian is happy with the election of Yasir 'Arafat for head of the state of Palestine as a crowning of numerous struggles that have been waged for this day.

Our Conditions for Accepting Elections

[AL-BAYADIR AL-SIYASI] But what are the conditions that you view for holding elections in the occupied territories?

[Al-Husayni] Free and democratic elections that are not tied to Camp David or to self-rule, that do not pose an obstacle to establishing the Palestinian state, that are held under international supervision and that are approved by the PLO because it is the party that sets the conditions and that knows perfectly well what we mean by freedom and democracy in particular. The PLO is the party that will determine the form of international supervision, will define the objectives of these elections and will determine how we guarantee that the elections will not be just a step toward implementing self-rule or Camp David.

Disputes Emerge Within ANO Over Future Direction

44040418 Jerusalem AL-BAYADIR AL-SIYASI in Arabic 6 May 89 p 18

[Article: "Different Points of View on Course of Action Emerge in Number of Radical Factions as a Result of Political Activities; Abu Nidal's Movement at Crossroads: It Can Either Bide Its Time and Conform, or Go Back to Its Former Activity"]

[Text] Palestinian factions, which now and for years have been outside the PLO, have been affected by recent political activities. They have been affected by PNC [Palestine National Council] resolutions, by the resolutions that followed the PNC resolutions, by the start of the American-Palestinian dialogue, and by the numerous suggestions which are lately being formulated to find a solution to the Middle East question. Abu Nidal's Organization [ANO] is the most important of these factions. Also known as "Fatah, the Revolutionary Council," the ANO is the faction to which numerous terrorist activities on the international scene have been attributed.

The ANO was recently expelled from Syria. At that time, approximately 1 year ago, Abu Nidal was asked to go to Lebanon or any other country. This request was made after the United States temporarily crossed out Syria's name from the list of countries that support terrorism. The ANO's expulsion from Syria came in the context of talks between America and Syria about the future of Lebanon and the efforts that were being made to effect the release of foreign hostages who are still being held by Lebanese parties in Lebanon.

The latest information about Abu Nidal is that he went to Lebanon after leaving Syria. Now he travels between Tehran and West Tripoli. Last February the ANO's Revolutionary Council held a general conference in Tehran during the latter part of the month at which several issues were discussed and considered. The most important of these issues dealt with whether the ANO was to return to the PLO or maintain an opposing posture. Two prominent tendencies emerged.

The first supported returning to the PLO and adhering to the PNC resolutions.

The second tendency opposed that approach and asked that "operations" and other activities be stepped up "to thwart the conspiracies which," according to that tendency's leaders, "were being devised against the Palestinian cause."

At first, Sabri al-Banna, the group's leader, also known as Abu Nidal, was inclined to return to the PLO. He had met with the late Abu Jihad in Algeria approximately 2 years ago and had promised him then that he would adhere to PNC resolutions. Abu Jihad had then given Abu Nidal 1 year to act on his intentions and to stop the group's activities on the international scene. Two years ago Abu Nidal issued an important statement to an Arabic magazine, which is published in Europe, in which he affirmed that he himself opposed "terrorism" and that he was only defending himself. Citizens took this statement as a good sign, and they felt that in time the ANO would adhere to PNC [Palestinian National Council] resolutions and national unity between all groups and factions would be strengthened.

Abu Jihad then died on 16 April 1988, and diplomatic activities were stepped up following the incidents on the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. A meeting for the PNC was held in Algeria, but the ANO was not invited to attend and did not express its wish to participate in this important emergency meeting.

That is why Abu Nidal started thinking about going back to the old methods. He started supporting the first tendency which thinks that assassinations and other actions are necessary to stop the movement toward "capitulation." In this approach Abu Nidal was supported by 'Atif Hanun and 'Imad Milhis. Abu Nidal's point of view and that of his supporters is as follows:

Because staying out of the picture could weaken this faction and could nullify its existence and its effects, it has to prove itself to others. This is especially important since the Popular Front Movement, the General Command, which is led by Ahmad Jibril, has been standing out recently. It has become the subject of worldwide attention, and its activities are being watched. Syria has been supporting this group even though recently it has not been supporting any "terrorist" action which could implicate it in political problems it can do without. This is because Syria has numerous problems at the present time.

The tendency which opposes such activities in Abu Nidal's Revolutionary Council is led by 'Abd-al-Rahman 'Isa and Mustafa Murad. They did not attend the meeting. Mr 'Isa and Mr Murad advocate that the ANO wait a little. They think it is necessary that the faction's relationship with Syria be strengthened, and they think that no action should be taken even though the faction does not wish to return now to the PLO. Members of this tendency say that carrying out any action now would undermine the cause at the present time and would hurt Palestinian citizens on the West Bank and in the Gaza Strip. Because any action now would turn the world's attention away from the uprising, it would hurt the people's intifadah [uprising]. Any such operation would be used by numerous parties to refute the Palestinian people's accomplishments in Palestine. Such operations would further alienate Syria from this faction and, consequently, create difficulties for the ANO in Lebanon because Syria, which has a strong military presence in Lebanon, might use its military to act against the ANO's presence in Lebanon. Although Syria has taken no such action yet, it may decide to use its military at the request of numerous countries. Syria may use its military against the ANO if it is pressed to do so by various parties. So far, however, Syria is allowing the ANO the same freedom of action it is allowing any other faction which is loyal to Syria.

The Revolutionary Council of Abu Nidal's movement did not reach any decision concerning these matters, but its chairman, Abu Nidal, was authorized to evaluate matters in consultation with others before any action is taken in the future on the international scene and on the Palestinian scene as well. The ANO's Revolutionary Council affirmed that it was necessary to strengthen and reinforce the faction's relationship with Iran, particularly since Iran is supporting the ANO. Iran is guaranteeing the ANO's freedom of action, and it is also financing it.

It remains to be said that the Revolutionary Council also decided to monitor political activities continuously. The council will watch political activities closely and evaluate them carefully before making any difficult decision which may have major negative or positive consequences.

It is thus possible to conclude that current political activities are affecting the hard-line factions. The failure of any of these activities could have grave consequences and could eventually lead to a return of the radical and hard-line approach. Failure can also lead to the growth of the hard-liners' tendency.

Popular Army Proclamation Issued in West Bank, Gaza

44040412 Nicosia AL-NASR in Arabic 15 Apr 89 p 11

[Article: "Circular From Popular Army Command in Occupied State of Palestine"]

[Text] The Popular Army Command in the occupied state of Palestine has issued the following circular which has been distributed in the various towns, villages and refugee camps of the West Bank and Gaza Strip:

To our loyal heroes who are operating in the valiant popular army's units:

Our Palestinian struggle against the presence of the hateful Zionist occupation on our sacred Palestinian soil, a struggle aimed at wresting freedom and independence and at establishing the independent Palestinian state, with the illustrious Jerusalem as its capital, is escalating day after day.

Our great Palestinian struggle continues and escalates, relying on two fundamental mainstays which are now forming a stifling blockade against the enemy, which are harassing his ranks and which are strongly and equally shaking the mainstays of its internal and external existence.

The first fundamental mainstay is embodied in the continued escalation of the heroic intifadah [uprising] which is being perpetuated by our gigantic Palestinian generations in all the towns, villages and refugee camps throughout the homeland and by the arms of all our people's men, women, elders and children under the canopy of a firm national unity, of a comprehensive popular response, of indescribable heroism and of extraordinary ability to innovate, create and invent in the daily confrontation arenas. Throughout 16 consecutive months, the intifadah has been able to break all links of the Zionist blockade and to foil all the attempts made by the ugliest waves of black terrorism, blind violence and insane hatred. Even though the existing Zionist occupation has thrown all the methods and means of terrorism and violence at its disposal, including the iron-fist policy, collective punishment, brutal oppression, indiscriminate killing and torture, kidnapping, the arrest of wounded people in hospitals, the demolition of houses and homes, the deportations and all the other means of terrorism, against the intifadah and even though it has employed most of its army reserve forces, border guard, Shin Bet agents, intelligence and Mosad men and the troops of settlers which it has armed and thrown into the raging struggle against our people, all

this has not weakened the resolve of our generations, the blessed intifadah generations, but has so strengthened their power of defiance and of making daily accomplishments in the clash and confrontation arenas that numerous enemy—political and military leaders—have been compelled to unwillingly acknowledge their abysmal failure and the intifadah's ability to overcome all the steel and fire barriers and to advance steadily toward the Palestinian objective from which there can be no retreat, namely the objective of wresting our freedom and independence and of establishing our independent state.

The second fundamental mainstay is our central leadership's selection of the right time to launch the initiative emanating from the PNC [Palestine National Council]'s 19th session in Algiers. This initiative has represented a vigilant and accurate reading of the developments and changes in the reality engulfing us—a reading aimed at breaking the logic on which the enemy had relied, at severing the enemy's communication lines with the forces that have supported him for long periods of time, at finally depriving the enemy of all the possibilities of [taking] the initiative, at making the incontestables which the enemy propagated in the past seem like some sort of fabricated illusions and at opening the way for our field struggle action to take its right place and to have its broad influence in all the international arenas and assemblies. The evident example of this [vigilant and accurate reading] is that 107 countries have recognized the independent state of Palestine since this state was proclaimed. Moreover, the voice of the Palestinian reality is now ringing loudly in all parts of the world, even in the arenas which had been monopolized by the enemy. The voice of the Palestinian reality is even ringing within the entity of the enemy himself, despite all the manifestations of intransigence, radicalism and withdrawal with which the enemy engulfs himself to escape acknowledging this reality.

Hero brothers in all units of our valiant popular army:

Thus, our great Palestinian struggle is rising with two extraordinarily strong wings—the wing of the blessed and heroic intifadah and of its comprehensive and escalating field action and the wing of the political initiative and movement and of the accomplishments that are being made and that are accumulating daily at this level.

Through this vision, our great struggle's constant progress and our ceaseless advance toward our sacred objective must inevitably compel our enemy to amass whatever power of terrorism, violence, aggression and crime he has at his disposal against our people and against our intifadah's generation in a desperate attempt to escape the pressure and influence of our great struggle and of our continuous success. We are aware that the last quarter-hour battles, the pre-dawn battles and pre-victory battles are always the most ferocious, violent and

raging. We now see that our Zionist enemy is embarking openly on a feverish race with time, imagining that he can undermine the flow of our rushing intifadah and can disable our great people.

Our awareness of all this requires us, we the active members of our popular army's units in all the villages, towns and refugee camps and in all parts of the homeland, [to operate] on firm bases of careful organization and of steely revolutionary discipline, to solidify the multi-faceted experience and capability of every member of our popular army's units, to define the tasks very accurately and responsibly and to consider constant qualitative creativity the mainstay on which our units are built.

In this regard, it is important to emphasize that the practical and revolutionary experience and capability of every member of our popular army emanates from and develops through action itself, through the clash and confrontation arenas themselves, through detailed knowledge of the struggle arena and of the requirements of the struggle and through a comprehensive pondering of the horizons of the next phase of our internecine struggle against the Zionist enemy.

The emergence of our popular army in the previous phases, the rise of its vanguards in the various confrontation arenas and its broad contributions at the various levels have had a major moral influence on our struggling and fighting people and on our brave and gigantic generations. As a consequence, we are required to constantly take the initiative to contribute qualitatively and to make inspired innovations in all areas and all arenas of effective action within the ocean of the blessed and heroic intifadah. The extraordinary heroic examples demonstrated at the level of entrenching the offensive spirit against the enemy, of pursuing the enemy soldiers and troops in the days of the Palestinian molotov, of taking away the enemy troops' rifles, sticks, clubs and helmets, of constantly chasing them in the streets, quarters and squares of refugees camps, villages and towns, of stabbing them with knives and daggers and of depriving them of their prestige have had their negative effect on the ranks of the enemy troops, spreading terror, fear, tension and confusion among them. These examples have also had their positive effect on our people and generations, redoubling their offensive spirit, destroying the fear barrier finally and [enabling them] to proceed to implement the required tasks on the basis of self-confidence, capability, efficiency and creativity.

Forward, heroes of our valiant popular army.

Forward on the path of courage, efficiency, discipline and creativity.

And it is a revolution until victory.

PLO Funding for Intifadah Described
44040408b Kuwait AL-WATAN in Arabic
17 Apr 89 p 18

[Text] Tunis (AL-WATAN exclusive) A leading Palestinian source disclosed to AL-WATAN the amount of assistance decided in meetings of the central council held recently in the Tunisian capital.

The source confirmed that the total amount fixed by the Supreme Committee for the Occupied Homeland totalled about \$6.5 million, and indicated that this assistance is being given in the context of an on-going plan to provide for the daily needs of the Palestinians in the interior in order to reinforce their resistance against Israeli oppression.

The source refrained from specifying when the funds would reach the interior. Nor did he provide details regarding which channels would be used to transfer the funds to the West Bank and the Gaza Strip.

The source elucidated the assistance program, stating that the following was decided:

- The allocation of \$200,000 to reimburse fees for the renewal of the documents of Gazan returnees [as published] issued under the Egyptian government.
- The allocation of 17,000 per month for employees in Gaza.
- The allocation of 500,000 thousand to the Aid Agency for the supply of food to the Gaza Strip.
- The allocation of \$3 million for poor families, to be distributed in amounts of \$100 per family to 20,000 families in the Gaza Strip and 10,000 families in the West Bank.
- The marketing of Palestinian crops and products through agreements made with a number of international banks and western companies.
- The allocation of \$30,000 for the formation of student councils in the West Bank and Gaza, in which all Palestinian groups represented in the Supreme Committee for the Occupied Homeland will participate.

ALGERIA

Port Traffic Statistics for 1988 Reported
45190066b Algiers EL MOUDJAHID in French
9 Apr 89 p 3

[APS article: "Developing Traffic"]

[Text] During 1988, 8,142 vessels called at Algerian ports, as compared to 8,477 in 1987. This represented a decline of 335 vessels (4 percent), according to a document published by the Ministry of Transportation.

This document, which sets forth an analysis of port activity, notes that the gross tonnage of these vessels, on the contrary, showed a positive development, with an increase from 79.3 million tons in 1987 to 82.2 million tons in 1988 (up 3.7 percent).

Total goods traffic handled by all of our commercial ports together came to 77.9 million tons for 1988, as compared to 74.6 million tons (metric) in 1987, representing an increase of 4.4 percent, the document said.

It went on to explain that "goods traffic—both import and exports, but excluding hydrocarbons—came to 16.9 metric tons in 1988, as compared to 15.4 metric tons in 1987, showing an increase of almost 10 percent. This traffic represented nearly 22 percent of the overall traffic."

More than 496,000 passengers used maritime transport services in 1988, as compared to 439,042 in the preceding year. This represents an increase of 13 percent.

With regard to goods volume, excluding hydrocarbons, the document reported imports totaling 14.6 metric tons in 1988, as compared to 13.1 metric tons in 1987, showing an increase of almost 11 percent.

This increase was due above all to increased imports of grains, the documents explained. It said that this type of traffic saw a clear development in the course of 1988 to a total tonnage of 5.5 million, as compared to 3.8 million metric tons in the 1987 fiscal period.

The grain tonnage accounted for nearly 32 percent of the overall volume imported, and 38 percent of the imports, hydrocarbons excluded, according to these same statistics. They further note that:

- The total for foodstuffs was up 6 percent over the figure for 1987,
- metallurgical products were up 13 percent, and
- metallurgical ores and scraps were up 25 percent over the figure for the preceding year.

There was a decline, on the other hand, for all other types of products.

It should also be noted that despite the substantial increase in the number of containers (28 percent) unloaded at all of the ports taken together, the net tonnage of goods showed a decline of 7 percent.

With regard to exports, made up to the extent of 96 percent of hydrocarbons, there was an increase of 3.4 percent in 1988 over the preceding year.

Goods exported, hydrocarbons excluded, showed an increase of 3.6 percent over 1987, the Ministry of Transportation document revealed.

The categories of products showing a positive development were:

- Metallurgical products, up 2 percent;
- fertilizers (10 percent);
- chemical products (13.8 percent); and
- ores and construction materials (104 percent).

The document emphasized the remarkable development seen in the number of full containers exported, and notes that in fact this traffic increased from 2,740 TEU, 20-foot equivalent, in 1987, to 5,885 TEU in 1988, representing an increase of nearly 11 percent. The net tonnage of goods exported in such containers increased from 22,799 tons in 1987 to 32,409 tons in 1988, representing an increase of 42 percent.

However, the document concluded that despite all this, a great deal of effort remains to be made. It noted that the number of containers returning empty remains substantial, with an increase from 21,352 containers in 1987 to 22,879 in 1988 (up 7 percent).

Effect of Press Reform on Party Journals Analyzed

*45190066a Algiers EL MOUDJAHID in French
10 Apr 89 p 24*

[Article by Ahmed Kada]

[Text] Some journalists have expressed reservations about the possibility of a takeover of the national daily newspapers by the FLN [National Liberation Front]. Their concern comes from a desire to see the current situation continue, so that the national dailies can retain their public service status. We have clearly explained that this is impossible, for reasons which, in our view, are objective.

In challenging "putting the press in the grip of political orientations," these journalists seem to fear for freedom of expression. As if the danger came only from this quarter, they deliberately ignore the risks in "putting the media in the grip of individuals." However, experience, in terms of the conduct of the FLN with regard to the press, shows us that the danger would not come from political associations, for on the contrary, they would favor journalists' freedom of expression.

Their diversity will allow newsmen to find multiple channels of expression, and they will find cadres in agreement with their ideological aspirations.

The publications of the FLN and its government have not always spoken favorably of it, and quite recently we have seen a regular attack waged against it, while this press was unable to draw the fire.

There have been fewer interventions in the FLN bodies than in the past. But if on occasion there have been some pressures, they have never been carried out by the organic government cadres.

The journalists working for the central organs of the FLN have never been concerned, and no "political orientation" has imposed a style of writing on them. Even the editorials have often been the work of the editorial staffs of these journals. None of these newsmen has been asked to have a membership card, much less has the application of the provisions of Article 121 of the party bylaws been demanded in connection with recruiting.

Various political attitudes can be set forth in REVOLUTION AFRICAINE and EL MOUDJAHID. What party allows independent journalists to be published in its journals? This does full honor to the FLN.

Moreover, these reservations about FLN control of these national press organs are dictated by a strategy that is designed to reduce the FLN, which has been in existence for 35 years, to the same level as a little group that has just been established.

The FLN is being asked to surrender all of the resources it has developed for itself in 35 years of existence, not on the basis of state resources, but by nationalizing assets that in the majority of cases were abandoned by the colonials, and to share is legacy and its membership.

The fears about restrictions on freedom of expression can therefore be dismissed at the outset, due to the fact that the Constitution guarantees this freedom. But it can only prevail through the daily militant action of the journalists and creative writers and their rejection of conformity. The citizens themselves should be involved, so that their right to information will prevail and will contribute to the development of democracy.

Reorganization Needed

The new constitutional provisions require a profound reorganization of the news sector and the national press in general, with a view to more rational management.

The pluralism being introduced demands a renovated methodology for dealing with information and the exercise of the profession of journalism, as dictated by the information code. The national daily newspapers were organized as public service organs to allow them to improve their management, but their operations have not followed suit. This is equally true for their administration, their financing, and the participation of journalists in their management. The introduction of the GSE [Socialist Management of Businesses] should have made such participation possible.

Today, this organization must be implemented in accordance with the provisions pertaining to the autonomy of enterprises, with the reassignment of the daily newspapers to the FLN, so as to make the journalists' and technicians' collectives responsible for management and to make their work profitable.

In the establishment of new press organs, numerous problems will be encountered, those pertaining to financing and supplies, of paper in particular, among them, although certain associations have already placed orders for their rotary offset presses without waiting for the promulgation of the information code.

Since state aid to the press will certainly be altered by the criteria the code or its regulatory texts will determine, what other sources of financing can be found?

This aid cannot, in fact, be allocated to the press organs that are controlled by individuals, as they will have to see to their own monetary investments and profits.

On the one hand, there are the results of sales, wherein each press organ will have to make the necessary effort to ensure circulation. This will require that prices be adjusted on the basis of production costs, for in the future, the survival of a periodical will depend on its public readership.

What contribution should advertising make?

Should it be monopolized, so that the initiative is left to each journal to negotiate with the client, or should the criteria be determined by the competent body (ANEP) [National Publication and Advertising Agency] as a function of the requirements of the clientele?

And finally, there is the question of the balance subsidies the political associations have paid to their press organs.

In the past, moreover, circulation was not consistent because no study of coverage had been made in the light of experience with a view to improving it. This is the reason for the need to reorganize delivery services. This reorganization could be carried out on the basis of enterprise autonomy, so that the press organs that underwrite the shares will be involved in management for the purpose of developing circulation by reducing costs, thus serving the interests of the press. This would have the advantage of putting certain delivery service profits back into the press enterprises to balance their management.

And in addition, since the press will be essentially partisan, will the political leaders be satisfied to make decisions where the editorial line is concerned? Will they be willing to allow professional journalists who are not necessarily members of their parties to write for their journals?

This press, which will take pride in seeing to the interests of the readers in general, will have every reason to encourage freedom of expression. To do so, it will have to find a balance between the right of the political leaders to take responsibility for the publication and the right of the journalists to manage the press organs and to deal with information on a daily basis.

Apart from their right to appoint the editor of the publication, the leaders of the political association will reserve for themselves control of the content of the editorials, the articles expressing the opinions of the management, and the theoretical studies.

The journalists, on the other hand, will appoint the editorial committee, will nominate its head, and will fully manage news reporting—investigations, reports, studies, analyses, and coverage of current events, the activities of the political association among them.

This democratization of management is imperative if the press workers (journalists and technicians) are to become involved in the leadership councils and editorial committees.

This participation and responsibility will avoid the dangers of conflicts concerning the concepts of information and freedom of expression.

The temporary measures adopted recently by the sponsoring ministry establishing editorial collectives within the press organs represent a stage on the way to participation by the journalists in the management of the press organs, and are a response to a part of their demands.

Moreover, the creative initiative of the associations in the press sector should not be limited by the provision that authorizes each to establish two journals in two languages.

On the contrary, if an association has the resources to publish several periodicals or journals, why should it be prevented? For this undertaking could only be beneficial in terms of the diversification and the development of information.

However, there should be a requirement that at least one publication be in Arabic. In any case, this possibility is limited of itself by the financial resources and the paper crisis, which is making apportionment of quotas necessary.

In conclusion, it will be a question on the one hand of maintaining public ownership of the main information and communications agencies, and preventing natural persons from establishing financial trusts that would try to monopolize the press.

Some of the decisions to be made must pertain to the organization and development of the amateur radio network. The national daily newspapers must be provided with a new legal status, confirming the ownership of these organs by the FLN. Moreover, state control and pluralism of the press must be given priority through the development of the partisan press. This will guarantee not only freedom of expression, but also the exercise of the right of the citizens to information.

It is this policy that will work toward objective reporting and the raising of the consciousness of the masses with a view to their political education.

The state will efficiently play its role as a regulator, in relation to all of the political groups, in order to safeguard the interests of Algerian public opinion.

Within this context, the audiovisual council must be further defined and given new impetus, in the light of the changes being made.

Its responsibilities should make it a tool for the prevention of any abuse of authority, abusive censorship, or violations of freedom of expression, and for allocating broadcast time among the various political groups during the electoral campaigns.

Also, it will rule on any appeal on the part of the journalists and the creative writers which may be referred to it.

It is the openness of spirit and tolerance that characterize the task of the information sector that will constitute one of the bases of democracy.

BAHRAIN

Agreement To Promote Industry Signed *44000500a Muscat TIMES OF OMAN in English* *19 Apr 89 p 19*

[Text] The Bahrain-based Gulf Industrial Consultancy Organisation [GICO] and the AGCC [Arab Gulf Corporation Council] general secretariat have entered into an agreement giving the organisation priority in regional industrial consultancy work and feasibility studies for industrial projects.

Secretary-General of the GICO, Dr. 'Abdallah Hamad al-Mu'ajil said that a ten-year co-operation agreement was signed between the two sides in which the various individual industrial sector committees will become joint committees.

Island To Have a Court of Cassation

44000500c Muscat *TIMES OF OMAN* in English
20 Apr 89 p 19

[Text] Bahrain is to have a Court of Cassation which will be the highest judicial authority on the island and equal to the supreme court in some countries.

A memorandum for establishment of this court, submitted by the Minister of State for Legal Affairs Dr Husayn Muhammad al-Baharnah, was recently approved by a cabinet session presided over by Prime Minister Shaykh Khalifah Ibn-Salman Al Khalifah.

EGYPT

Al-Baz Views Relations With Sudan, Ethiopia

NC1505205389 Cairo *MENA* in Arabic
2000 GMT 15 May 89

[Text] Cairo, 15 May (MENA)—Dr Usamah al-Baz, first Foreign Ministry under secretary and director of the president's Office for Political Affairs, has emphasized the importance of Egyptian-Sudanese relations and their development. He praised the discussions that took place in the symposium on Egyptian-Sudanese relations and noted that such meetings between the Sudanese and Egyptians in the various sectors are important for strengthening and developing these relations. He said that such a symposium can be a step toward increasing the awareness of many specialists in the two countries to overcome differences.

In a speech he delivered at the closing session of the symposium, Dr al-Baz said that a context for bilateral relations must be sought in the light of the changes that are taking place in the region. He affirmed that Egypt cares for the unity of the Sudanese territory and people and supports all the peace efforts in the south.

Dr al-Baz said that Egypt understands that its relations with Sudan are not only based on equality but also on mutual interest and benefit. He added that Egyptian-Sudanese relations are not affected by a third party and denied that Sudanese-Libyan relations are an obstacle to developing Sudanese-Egyptian relations, because, he said, Sudan has the right to manage its relations with the neighboring states as it wishes for its own interest.

Dr al-Baz said that Ethiopia is an important country for Sudan and Egypt. "We are tied to Ethiopia by joint interests, we have relations with Ethiopia and Sudan, and there is no contradiction in this. Ethiopia is a neighbor with which we are tied by deep-rooted relations. We must work together within the context of cooperation and not contradiction," he said.

Dr al-Baz concluded: "There is no problem with regard to the joint defense agreement and it must not be raised as a subject of difference. We must view matters in their

proper perspective. Egypt is interested in peace in Sudan and the settlement of the problem in the south. It is also interested in Sudan's security because it is part of Egypt's security."

Ambassador to Moscow Views USSR Role in Region, Internal Reforms

45040334B Cairo *AKHIR SA'AH* in Arabic
19 Apr 89 pp 18-19

[Interview with Mr Ahmad Mahir al-Sayyid, Egyptian ambassador to the Soviet Union, by Dr Mamduh Mustafa: "Egypt's Ambassador to Soviet Union Tells AKHIR SA'AH, 'Balancing Interests Is Basis of Egyptian-Soviet Relations; Shevardnadze's Tour Confirmed Dynamic Nature of Soviet Decision on Palestinian Cause; Recent Elections Will Change Soviet Citizens' Character, Alter Their Way of Thinking,'" date and place of interview not specified]

[Excerpts] [Passage omitted]

The Soviet Position and America

[al-Sayyid] No action was taken on the Soviet position supporting the Arab position, and none of the required activity in that regard was carried out. The Soviet Union was declaring its position from Moscow, and it was affirming that an international conference was the ideal and only method for achieving a settlement. That is what the Arab countries have been calling for. The Soviet Union was declaring that position, but it was not taking any concrete action to support it. Shevardnadze's visit, therefore, is a declaration that the Soviet Union has decided to take action and to back up its declared positions by actions. It indicates that the Soviet Union is shifting from a stage of making declarations and announcing intentions to that of taking serious action to carry out those intentions. [passage omitted]

Accordingly, Soviet action is being taken in the context of U.S.-Soviet cooperation in an attempt to settle regional disputes. This method worked with other problems like those in Namibia and Angola, and it is about to produce results in the matter of Kampuchea. That is why this constructive cooperation between the two superpowers can be called competition. It is competition to do good, not to dominate. Because the peace process can benefit from this competition, Shevardnadze's visit, when placed in the proper framework, becomes important.

As to what happened during the visit itself, the Soviets proposed ideas and they made it quite clear that those ideas did not constitute a new initiative. They were proposing ideas that would help bring about an international conference. They stated unequivocally that they were not trying to force those ideas on anyone, and they also stated that they were not claiming their ideas represented the whole truth. They are saying, however, that these ideas represent their contribution to the effort

to help the parties get started on their quest for a settlement. Those ideas represent the best method that the parties can use to negotiate a settlement, and that method is the international conference. It is indisputable that bilateral talks can be held in the context of such an international conference.

Making Preparations for the International Conference

The Soviet idea quite simply is that if we want to have an international conference, we have to make preparations for it. We have to make preparations for that conference on different levels in the Security Council. We have to make preparations for that conference with the five superpowers and with the parties involved. We have to have bilateral communications with the parties as well as bilateral communications between the parties. [passage omitted]

Because of all this we can say that Shevardnadze's visit was an important step taken by the Soviet Union to bring us closer to the international conference. This visit did achieve the results that were expected, and we were delighted with it in Egypt. We welcomed the opinions which were expressed during the foreign minister's visit. They are opinions we agree with. After all, the ultimate goal is for all of us to get started on the road which leads to the settlement we aspire to.

Egyptian-Soviet Cooperation

[AL-MUSAWWAR] What are the important areas for Egyptian-Soviet cooperation during the coming period? [passage omitted]

[al-Sayyid] There are many areas for cooperation in trade and industry. Egyptians and Soviets will be working together to modernize some of the factories which have been built, to expand some factories, and to build new ones. There are many other areas for Soviet-Egyptian cooperation. [passage omitted]

[AL-MUSAWWAR] Given the new Soviet policy under Gorbachev, what is the basis for these relations?

[al-Sayyid] Today, Egyptian-Soviet relations are based on the fundamental principle of total equality, mutual respect and non-intervention in the domestic affairs of countries. Our relations are based on a principle which the Soviets have talked about a great deal. This is the principle of balanced interests. This means that when we work with one country or another, we are to consider our interests as well as those of the other country. If those interests are balanced and if this cooperation is compatible with our interests, then we can proceed in good faith with a mutual desire that this cooperation go as far as possible within the framework of the principles I spoke of.

If we touch upon another area of cooperation, like that of establishing joint projects, [I can say that] we are willing to work with the Soviet Union in that area. We are looking into the possibilities of this cooperation which may be possible in some areas. It may be said, however, that we have not yet come to that stage of thinking about action or actual implementation.

Joint projects could be set up in the Soviet Union, and they could be set up in Egypt. I believe, however, that we have not yet come to that stage. At the present time we are trying to develop the conventional modes for cooperation between the two countries, and we are keeping in mind the possibility that in the future we might shift to non-conventional areas of cooperation.

The Significance of New Elections

[AL-MUSAWWAR] What do you think about the elections which were held recently in the Soviet Union?

[al-Sayyid] The Soviet Union is now going through a very important stage of its development. In my judgment this is considered the most important stage that the Soviet Union has gone through since 1917.

People who know about the Soviet Union because they lived in it or because they read about it would find that the Soviet Union now is a country that is completely different from the one we have been hearing about. The elections period ended recently, and for the first time since the outbreak of the Communist Revolution in 1917, these elections gave candidates who were running for office a chance to compete and become involved in political conflict. This political conflict may be described as a violent, political conflict, even though no violence was involved, because the verbal conflict between the contenders was quite vehement. A political conflict of ideas is something that the Soviet Union has not experienced before. [passage omitted]

[AL-MUSAWWAR] What are your impressions about the outcome of these elections for the short-term as well as the long-term? [passage omitted]

[al-Sayyid] Now, however, the Soviet citizen is expected to be active, not passive. He is expected to contribute his ideas and his work, and he is expected to set forth all matters for discussion. He is expected to come up with whatever would serve the interests of all the people. This means the dogmatic approach is no longer prevalent in Soviet political life. In fact, Soviet citizens are expected to think; in the past, however, they were expected not to think.

Soviet citizens are expected to ask questions and to question; in the past they had to wait for instructions, orders, or administrative decrees from higher-ups. In my judgment this is a very significant development, and its

effect will extend beyond the Soviet Union to the whole world. In fact, this will have an effect on all the powers in the world which used to consider the Soviet Union their ideal and still do.

[AL-MUSAWWAR] To what extent are these policies reflected on many of the powers in the world?

[al-Sayyid] This Soviet change will necessarily have an effect on the development of many of the powers in the world which look upon the Soviet Union as their Big Brother or the founder of the theory behind their movement. Of course, this change is not easy. There is resistance to it, and many obstacles and impediments lie in its path. That is why what the Soviet leaders are doing now under Chairman Gorbachev is formidable. While some of the results of their action are forthcoming, most of the results will become evident later. This means that this matter will take some time. [Passage omitted]

The Soviet Union has a big task ahead of it. Work on that task has actually begun. I believe that the new Soviet parliament with its new authorizations will also become a significant factor in moving the country in that direction.

Candor About the Economic Problem [passage omitted]

[AL-MUSAWWAR] What are the Soviet Union's new policies, especially the economic policies?

[al-Sayyid] As far as the standard of living in the Soviet Union is concerned, there is no doubt that the Soviet Union is having economic difficulties which are felt by every person. In the past, however, this economic problem was not dealt with. The only thing that was done about it was to hide it. The Soviets did what ostriches do: they would deny having an economic problem, and then they themselves would believe that.

Now, however, the Soviets are confronting this economic problem by talking about it. For the first time it was announced that the Soviet Union's budget had a large deficit. In our opinion, admitting that one has a disease and diagnosing that disease are fundamental steps which have to be taken to treat a problem.

I would like to say that the Soviet people's standard of living did not rise recently. But this fact is being recognized, and officials also realize that this has to be changed. They realize that this problem has to be confronted squarely, and that is why I would imagine that things will improve. [passage omitted]

Relations Between Cairo and Moscow

[AL-MUSAWWAR] What will Egyptian-Soviet relations be like in the wake of the change that has taken place in all areas of Soviet policy?

[al-Sayyid] To summarize what we said in general, let me say that in communicating with the Soviets I get the sense that the Soviet Union has a special place for Egypt. I sense that the Soviet Union has a real, sincere and profound desire for Egyptian-Soviet relations to become ideal relations and a model of good relations between two countries.

We think that the Soviet Union realizes and appreciates Egypt's role and President Muhammad Husni Mubarak's policy. The Soviet Union appreciates the fact that this policy is based on constant principles and on unequivocal bases. The Soviet Union realizes that these bases and principles are proper ones.

If we consider the visit that Edward Shevardnadze, the Soviet foreign minister, made to the Middle East area, we would see quite clearly that this visit and the way it was arranged reflects the prestige that Egypt has in the Soviet Union. Shevardnadze's visit to Cairo was the high point of the Soviet minister's visit to the area, and it was clear that it was the most important part of his trip.

This would be enough to point out what the Soviets think about Egypt and about Egypt's role and Egypt's leaders. This is something that everyone has felt, and it is no secret. Those thoughts are actually translated into action.

The Policy of Balanced Interests

[AL-MUSAWWAR] What is the common element that the Soviet Union is careful about in its relations with countries, especially the countries of the Middle East? [passage omitted]

[al-Sayyid] The common element which could tie all these matters together is this: People and their legitimate wishes must be respected; any intervention to prevent peoples—the people of Palestine, the people of Lebanon, or those of any other country—from exercising their right to determine their own destiny and to lead a free, honorable and independent life is an attempt that is to be rejected. Any such attempt must be rejected because it interferes with the achievement of peace. Peace in the area is indivisible, and people's rights are sacred and must be respected. This is why Israel's and Syria's intervention in Lebanon is delaying a settlement and interfering with peace. The attempt to prevent the Lebanese people from becoming free and independent in their own country and the attempt to keep them from determining their own destiny are also delaying a settlement and interfering with peace. Similarly, Israeli practices and the Israeli occupation authorities on the West Bank and in the Gaza Strip are delaying the settlement process and interfering with peace. That is why peace must prevail in all the countries of the area. It may therefore be said that a Lebanese settlement, a Palestinian settlement and a settlement of the Middle East problem are all related episodes which must be settled so that peace can be achieved.

Of course, making progress in any one of these problems will have a positive effect on another problem, just as deterioration in one problem will also affect another. In other words, a settlement in the Middle East, as I said, must be a comprehensive settlement that includes all the parties to the conflict. As to which one should come before the other, let me say that all these matters are interrelated, and we must make progress on all fronts.

Navy Commander on Joint Exercises With French Fleet

*NC1405184389 Cairo MENA in Arabic
1430 GMT 14 May 89*

[All names of French ships and aircraft as received]

[Excerpts] Alexandria, 14 May (MENA)—Navy Commander Rear Admiral Muhammad Sharif al-Sadiq has announced that high-level joint exercises in the Mediterranean between the Egyptian Navy and the French fleet will begin today and last for 1 week. The Navy commander's announcement came in a press conference he held at the Navy headquarters in the Ra's al-Tin area of Alexandria today.

During the exercises, he said, some units from the French fleet will pay a visit to Alexandria and Port Said. The French and Egyptian naval units will stay in the open sea for 3 days to perform the joint exercises, he said, adding that some exercises, such as the signal and communications exercises, will be conducted while the naval units are docked at the ports during their visit. The other formalities will be observed in accordance with the rules of protocol applicable during the visits of friendly navies to our ports.

Rear Admiral al-Sadiq said he welcomes joint exercises with the navies of friendly countries in the Mediterranean, noting that similar exercises codenamed "Storm" were held in March between the Egyptian and Italian Navies. He added that the current exercises with the French, codenamed "Cleopatra-2," are not the first such exercises, for they were preceded by the "Cleopatra-1" exercises. He noted that joint exercises with the U.S. 6th Fleet have also been carried out in the Mediterranean. [passage omitted]

The commander of the Egyptian Navy pointed out that the French aircraft carrier "Foch," with approximately 30 Super Etendard jet fighters aboard, along with 2 Elysee reconnaissance aircraft, which can stay in the air between 4-6 hours, and 10 giant Super Frelon helicopters, which can be equipped with missiles and equipment to detect ships and submarines and can accommodate a platoon of soldiers, will take part in the exercises. Rear Admiral al-Sadiq added that these aircraft will be supported by one or two Atlantic long-range reconnaissance aircraft which will fly from France to al-Nuzhah Airport in Alexandria, and then fly back home again after their mission is over.

The Egyptian Navy commander added that the cruiser "Colbert"; the modern frigate "Caspar," which is used for air defense purposes; and the frigate "Dukid" and supply ship "Var," both currently at Port Said, will also take part in the exercises. He added that all the French units will meet at sea at the time specified for the exercises. He noted that from the Egyptian side, approximately 10 naval units of various types will take part in the training, including missile launches, submarines, hunters, and auxiliary ships. The exercises, he said, will be performed in four phases.

Regarding the importance of these exercises, the Navy commander said they help strengthen the Egyptian Navy's capabilities in carrying out specific assignments within certain periods of time. "They also help promote our ability to communicate and make plans with foreign fleets so that, when necessary, we are able to act on assignments as fast as possible and without any additional and time-consuming arrangements." [passage omitted]

Regarding joint exercises with other countries, the Navy commander said the Egyptian naval forces hold exercises with friendly navies such as Italy and the United States and that, should the circumstances permit, there will be joint exercises with the British next year. He pointed out that joint exercises will be held with the Americans this winter. [passage omitted]

Hajjaj Elected President of USSR Trade Representatives

*45000152 Cairo AL-AHRAM AL-IQTISADI in Arabic
17 Apr 89 p 12*

[Text] Dr 'Abd-al-'Aziz Ibrahim Hajjaj, the minister plenipotentiary for trade in Moscow, has been elected president of the Union of Trade Representatives and Economic Commissioners to the Soviet Union.

This is the second time that Dr 'Abd-al-'Aziz Hajjaj has served in Moscow. He was formerly the commerce attache to the Soviet Union in the sixties.

It was the efforts and expertise of Dr 'Abd-al-'Aziz Hajjaj since assuming the supervision of the trade representative's office in Moscow in December 1986 that influenced the development of relations between Egypt and the Soviet Union in the trade and economic arenas.

Shaykh Al-Sha'rawi Praises Book Repudiating Rushdi's Book

45000153 Cairo UKTUBAR in Arabic 30 Apr 89 p 8

[Text] Shaykh Muhammad Mutawalli al-Sha'rawi has contacted Dr Shams-al-Din al-Fasi and congratulated him on his new book, "Divine Verses," which disproves "Satanic Verses," the book by the apostate Salman Rushdi. Shaykh al-Sha'rawi asserted that the publication of books like these is a practical response to thinking such as Rushdi's, who thought he could slander Islam.

LEBANON

Ba'th Party Secretary Urges Syria To Withdraw
44040380 London AL-DUSTUR in Arabic
24 Apr 89 pp 8-9

[Interview with Dr 'Abd-al-Majid al-Rafi'i, secretary of Socialist Arab Ba'th Party Regional Command in Lebanon, by al-Salami al-Hasani; date, place not given; "Dr 'Abd-al-Majid al-Rafi'i to AL-DUSTUR: Syrian Forces' Departure Opens Door to Lebanon's Unity"]

[Text] From the 14th of last March to the present, Lebanon's crisis has re-attracted Arab and international attention. The Arab League formed the Good-Offices Committee under the chairmanship of Kuwait's foreign minister. Since its formation, the committee has been listening to the Lebanese factions and has been issuing repeated appeals for a cease-fire. Internationally, France has entered the crisis through the door of humane aid and diplomatic efforts and has threatened to raise the entire issue before the Security Council if the Arab League fails to develop a solution swiftly.

While General Michel 'Awn's government demands internationalizing the issue because the Security Council is required to force the observation of its resolutions on the departure of all non-Lebanese forces, especially the Israeli forces, from Lebanon, Syria and its Lebanese allies firmly reject the internationalization of Lebanon's crisis. In this political and diplomatic climate, the mutual exchange, at times violent and at others interspersed, continues.

[AL-DUSTUR] has interviewed Dr 'Abd-al-Majid al-Rafi'i, secretary of the Socialist Arab Ba'th Party Regional Command in Lebanon, in a dialogue on Lebanon and on how it can overcome its crisis.

[AL-DUSTUR] Lebanon's crisis is summed up today in the confrontation between General Michel 'Awn and the Syrian forces. The question raised by several observers is: Who will emerge from this confrontation triumphant?

[Al-Rafi'i] The recent developments of the crisis, specifically since the end of President Amin al-Jumayyil's term on 23 September 1989, are not isolated from the entire Lebanese crisis. Rather, they are the result of accumulations which began prior to 13 April 1975 and have continued to the present and of the alternate roles played by foreign, Arab and local elements to lead the crisis to its present condition. It is true that the combatants and the professionals are internal elements. But the entire crisis cannot be isolated from the course of the Arab-Zionist conflict. The Zionist forces and the forces stemming from the Arab nation's conflict with its enemies and with the anti-Arab forces which do not want our nation to move forth with its progress and prosperity—these forces have become intertwined with this crisis.

Alternation of Roles

The Zionist enemy continues to occupy Lebanese territories and to interfere directly or indirectly in Lebanon's internal affairs. The Syrian regime also entered—with the entry of its forces in 1976 and prior to that politically—the crisis as an instrument of plotting against the country's unity and sovereignty. It has played a very negative and fundamental role in splitting the country's unity and sovereignty. The Syrian regime claimed that by its involvement, it came to safeguard Lebanon's unity, to bolster the Palestinian resistance and to confront the Zionist enemy. What is the result? Lebanon's unity has been cracked under the canopy of its forces and of its plotting and the partitionist pollution has even reached the legitimate institutions which had remained united for more than 13 years. As for the Palestinian resistance, everybody is aware how this regime has pursued it, how hard it has hit its camps and how hard it has tried to break its unity in an attempt to usurp its role in every sense of the word. We are all aware how the refugee camps, from Tall al-Za'tar to al-Barid and from al-Baddawi to Sabra and Shatila, were hit. All these elements confirm that the Syrian regime is the main plotter against the resistance in its entirety. As for defending Lebanon against the Zionist aggression, the very recent history demonstrates how the Syrian forces retreated before the Zionist enemy in the Lebanese arena while this enemy advanced to occupy the most impregnable positions in Lebanon. The Syrian regime ordered its forces to retreat without any resistance before the Zionist enemy. The Syrian regime has acted in utter contrast with the three elements for which it alleges it entered Lebanon and its entry has turned into a curse for Lebanon's unity and sovereignty and for the Palestinian resistance's struggle. This chain of Syrian intervention opened the door for Iranian elements from the Revolutionary Guard Forces, as well as to other capabilities, which have tampered with the unity of Lebanon's social fabric. The Syrian and Iranian regimes are responsible for the deteriorating crisis and for the lives of many. These accumulations led the institutions, whether governmental, legislative or security, to the brink of collapse. Since 23 September 1988, Lebanon has been without a president and it is ruled by two governments, one which has assumed legitimacy by emanating from the president of the republic within the limits of his term and in implementation of an explicit constitutional provision and a second government which, with our respect for its chairman and members, has been imposed by a fait accompli. Thus, Lebanon now has two leaderships. The Syrian regime has not been content with leading the situation to this level but has also obstructed a task we have always advocated, namely the task of making the Arabs resolve to take the Lebanon issue seriously and to exert serious efforts to bring Lebanon's crisis out of the dark tunnel into which it has gotten. In its latest session, the Arab foreign ministers conference approved the six-member committee. This committee took hold of the Lebanese dossier and began to work seriously and actively to develop a solution through a

number of meetings, beginning with meetings with Prime Minister al-Huss, General 'Awn and Husayn al-Husayni. At a later phase, the committee held consultations with the clergymen of the six main factions and was preparing to meet with a large number of politicians representing the countries' various tendencies, whether represented or not represented in the Chamber of Deputies, because they represent on the ground a reality which cannot be disregarded. But the Syrian authorities obstructed, either directly or through those Lebanese forces that deal with it, the third phase of the committee's work by raising objections to or vetoing some of the members selected by the committee for consultation or by touching off the security conditions in order to impose members who hold the Syrian authorities' opinion but who were not selected by the committee. Thus, the tension and the crisis escalated to the point which reminded us of the days of the 2-year war. It is as if we have started from scratch. The plot continues and the conflict goes on. The issue is not between the person of General 'Awn and the Syrian regime. General 'Awn represents the Lebanese legitimate constitutional government in every sense of the word. If it were not for these divisive conditions that have taken sectarian directions, General 'Awn would represent legitimacy to all the Lebanese and to all the authorities. But the Syrian pressures' imposition of a fait accompli that contravenes all the constitutional traditions has turned 'Awn's government into a disputable government in the Lebanese political circles.

The battle led by General 'Awn, i.e., the battle to unite the country, is one aspect of the crisis. The plot is aimed at Lebanon's unity and seeks to partition Lebanon finally so that this may constitute a starting point for partitioning the Arab homeland on sectarian and denominational bases into warring, feuding and feeble mini-states so that the Zionist entity may be the strongest of these entities. The battle is a battle for uniting Lebanon against those who want to partition it and who have been working toward this end for more than 14 years. This battle has not yet taken its comprehensive national dimension because the fabricated conditions to which these events led have taken their toll, and we do not deny this. General 'Awn does not view the battle only from the angle of the conflict with the Syrian regime on the ground. He has also stated on more than one occasion that he demands the ouster of the Zionist enemy. We believe that the alternate roles played by the Zionist enemy and the Syrian regime have led the country to this phase. We also believe that the battle must take its comprehensive national course and that all the forces must understand that this country's future depends on their standing, with all their political and national forces, in the face of whoever obstructs Lebanon's unity and violates its sovereignty.

Feeble Legitimacy

[AL-DUSTUR] The Syrian forces entered Lebanon under the cover of the Lebanese legitimacy and then of

Arab legitimacy. Now, the Syrian authorities have partitioned the Lebanese legitimacy and have, consequently, eliminated this legitimacy as an important factor that may ask them to leave Lebanon. Will the Arab legitimacy continue, despite this, to give its cover to the Syrian presence in Lebanon?

[Al-Rifa'i] Initially, when the Syrian forces entered Lebanon partially in April 1976 and then heavily on 1 June 1976, they did not do so at the request of Sulayman Franjiyah, who was president at the time, or of the late Rashid Karami who was the prime minister. They entered at the request of Lebanese forces which were allied with Syria at the time, namely the Phalangist forces. Contrary to the prevalent opinion saying that the Syrian forces are backed by Lebanese legitimacy, a council was formed on an initiative by Raymond Iddih and included the overwhelming majority of former prime ministers, as well as Rashid Karami, numerous deputies and myself. It was called the National Union Council and was formed in June 1976, i.e., a few days after the heavy entry of the Syrian regime's forces into Lebanon. This council's most important demand was to ask the Syrian forces to leave Lebanon. As for Arab legitimacy, it was bestowed in October 1976 when an Arab mini-summit was held in Riyadh first and then a six-member summit in Cairo. This legitimacy was not unanimous, as stipulated to date in the Arab League conventions. This legitimacy was opposed on the one hand by Iraq and on the other by Libya which was represented at ambassadorial level. This legitimacy, gained within the framework of the Arab Deterrence Forces, was not a legitimacy given to the Syrian regime to do whatever it pleases in Lebanon. It was intended to help Lebanon maintain security. The Syrian forces worked to oust the other Arab forces participating in the Deterrence Forces and stayed in the arena alone. The Syrian forces' initial action was to shell East Beirut throughout 100 consecutive days, from 1 July 1978 to 8 October 1978, destroying buildings and institutions, blockading the population and cutting off water, electricity, foodstuffs and supplies. This action was repeated by striking the Palestinian camps and all the cities for trivial reasons.

Tripoli was hit cruelly for the first time in 1982. The Syrian regime's forces hit the city from one side and the Zionist forces hit it from the sea on the other side on the pretext that Yasir 'Arafat did not obey orders. The city was hit for a second time in 1985 on the feeble pretext that the Islamic Unification Movement controlled the scene in Tripoli. The city was pounded mercilessly throughout 18 days. More than 80 percent of the city's population was made homeless, more than 80 percent of its buildings were cracked, and we a picture to proof this, and hundreds of people were killed. This was in addition to obstructing the city's role in every sense of the word. The city was hit for a third time under an even more feeble pretext, namely that a Syrian roadblock in al-Tabbanah Quarter, the city's biggest quarter with a population of nearly 80,000 inhabitants, was subjected

to bullet shots. This quarter, as well as the adjacent al-Zahriyah al-Gharba' Quarter, were blockaded and the Syrian forces opened a downpour of shells on the quarter, destroying more than 90 percent of its buildings, and we have pictures to attest to this.

There is a major street crossing Tripoli, called Syria Street. It is a name of which we are proud because it represents the people's Syria. This street was 12 meters wide and is now more than 30 meters wide because all the buildings [on its sides] have been destroyed. Did the Arab countries empower the Syrian regime to do all it has done to Lebanon? Did they empower this regime, which is subjecting Syria's citizens from Hamah to Homs and to Palmyra's [Tadmur's] prison to all kinds of torture, to come with its forces and destroy the cities on the heads of their inhabitants? I can say no. The Arab countries with their various tendencies have recently realized the need to re-examine Lebanon's crisis. The latest Arab foreign ministers conference was held and it assigned the six-member committee to study the Lebanese dossier. I can say that the mere studying of the Lebanese dossier is tantamount to a re-examination of this Arab commission [to Syria]. On the other hand, the lack of a Syrian presence in any committee of any Arab group discussing Lebanon or seeking to solve Lebanon's crisis indicates that the fingers of accusation are pointing at the Syrian regime and saying that its presence in Lebanon throughout this long period has been negative, not positive. In any public, private or international institutions or any kind of institutions, when one fails throughout 13 years to perform a task entrusted to him, especially when he had compelled others to assign him the task, then such a person cannot be told: Yes, carry on with the task. Rather, he must be told: Your task has ended because you have failed to unite, failed to protect the Palestinian resistance and failed to protect Lebanon from the Zionist aggression.

Therefore, I believe that the Arab countries will embrace the opinion saying that the Syrian regime's work throughout this period has been very negative and catastrophic to Lebanon's unity, sovereignty and democracy. So, a re-examination is needed. We demand more than what the Arab countries have done. With our respect for the Arab foreign ministers, we demand that the six-member committee present its report and proposals to the Arab foreign ministers so that they may submit them to an Arab summit because an Arab summit will abridge the time by taking an initiative in the direction of preserving Lebanon's unity, ousting the Syrian regime from Lebanon, restoring the Lebanese institutions to their normal condition and embracing and nurturing a Lebanese dialogue protected by an Arab force that does not impose its will and that has no ambitions in Lebanon. So, I believe that the legitimacy the Arabs gave the Syrian regime will be wrested in one way or another. We hope that it will be done in the most superior manner by ousting the Syrian forces and replacing them by Arab forces that protect security and tend dialogue. As for the Lebanese side, as long as the Syrian forces' presence in

Lebanon in the past was not legitimate, then their current presence is illegitimate, especially since President Amin al-Jumayyil had officially requested them to leave. The same request has been made by the present prime minister who, along with his entire cabinet, constitutionally fill the position of president of the republic which became vacant as a result of the failure to elect a president.

MOROCCO

Major Moroccan Bank Seeks Additional African, International Markets

45190062a Casablanca LA VIE ECONOMIQUE in French 24 Mar 89 p 17

[Text] The People's Bank is enlarging internationally by opening a new office in Abidjan. The office is a liaison facility primarily for helping importers and exporters on either side with their commercial transactions, and for publicizing Morocco, its potential, and its various investment laws to foreign investors in promoting investment opportunities in Morocco.

As a leader in the nation and a pioneer in seeking out new markets, the People's Bank is dramatizing its position as an avant garde institution by taking the initiative in making its mark in the world's great cities, crossroads of international trade.

Policy of Growth

This international expansion is a concrete answer to the Moroccan Government's call to broaden relations with the outside world. A body of measures has been put in place to encourage and stimulate international trade, one of the nation's major priorities.

Abidjan is the first host of a Moroccan banking office in Africa, signaling a new era and putting Abidjan in the same league with Brussels and Montreal.

This presence of the People's Bank on the international scene is nothing new, since for over 20 years two branches of the "Chaabi Bank of Morocco," in Brussels and Paris, and several TME [Overseas Moroccan Workers] delegations have assisted and advised Moroccans abroad (in France, Belgium, the Netherlands, England, FRG, Spain, Denmark, Gibraltar, and Saudi Arabia).

Abidjan, a Strategic Choice

Abidjan is a strategic location in Africa and mirrors the characteristics of the Ivory Coast, the economic dynamism of which is called the "Ivorian miracle."

"The Ivory Coast will definitely remain one of the best examples of Third World development to the end of this century," says S. Gabsi in JEUNE AFRIQUE.

Abidjan, emphasized Mr Abdellatif Laraki, acting president of CPM [People's Credit of Morocco], "is the prelude to an action of great scope with the goal of inaugurating sustained cooperation with African financial institutions."

Morocco and the Ivory Coast

Although the creation of the North African Arab Union was motivated by shifting alliances on the international scene and the challenges facing the countries and people in the region politically, economically, culturally, and socially, "this North African entity," pointed out His Majesty Hassan II at his press conference, "is not meant to be a wall between us and our African siblings. On the contrary. From the outset, we will have very preferential relations, either bilaterally or collectively."

Morocco is establishing preferential relations with the Ivory Coast within the framework of the treaty of friendship and cooperation between the two countries.

In spite of the enormous potentials of these two African pacesetters, trade between the two has been relatively modest until now. The Ivory Coast ranks only third among Morocco's suppliers in Africa and fifth among its African markets. "...We have high hopes this office in the Ivory Coast can be an organ for liaison, information, and aid in developing business relations between Moroccan and African companies," said the acting president, Mr Abdellatif Laraki.

"COMEX": Real Professionals

Corps of "COMEX," (foreign trade attaches) are being set up to spur action by expanding assistance in research on new foreign markets.

In this way, genuine foreign trade professionals are available to business people in each country to develop their commercial ties with Morocco.

Further People's Bank Expansion Coming

Soon the People's Bank will open an office in Madrid. Of EEC members, Spain has the closest links to Morocco geographically, historically, and through large-scale joint projects, such as a fixed crossing linking Africa to Europe at the strait of Gibraltar.

The People's Bank also has been asked by some African countries to help them create similar financial institutions, based on a cooperative, shareholder system, within their own borders. This development confirms the People's Bank's influence on the international scene.

Photo Caption

[Photograph not reproduced] Mr Abdellatif Laraki, chief executive officer of the Central People's Bank, at a press conference in Abidjan at the opening of the new office of

the People's Bank in the Ivory Coast: "Today, unification of Europe through a common market is that continent's priority. The Arab states have seen the light; they are organizing. South-South cooperation must be a permanent necessity for Africa with the goal of creating a united and strong United States of Africa in the economic sphere. Morocco is ready to help all African countries desiring to create their own banking systems."

Export, Production Statistics for Canned Fish Products Reported

45190062b Casablanca LA VIE ECONOMIQUE in French 24 Mar 89 p 18

[Excerpts from report of the National Association of Fish Canning Industries; first paragraph is LA VIE ECONOMIQUE introduction]

[Text] The National Association of Fish Canning Industries (ASONAP) recently held its regular general meeting. The meeting was marked by a status report. We are publishing large excerpts from this document here because it gives an evaluation of the activities of the fish canning sector over the last three campaigns.

With the exception of the port of Safi in 1987, recent campaigns have been characterized by an insufficient fish harvest. Slow periods have stretched from one year to another, forcing canners to organize around the port of Tan Tan. This effort focused primarily on refrigeration.

Refrigeration, a Necessity

It must be noted that sizable investments have been made for the purchase of refrigerated trucks by both the canners themselves and private transporters, although much remains to be done in this area.

(...)At the same time, most canners now back the need for wider use of refrigeration in handling and transporting fish. Funds earmarked for this equipment over the last 3 years are significant and estimated at 24 million dirhams.

Unfortunately, the boats involved are not seeing a similar refitting that would add their link to the chain. The fish, taken in bulk, are still brought to the port without refrigeration.

Supply of Raw Material

(...)The pattern of inshore fishing activity emerges from statistics for the amounts registered at the four principal ports. The amounts are distributed as follows:

Distribution of Inshore Fish Harvest for 1986, 1987, and 1988

Year	Canned		By-Products		Frozen	Total
1986	96,992tonnes	32.55%	196,120tonnes	65.81%	4,860tonnes	297,972tonnes
1987	94,595tonnes	42.29%	122,339tonnes	54.69%	6,729tonnes	223,663tonnes
1988 (first half)	22,741tonnes	37.93%	34,447tonnes	57.45%	2,769tonnes	59,957tonnes

The table shows that by-products make up the largest share.

The percentage of fish for canning rose in 1987: 42.29 percent of the total, compared to 32.55 percent in 1986.

The figures for the 1987 campaign reflect the significant increase in the weight unloaded at Safi, as seen in the following table, which shows the amounts for canning unloaded at the four ports.

Quantities of Fish for Canning Unloaded at Safi, Agadir, Essaouira, and Tan Tan

Year	Safi		Agadir		Essaouira		Tan Tan		Total tonnes
	tonnes	%	tonnes	%	tonnes	%	tonnes	%	
1986	18,034	18.60	32,659	33.68	16,381	16.88	29,918	30.84	96,992
1987	43,077	45.54	20,452	21.62	17,125	18.10	13,941	14.74	94,595
1988 (first half)	4,638		11,051		1,409		5,643		22,741

For reference purposes, note that in 1987, the canning factories as a whole processed 82,300 tonnes of sardines, 87 percent of the total fish canned; 7,565 tonnes of mackerel, 8 percent; and 4,730 tonnes of anchovies, 5 percent.

These figures come from the Office of Fishing. According to ASONAP, the figures should be increased by approximately 12 percent.

The average amount of fish processed in the last three campaigns is close to 120,000 tonnes, too low to optimize the return on production capacity.

Equipment Needs

It seems the fishing profession cannot count on any substantial increase in quantity in the coming years. Policy on coastal fishing is stalled between the need to protect the small-scale fishermen and a total lack of means for overhauling the equipment of the artisanal fleet.

"Modernize" is the appealing slogan coming from government leaders, but it is meaningless without concrete incentive measures to make the effort possible.

In any case, the canners did not wait for incentive measures to overhaul their facilities. Many of them made a special effort to modernize their plants in the last 3 years.

According to investment records of 1985 to 1988, the sector invested nearly 79 million dirhams as follows: equipment replacement, 31 million dirhams; new equipment, 36 million dirhams; expansion and reequipping of production lines, 12 million dirhams.

ASONAP has always encouraged its members to maintain their plants at par with international standards for technology and hygiene.

Twice an American expert has been called in for 1-month stays in Morocco, during which he toured the factories in Agadir, Essaouira, and Safi. His comments and advice persuaded most canners.

The Ministry of Energy, in collaboration with the federation, also did something very interesting in the factories. It surveyed to evaluate energy savings achievable through technical improvements.

ASONAP emphasizes it cannot claim all factories are now model facilities, but it is clear that great progress has been made, especially in hygiene, and the flagrant disparities that used to exist among the plants are being erased. In addition, for some time each in turn has been examined painstakingly by agencies created for this purpose.

Production costs continue to rise, an average rate of 7 percent per year for the last three campaigns.

Cans lead this upward climb. The price of the metal, now determined by the market, is no longer subject to negotiation by the industry.

Next come the fish, especially the amount from Tan Tan which entails more expense because of the distance of transport and the reduced yield.

"General expenses" also rose disproportionately.

The next table shows the quantity of canned goods produced for the period, in cartons of 100 cans ¼ club 30 [as published].

Amount of Fish Canned, in Cartons of 100 Cans ¼ Club 30

Year	Sardines	Mackerel	Tuna	Anchovies and Other	Total
1985/86	2,810,000	233,000	23,000	169,000	3,235,000
1986/87	2,890,000	256,000	32,000	182,000	3,360,000
1987/88	2,510,000	175,000	14,000	166,000	2,865,000

Safi Leads the Pack

The total is clearly over 3 million cartons, except for the last campaign when a nominal drop in production was brought on by a very marked drop-off in fishing during the first half of 1988. It must be pointed out that almost all of this deficit was recovered in the second half of the year, which is not included in these statistics (1988 production is at least 3,115,000 cartons).

Safi's total is still the largest. It almost reached 2 million cartons in 1987 because of a good local catch and an unusually large carryover of cans.

Exports by species during the last three campaigns are shown below.

Exports by Species, 1985-1988

Species	1985/86		1986/87		1987/88	
	tonnes	1000 Dirhams	tonnes	1000 Dirhams	tonnes	1000 Dirhams
Sardines	40,516	585,973	48,120	615,091	41,053	537,968
Mackerel	4,841	84,372	3,945	73,032	4,108	85,766
Anchovies	3,318	96,340	4,576	145,573	5,899	159,627
Tuna	36	1,535	133	3,388	13	294
Other	5,150	76,382	264	2,270	949	10,672
Total	53,861	844,602	57,038	839,354	52,022	794,327

Overall, exports reached an average of 54,000 tonnes, for a value of 820 million dirhams.

In passing, note that the ratio of value to weight for sardines fell noticeably, from 14.46 to 13.10, with a low of 12.78 at the end of 1987.

For the 1987/88 campaign, exports were distributed as follows:

Destination of 1987/88 Exports

Destination	Sardines		Mackerel		Anchovies, Tuna, and Other		Total	
	tonnes	1000 Dirhams	tonnes	1000 Dirhams	tonnes	1000 Dirhams	tonnes	1000 Dirhams
Europe	18,274	286,370	3,941	84,551	6,264	155,623	28,479	526,544
—EEC	(17,844)	(279,230)	(3,909)	(83,485)	(6,243)	(154,654)	(27,996)	(517,369)
—Other	(430)	(7,140)	(3,032)	(1,066)	(21)	(969)	(483)	(9,175)
Africa	19,802	216,982	115	740	239	1,950	20,156	219,672
Middle East	1,598	16,241	4	70	—	—	1,602	16,311
America	969	12,889	16	143	339	12,648	1,324	25,680
Asia	410	5,486	32	262	19	372	461	6,120
Total	41,053	537,968	4,108	85,766	6,861	170,593	52,022	794,327

Thus, for 3 years the profession saw nightmarish moments with contracts at alarming rates which did not even cover the minimum cost of the fish, cans, and labor.

Fortunately, wisdom, not to mention fear of imminent disaster, prevailed.

After general discussion and painstaking debates during two seminars, one at Mohammedia in March 1987 and the other at Agadir in April 1987, the profession finally reached a consensus: an end to underbidding through a voluntary system of self-regulation of bids by surveillance and harmonization of export prices.

OMAN

Omanization of Private Sector Discussed

44000498a Muscat *TIMES OF OMAN* in English
27 Apr 89 p 1

[Report by Meena Gunjvr]

[Excerpt] The Oman Chamber of Commerce and Industry [OCCI] is planning to hold technical and management courses for Omanis in its attempt to accelerate Omanisation in the private sector.

The OCCI President Mr. Maqbul 'Ali Sultan told the *TIMES* this week: "We are conducting a study to have technical and management courses at the Chamber."

The private sector has often been criticised for being slow in Omanising. Replying to such criticisms the President said: "Omanisation is one of the most important things which we are all committed to and it is true that the percentage of Omanis in the private sector is very unsatisfactory."

He said there were many aspects to this problem but one of the main reasons for a slower rate of Omanisation in the private sector was lack of training.

Training, he said, was most important. "If that is resolved more Omanis will be working in the private sector, especially at a time when the government will not be able to take many more Omanis."

He underlined the need for greater coordination between the private sector and the Government in this regard and the need for greater on-the-job training and more training institutes.

He urged the private sector in different economic sectors to establish training centres adding: "The Chamber is presently helping the retail business sector to set up a training centre for Omanis which is an important step towards Omanisation."

He said achieving Omanisation was the national duty of every Omani and that the Chamber had been making its contribution towards this goal.

The President mentioned the paper presented by the Chamber at the Omanisation seminar held at the State Consultative Council in January this year. The seminar aimed to assess the achievement the Government and the private sectors had made in Omanisation and to draw up future plans. [passage omitted]

Significant Industrial Growth in Private Sector Recorded

44000498c Muscat *TIMES OF OMAN* in English
27 Apr 89 p 7

[Text] Oman's industrial growth has been described as "unmatched by any other country in the region" by a new Bahrain-based publication dedicated to the cause of industrial and trade promotion in the Gulf.

The "Made in the Arab World: The AGCC [Arab Gulf Corporation Council] Countries" brought out by Falcon Publishing of Manama also stresses the big role that has been assigned to the private sector in a well-researched article on industry in the Sultanate.

"Oman's planned development process has proved by and large to be a success ... the contribution of the manufacturing sector to GDP [gross domestic product] (at current prices) dramatically surged from just RO2.1 million in 1975 to RO15.6 million in 1980.

Rate

"The rate of growth has since been more spectacular, unmatched by any other country in the region. The manufacturing sector's contribution shot up further to RO40 million in 1982, RO67 million in 1983, RO91 million in 1984, RO112 million in 1985 and further to RO177 million in 1986."

The article, headlined "key role for the private sector" and written by managing editor Dr P.K. Pillai, noted that the rate of growth of 85 times that the industrial sector had achieved over the 12-year period from 1975 to 1986 was a new record for the Arab region, if not for the whole world.

"Oman can legitimately claim to have developed a diversified industrial base within a short span of time," Dr. Pillai wrote.

He pointed out that Oman's industrial scene was dominated by a large number of medium and small-scale units which satisfy a considerable part of the local market requirements for consumer and intermediate goods.

"Some of them have achieved outstanding success in penetrating the neighbouring Arab Gulf markets," the article said.

It added that the Government's policy was to give maximum encouragement to the private sector " ... while the public sector did not hesitate to invest in heavy industries, it sought active private participation wherever possible."

Dr. Pillai said the Government had made it a point to mobilise private initiative by providing substantial financial back-up for the private sector and making available adequate facilities.

He said recently the Commerce and Industry Ministry carried out feasibility studies for certain vital industrial products to help the private sector. The Government, he added, had also set up a number of joint ownership projects to encourage private entrepreneurship.

Government Gas Pipeline Project Discussed

44040353 Muscat AL-WATAN in Arabic 14 Mar 89 p 3

[Article 'Abdallah Ibn-Sa'id al-Jawhari: "Gas Lines Not Needed Until Year 2010. All Areas Can Be Covered."

[Text] As part of current efforts to expand the production capacity of the government gas distribution network, the Ministry of Oil and Minerals is in the process of laying 180 kms of 36" gas pipelines between Jibal and Izki, whereby this distance will be linked to existing pipelines in Izki District.

Khalifah Ibn-Mubarak al-Hana'i, director general of oil and gas at the Ministry of Oil and Minerals, said: "The laying of these new gas pipelines is part of the ministry's ongoing efforts to develop and expand facilities and installations belonging to the government gas network, which is now in its fourth phase."

He said that God willing, the extension process will be completed in the second half of this year.

He indicated that the fourth phase of the network expansion plan includes the drilling of 5 free gas wells, the construction of another natural gas station in al-Gharbah under the control of the Ministry of Electricity and Water and the expansion of Wadi al-Jazi natural gas station at the copper plant in Sahar, in addition to the expansion of other stations to meet the demand for natural gas.

He said that in the summer of 1988, the sultanate was able, for the first time, to utilize gas in industry with a view to supplying factories with their gas needs, pointing out that this step will help cut production costs due to rising fuel oil prices and will facilitate the operation process.

The government, through the Ministry of Oil and Minerals, is now channeling gas from non-associated gas reservoirs in the Jibal field north of Oman to Muscat and Sahar. Gas to the Muscat area is transported via 2"

diameter pipelines along a distance of 325 kms and to Sahar via 1.6" diameter pipelines along the length of the northwestern stretch along the entire Batinah shoreline for a distance of 227 kms.

To get a close look at the gas project in the Jibal area, AL-WATAN toured this major project. Our tour was not easy. We faced many hardships, including rough roads and dirty desert winds, not to mention several car breakdowns along the way in the middle of the desert. But, thanks to God and owing to our determination, we were able to overcome these hardships and continue our difficult journey.

We were accompanied by Khalifah Ibn-Mubarak al-Hana'i, director general of oil and gas at the Ministry of Oil and Minerals. This was an opportune time for him to tell us about the expansion project in the Jibal area.

He began by saying that the Ministry of Oil and Minerals is always seeking to develop and expand the government gas network and that the new expansion has been made necessary by a greater production power and, consequently, higher local consumption, such as supplying factories and government installations in addition to local use. Gas used to be transported via 20" diameter pipelines, but the new expansion in its fourth phase brought the capacity up to 36" at a cost of \$66 million.

Al-Hana'i underscored this by saying: "Therefore, we will not need any gas lines until the year 2010, and we can cover the Muscat and Batinah areas. Furthermore, as a result of optimal exploitation of gas, flames have completely disappeared from most of the sultanate's fields where associated gas used to be burned off during the oil production process."

Studied Plans

He said that the ministry has studied plans to extend government gas pipelines to other areas such as the southern and eastern regions and, God willing, all parts of the sultanate will be covered by the government gas network. If we are to talk about the benefits of government gas, we can say that this network has achieved tremendous success during this period for when the new expansion is completed production rise a hundredfold.

Khalifah Ibn-Mubarak al-Hana'i went on to say: "Ever since we began exploiting gas in 1978, when His Majesty Sultan Qabus Ibn-Sultan opened the natural gas unit in the Jibal field—the year we took our first steps in the gas project—the ministry has been overseeing this project directly and has kept up with gas project developments step by step, attaining the self-sufficiency and the optimal exploitation of this wealth we are now witnessing via a long experiment in this regard."

The director general of oil and gas at the Ministry of Oil and Minerals affirmed that "the ministry is going ahead with its gas program in hope of finding additional

amounts of gas to bolster the country's reserves in order to preserve and develop the natural resources and to substitute gas for oil as a source of energy, thereby cutting costs and promoting the national industries by providing a source of energy at low prices."

Al-Hana'i pointed out that the consumption of government gas has been rising steadily since 1978. For example, in 1978, the year we began using gas, we consumed 0.840 million cubic meters. In 1979, this figure rose to 0.846 million and in 1980, to 1.053 million.

In 1981, consumption went up to 1.306 million cubic meters, then to 1.572 million in 1982, 2.086 million in 1983, jumping to 2.729 million in 1984 and 3.093 million in 1985 and 3.863 million in 1986, then dropped to 3.283 million. We expect consumption to go up in the coming years.

Plan To Utilize Water Resources Formulated

44000498b Muscat *TIMES OF OMAN* in English
20 Apr 89 p 6

[Excerpts] The water resources of al-Batinah region will be utilised under a plan aimed at putting them at the disposal of the national economy.

The use of the rich water resources of this area will be under the supervision of a high-level committee set up by His Majesty Sultan Qabus by virtue of a Royal Decree.

The committee, named 'National Committee for guiding the use of al-Batinah waters' will formulate plans which show the Government's endeavour to develop and safeguard water resources.

The committee will secure active participation of citizens in the efforts to exploit properly the water resources in the al-Batinah region with a view to promoting agriculture.

The committee will be chaired by His Majesty's Advisor for Economic Planning Affairs and its deputy chairman will be the Minister of Regional Municipalities. [passage omitted]

The decree empowers the committee to seek assistance of experts from Ministries and government organisations whenever required.

The office of the advisor to His Majesty for Economic Planning will send the necessary staff to make up the secretariat of the committee. The office will also provide a specialised expert for the deliberations of the committee. Contacts with citizens will be made through information media and through the Walis and government organisations in the al-Batinah region.

The decree says that all those whose participation is required for the committee's activities must fully cooperate with it 'in order to enable it to perform its functions in the best way'.

The activities of the committee will conclude at the end of December 1989.

QATAR

State Budget Ratified

44000499b Muscat *TIMES OF OMAN* in English
27 Apr 89 p 17

[Excerpt] The Emir Shaykh Khalifah Ibn-Hamad Al Thani, recently promulgated an Emir decree ratifying the state budget for fiscal year 1989-90, as proposed by the Minister of Finance and Petroleum, Shaykh 'Abd-al'Aziz Ibn-Khalifah Al Thani.

The budget estimates revenue of QR5.835bn—7.9 percent less than that of the outgoing year—and expenditure of QR11.482bn—7.7 percent less—leaving a deficit of QR5.648bn. Last year's estimated deficit was QR6.106bn.

In a statement accompanying the budget Shaykh 'Abd-al'Aziz stressed the budget's thrust of continuing the policy of expenditure rationalisation and development of revenue resources without undermining general performance. [passage omitted]

Equal Treatment for AGCC Nationals Decided

44000499a Muscat *TIMES OF OMAN* in English
27 Apr 89 p 17

[Text] The Emir Shaykh Kahlifah ibn-Hamad al Thani has issued a law according equal treatment to AGCC [Arab Gulf Corporation Council] nationals at Qatari health centres, clinics and hospitals.

Under the law AGCC nationals residing or on visit in Qatar will be granted equal treatment as Qatari citizens at public health establishments in the country.

The Emir also issued a law giving equal treatment to AGCC nationals regarding taxes.

Industrial Accomplishments, Balanced Economy Discussed

44040287 Paris *AL-MUSTAQBAL* in Arabic
25 Feb 89 pp 42-43

["Qatar in 17 Years: Towards a Balanced Economy"]

[Text]

Qatar commemorates the 17th anniversary of Shaykh Khalifah Ibn-Hamad Al Thani's accession to power: A spotlight on Qatar's economic accomplishments

Qatar, in its economic development plans, is raising its slogan calling for the attainment of a balanced economy based upon the choice of industry as an approach to building a firm production foundation and the development of numerous petrochemical industries and high-yield basic industrial projects capable of surviving and competing in foreign markets.

This slogan concurs with the declaration of the Emir of the State Qatar Shaykh Khalifah Ibn-Hamad Al Thani: "In our view, industrialization projects are important in that they constitute the cornerstone in the building of our nation's edifice. We have embarked on industrialization and instituted its programs because we do not want to subject ourselves to economic perils in the future. Perhaps, the most important safeguards in this connection constitute an effort to diversify the sources of our national income by building a firm industrial foundation, for this would lessen our dependence on oil."

The studied plans and programs implemented by the government bodies supervising the development and growth of the industrial sector have attained a number of levels of industrial fundamentals as manifested in the enactment of a large number of industrial regulations, subsidy incentives, customs exemptions and the provision of basic infrastructure services such as water, electricity, and transportation at suitable prices for promotion, in addition to the building of numerous complexes and industrial areas equipped with all the necessary requisites and services. The most prominent industrial areas in Qatar are manifest in three integrated complexes. Two of these complexes are located in the Musay'id area, the first of which is devoted to heavy industry and the second, to medium industry. The third area, located west of the city of Doha and Salwa Road, specializes in light industry and encompasses most of the private sector's industrial projects.

The Musay'id area is considered the foremost industrial area in Qatar. It represents a huge industrial arsenal, for it contains the heavy industries, and the natural gas liquefaction, steel, iron, and petrochemical complexes. The other industrial complexes receive a great deal of government subsidy incentives to encourage the private sector to invest and participate more in setting up and operating numerous light consumer industries in order to produce an economic return that would guarantee a reduction in the bill for foreign commodity imports.

In the oil sector last year, the collective accomplishments in the field of refining were characterized by a large increase in the National Oil Distribution Company (NODCO)'s production. The total production of its refinery reached 12.10 million barrels of assorted high-quality petroleum products, amounting to a 15 percent increase over the previous production rates. This was

done in order to meet the increasing demand for local products in fulfillment of the export contracts concluded with Qatar General Petroleum Corporation and to create a strategic reserve that would satisfy the local consumption of petroleum products for a period of approximately more than 2 months. NODCO's sales volume also increased in 1988, reaching 650 million Riyals, an increase of 18 percent over the previous year. Exports of petroleum products for the same period amounted to 7.6 million barrels.

Among the production development projects supervised by Qatar General Petroleum Corporation is the laying of two oil pipelines that connect the refinery to the oil platforms at Musay'id Port: one for white products and local distribution, and the other for exporting the surplus products not needed by the local market. In the future, the quantity of exports is expected to double once these two pipelines become fully operational. This would enable the company to operate the refinery at a higher production capacity and realize additional revenue for the country.

In the domain of chemical fertilizers, Qatar Chemical Fertilizer Company (QAFCO) continued its excellent performance in the production of ammonia and urea during the past year—setting new records that surpass the projected production capacity by a high percentage. The ammonia sales volume for 1987 reached new record numbers. However, the urea sales volume for the same year decreased by 100 thousand tons as a result of the drop in urea prices in world markets. This is because the company exerted great efforts in guiding production and reducing costs so as to confront the probable losses resulting from the price drop.

In the domain of steel, Qatar's Iron and Steel Company (QASCO) maintained its production performance level which had only witnessed slight fluctuations last year when its production of spongy iron dropped by only 1 percent of its production of steel blocks dropped by about 3 percent, whereas its production of reinforcing bars increased by 2 percent.

QASCO is still operating at an actual production capacity that greatly surpasses the projected production capacity, which increased from a 100 percent rate of production in 1987 to about a 153 percent rate of production in 1988.

QASCO is considered to be among those companies having a international reputation for operational efficiency and realization of projected production capacity. QASCO's sales of reinforcing bars have witnessed a 1.4 percent quantitative increase in 1988.

As for the Qatar Petrochemical Company, its production of ethylene has attained the highest percentage since it began production, having reached 262,687 metric tons, 93.8 percent of the projected production capacity.

The Company's polyethylene production has reached 173,891 tons, 124 percent of the projected production capacity. Sulfur production has set a new record since the inception of production at the factory, having reached 48,211 tons, 104.8 percent of the projected production capacity.

Last year's production showed a noticeable development with high percentages of the projected production capacity achieved placing it in a prominent position vis-a-vis previous years. As a result, ethylene sales last year registered a quantitative increase of 24 percent over the previous sales. However, the quantity of polyethylene sold registered a 15.36 percent decrease. Yet, the price per ton registered a market increase which compensated for the quantitative decrease in this product's sales.

Qatar General Petroleum Corporation supervises the operation of two liquefied natural gas factories in Musay'id. The production of this huge complex, which began operating in 1981, has witnessed increasing rates of production in comparison with its projected production capacity which amounts to 2,370 tons of propane daily, 1,750 tons of butane, 1,750 tons of compressed gas, and approximately 2,495 tons of ethane-rich gas.

Qatar's cement industry—the oldest of the national industries—has been characterized by a far-reaching reputation for the excellence in its production specifications. Qatar National Cement Manufacturing Company has made wide-spread achievements, especially in the area of expanding production. It currently operates three factories that produce regular cement, Portland cement, and salt-resistant cement—as compared to only one factory when production began in 1969. During the past year, the production capacity of the Company's three furnaces reached about 330 thousand tons of the assorted types of cement.

In addition to the aforementioned 'skeleton' industries, the State, in cooperation with the private sector, has established a wide range of medium and light industries which include the organic fertilizer and unslaked lime projects and factories for the manufacture of cleaners, cardboard, dyes, garments, paper, and plastics, in addition to the production of milk and dairy products, household furniture, and glass and the manufacture of electrical equipment.

The Most Important Active Industries Are:

1. Flour mills, which have been operating since 1972 under private sector capital, with the aim of producing and satisfying local consumption needs for flour and bran. Their annual production capacity amounts to about 30 thousand tons of flour, semolina, and bran.

2. The organic fertilizer industry, which has been operating since 1977, under the supervision of the Ministry of Municipal Affairs, for the purpose of transforming refuse into organic fertilizer and providing 70 tons of organic fertilizer daily for land cultivation improvement.

3. Paper and plastic factories, run by the private sector to meet the country's needs for paper and plastic wrapping and packaging materials. There are 22 installations for manufacturing plastics, as well as more than 20 installations for manufacturing paper.

4. The manufacture of cleaners: Qatar Cleaners Company, run by the private sector, undertakes the task of satisfying local consumption needs for high-quality cleaners. Its annual production amounts to about 9,000 tons of powders and 18,000 tons of liquid cleaners.

5. New projects: The industrial institutions supervising the development of national industry have granted numerous licenses (about 15 during the past year) to set up and establish different industrial projects, including the manufacture of plastic bags, oil-base and water-base dyes, heat and sound insulating glass, various electrical equipment, and motor oils.

SUDAN

Ba'th Party Proposes Oversight Committee for New Government

Formation of 'People's Committee'

45040303 Khartoum AL-HADAF in Arabic
27 Mar 89 p 4

[Article by Abu-Mazin: "Political Party-Trade Union Grouping Must Remain"]

[Text] We repeat what we have said previously, that the makeup of al-Sadiq's recent fifth government was born in the way that Mr al-Sadiq al-Mahdi has traditionally followed in bringing his governments into the world. It is a barren way, because it forces the child, against its will, to see the light of day while bearing in its overall shape distortions of character and lasting infirmities.

One consolation remains. The new government has made a public commitment that the interim program will be the only program that will guide its steps throughout the limited period of its life. But fears surround this one consolation, legitimate fears emerging from the flanking movement that al-Sadiq led against the national consensus that called for State Council sponsorship of the group negotiations and consultations on the formation of the expanded government into which the DUP [Democratic Unionist Party] was drawn and that bore fruit in a coalition government. In addition, there is the continued presence of the locally, regionally, and internationally infamous old guard in the body of the new government.

Nevertheless, the popular movement will cling to that one consolation, wagering that the new balance of forces on the scene, a balance that has imposed its prestige and presence since the December uprising, can exert pressure on the government if it diverges even an inch from the path of the interim program or if there is any connivance in the accomplishment of its urgent issues, particularly those of peace and the holding of the constitutional conference at an appropriate date in the near future.

The only way for the popular movement to press the government to abide by the interim program lies in continuing the formula of a grouping of political parties and trade unions that signed the program. It should be continued in the form of a permanent, organized, and stable people's committee to monitor and follow the government's performance as regards rapid political steps toward serious implementation of the program on a definite and prescribed timetable.

The new balance of national forces has proven its effectiveness and positive influence on the course of events favoring peace, democracy, and a decent life for the people of the Sudan. What is now demanded of this new balance in the field is that it continue its role of putting pressure on the course of political events in favor of the new government's abiding by the interim program. This will be seriously achieved only if a people's committee whose backbone is provided by the grouping of political parties and trade unions that signed the interim program exists to exercise credible oversight of the government's implementation of the program and of its not circumventing it.

Idea Supported by Other Parties

45040303 Khartoum AL-HADAF in Arabic
28 Mar 89 p 1

[Article: "Ba'th Party Call That Government Performance Be Monitored by 'People's Committee' of Forces That Signed the Program Welcomed"]

[Text] Political parties welcomed the Arab Socialist Ba'th Party's note to the State Council and political party and trade union leaders calling for the political parties and trade unions that signed the interim program to become a people's committee to fight for the program's implementation, preserve it from attempts at retreat or circumvention, and monitor the government's performance.

Dr Ahmad Bilal, member of the DUP [Democratic Unionist Party] Political Bureau, said that from the very first day they had considered themselves an oversight committee for popular monitoring of the new government's activity. Dr Bilal stated that they were with the government whenever it abided by the agreed-upon interim program, and against it whenever it departed even an inch from it. He said, "We will have no mercy on

the government if it turns away from the program. We will not be bound by partisanship in the coming period. The conduct of any minister will be held to account."

Mr Yuhannur Aklu, official spokesman for the African parties (BUSAB), asked that this be done quickly, so that no laxity would occur in the program's implementation. He added, "The fusion of all the forces that signed the program and believe in it into a people's committee is a call on whose side we stand. We will back it and give it support."

TUNISIA

Central Bank Governor Discusses IMF Loans, Unemployment

45190072 Tunis LE MAGHREB in French
21 Apr 89 pp 24-25

[Reprint of interview with Ismail Khelil, Tunisian Central Bank governor, originally published in ARABIES; interviewer's name, date, and place of interview not given—first paragraph is LE MAGHREB introduction]

[Text] We are reprinting the text of an interview given by Mr Khelil, member of the political bureau of the RCD [Rally for Constitutional Democracy] and minister-governor of the central bank, to the monthly magazine ARABIES, published in France. His sober remarks give a true idea of the state of the Tunisian economy.

[ARABIES] What condition is the country in, 1 and ½ years after Zine El Abidine Ben Ali came to power?

[Khelil] We inherited a heavy burden. Prior to 7 November 1987, there was a definite laxity in the way state affairs were run. Salaries were increased without consideration for the country's actual situation. All of that adds up to the fact that in July 1986, we entered into the greatest economic crisis the country has experienced since it became independent.

We were able to remedy the situation by instituting a structural adjustment plan which was chosen because the convergence of difficult economic conditions that occurred in 1986—most of them arising from phenomena existing outside Tunisian borders—had revealed the fragility of our economy. Hence the need to restructure in such a way as to avert the economic crisis, improve the standard of living, create as many jobs as possible, and, most importantly, improve our competitive standing and performance.

In short, it was on the basis of this structural adjustment plan that we negotiated lines of credit with the World Bank [International Bank for Reconstruction and Development] [IBRD] and the International Monetary Fund (IMF). I wish to make it clear that the plan was not dictated to us by these international financial institutions (the IBRD and the IMF).

[ARABIES] Thus, in 1986, Tunisia had recourse to the IMF and the international banking institutions in implementing its recovery plan. What results can be seen today, more than 2 years after the the plan was put into motion?

[Khelil] On the one hand, we had recourse to lines of credit from the World Bank in the form of sector loans: agricultural loans, industrial loans, etc. On the other hand, we obtained facilities from the International Monetary Fund with the unanimous support of nations friendly to us....

More than 2 years after the implementation of our structural adjustment plan, I must say that the overall results are positive. A few of the figures obtained in 1987 are: a growth rate of about 5.8 percent (in constant prices) and a rise in exports of 25 percent; as for income from tourism, a sharp rise of 47 percent was posted. We ended the year with good foreign currency reserves and reduced the deficit in our balance of payments, bringing it down to a mere 1 percent.

There are of course a few clouds in the picture: We were not able to create as many jobs as we would have liked and the debt continues to weigh on us.

[ARABIES] What is the debt estimated to be and what are the terms for repaying it?

[Khelil] To date, Tunisia has always honored its debt commitments on time. We do not have a problem of arrears. I must make it clear that our country did not for a moment consider the idea of rescheduling its debt....

It costs us \$1 million to service this debt. We are in the process of trying to reduce the amount outstanding which is about 5 million dinars. Our debt is structured in relatively healthy proportions: 60 percent is long-term and 40 percent is short- and mid-term.

[ARABIES] You have cited another major problem: unemployment. What approach are you taking to pull the country out of it?

[Khelil] Overall, I remain optimistic on the future because we see continued improvement in 1988, which is the second year of the plan. In 9 months, we accumulated sizeable foreign currency reserves. They could cover 3 months' worth of imports...which leaves us with considerable room to work with.

There remains the problem of growth and the creation of jobs: That is our Achilles' heel because we are saddled with 300,000 jobless persons. Of course, we knew from the start that the adjustment plan is not a magic potion that will instantly result in increased production and, consequently, a greater rate of job creation.

Because unemployment cannot wait, we must have recourse to social remedies, even before the economic solution begins to take effect. The important point is to guarantee a minimum income to every young Tunisian who enters the job market. In this context, while waiting for the economy to create jobs, we have instituted a program of regional development: In 1987, we made numerous grants to the governors of regions to enable them to start up regional projects likely to employ young people.

[ARABIES] A lighter tax burden and fiscal amnesty.... Will these investment-incentive measures eventually benefit only a privileged few in economic and financial circles?

[Khelil] No, these measures will benefit the entire community to the extent that we put our faith in our businessmen and business owners. They are the ones who will create jobs; not the state. We want the state to play a lesser role in economic development and management. It is perfectly understandable that we would turn to our business owners to offer them security and, more importantly, to involve them more in the the development process.

[ARABIES] Do you think that there is a risk that your program for a healthier economy will be disrupted by labor unrest as a result of the repercussions of drought and unemployment, among other factors?

[Khelil] It seems to me that the Tunisian people have demonstrated a great deal of good sense in the past. Today, it seems to me that an educational and awareness campaign is needed to explain to our countrymen the serious difficulties the nation's economy is facing. They will more readily understand the need for us to tighten our belts and brave rough times with as much solidarity as possible. That is the only way to make it through. The unions can assume an important role in maintaining a constructive dialogue.

[ARABIES] Some assert that the salary increases recently granted amount to a "blank check"....

[Khelil] It is true that Tunisia was living beyond its means in years gone by. But we are making every effort to control income policy and consequently, domestic demand. If President Ben Ali approved the modest increase, it was to demonstrate his sensitivity to the problems caused by the erosion of purchasing power, as salaries had not been raised since 1983.

Student Leaders Discuss University Conflict, Propose Solutions

Tunis REALITES in French 24-30 Mar 89 pp 29-31

[Interview with Abdellatif Mekki, general secretary of the UGET, and Hamadi El Euch, spokesman for the UGTE, by Nejib Lakenji; date and place not given]

[Text] Following outbreaks of violence at most of our universities, REALITES organized a face-off between the two union organizations: the UGET [General Union

of Tunisian Students], represented by its general secretary, Abdellatif Mekki; and the UGET [Tunisian General Student Union], which sent its spokesman, Hamadi el Euch.

[Question] Acts of violence and strikes have broken out on several campuses in recent days. How do you explain this growing unrest in the universities?

[El Euch] We must emphasize one thing: The problem was poorly presented by the Tunisian media. The scope of the violence was exaggerated. Our positions in the UGET are clear. We are against the use of violence in any form, no matter which political faction practices it.

The violence that has seized the university is aimed at UGET members and their objectives. It is a means to divert student opinion from the real problems that our organization raises every day in the different professional schools. It is a huge obstacle erected before us.

In posing the problem of violence, so as to seek the causes prompting students to act in this manner, we believe it is a reaction that has its roots in the difficulties experienced by Tunisian students and that it is a sociopsychological problem. However, having said that much, this form of counterattack by violence must never exist. In my opinion, we must seek peaceful solutions and not allow ourselves to get caught in the vicious cycle of violence. It is also true that certain splinter groups use violence to create malaise within the university. These splinter groups are thereby trying to hurt union work and damage our image.

The action is aimed at proving that the two trade union organizations are not capable of organizing students and gaining control of the situation.

[El Mekki] Speaking for the UGET, we are very optimistic about the results of our action in the universities aimed at surrounding and overcoming this pseudoscourge of violence. I think the problem is posed in other terms.

Such acts of violence are strictly aimed at our union organization, and those who are responsible for them want to create tension and malaise and bring about the failure of the era of democracy now beginning in our universities. Naturally, this does not rule out the fact that certain acts are due to the demands of the students, who are asking for an improvement in the student situation inside and outside the university. And we in the UGET support all the students' demands.

Other acts are the work of a few splinter groups which, as El Euch emphasized, are trying in this fashion to put a stick in the spokes of our organization and show that there is no union work and that no organization can henceforth truly organize Tunisian universities.

I would say that they are mistaken. I can even assure them that such isolated acts of violence will not last forever and will, as the days go by, completely disappear from the student scene.

[Question] Some think there are perhaps "mysterious hands" behind these disturbances, which in their opinion are not spontaneous. What do you think?

[El Mekki] We have formed an investigative committee to go out in the field, seek out these disturbing elements and define the precise causes of the violence. The task of this commission is also to make an in-depth investigation outside the student scene. But what I can say now, according to the early results of the UGET inquiry, is that the "outside hands" manipulating certain student splinter groups are not many. They naturally exist, but they are not as strong as one imagines.

The violence is the work of a few student groups. It is true there is a bond between these groups of different political factions and other individuals or parties outside the university.

But two explanations can be given for these acts of violence. The first is that there are elements on the student scene that are against any new democratic era in the university and that their actions define their ideologies. By every possible means, they are trying to destabilize the university and existing organizations.

The second explanation one hears is that these acts of violence are nothing more than the settling of accounts between students, whose ideologies and political-social factions are opposed to one another.

[El Euch] The first cause of the violence is the presence of law enforcement officers on the campuses, which is a provocation aimed at the students. I therefore assign a large share of the responsibility to the authorities and even the professors. The second cause is the exclusion of the students. We in the UGET suffer as a recognized organization from the same evil. We have been dispossessed of all our material rights. We are in a disastrous material situation, which cannot encourage us to carry out our union task successfully. We are incapable of perfectly organizing our rank and file and cells.

There are naturally outside hands in the university manipulating these splinter groups and trying to trouble the student scene in order to prove that the union organization is incapable of handling the situation in the university. But as El Mekki has said, these groups are doomed to failure.

[Question] What are the solutions to the violence?

[El Mekki] A few solutions exist. We must concentrate union work on sociocultural activities, first of all, in order to broaden the student's horizons and enable him to express himself in his own space. We must teach him

to live in society, despite ideological and political divergencies and on that basis, create student solidarity, forgetting about political orientations.

Politically speaking, we hope that differences will disappear and that the major political families existing on the student scene will consolidate their presence in a democratic spirit and establish a political pluralism on solid foundations.

We must also strengthen union work and the organizations. That is why I personally believe in a single union organization with democratic foundations. We in the UGTE believe that such a structure to which all political factions belong will be in the interest of the university and the nation.

We are for a single student union, a single human rights league, a single women's union and a single workers' union because all these unions have the same philosophy and the same sociopolitical objectives. These organizations work far from any partisan commitment, independently of any ideology. In my opinion, in order to eliminate violence, we must above all purge the student scene of any disturbing and provocative elements and offer students a cultural space with the necessary means, without exclusivity or exclusion, for ideological reasons. We must also withdraw law enforcement forces from the campuses as soon as possible so as to reduce coercion and pressure and finally, encourage dialogue between the different political factions and the government.

[El Euch] As I said at the beginning of the debate, the UGET believes that violence or resorting to isolated acts does not serve the student, the university or the country. On the contrary, it can erect obstacles and hurt union action. In the name of my organization, I reiterate the condemnation of such acts of violence.

Our union has repeatedly held special meetings to express its positions and attitudes. According to the UGET, solutions are within reach of the student himself. Dialogue between the government and the students must be democratic, open and sincere. There must be an equal distribution of material benefits and our union's property, premises and rights must be restored.

(After the questions asked by REALITES, each representative was given an opportunity to ask the other two questions of his own choosing.)

[El Euch] Why does the UGTE not organize all student groups, despite its openness, and concentrate on a single faction?

[El Mekki] Above all, I would say that the UGET has never represented all political factions within the Tunisian university and this has been so since its creation. The UGET was preceded by another student organization, which is the Voice of the Zitounian Student, and this organization was the only one that represented all

students in the republic and played an important role under the occupation and thereafter. Today, as you know, Shaykh Mohamed El Fitoui has returned to us after several years in exile and he was the first leader of that organization.

I would therefore say that despite all the blows dealt to student representation by the former regime and Bourguiba himself with the creation of other organizations to destabilize the Voice of the Zitounian Student, they never succeeded.

Bourguiba then had the idea of creating the General Union of Tunisian Students. I am not accusing those who participated in its creation of being Bourguiba supporters. Among them were nationalist students seeking the good of the student. In order to counter such an attempt, the Voice of the Zitounian Student formed a coalition with Ben Youssef's party, but the organization was nevertheless dissolved. The UGET was the only organization on the student scene, without thereby representing all ideological factions. It represented only the Destourian students.

As far as the UGTE is concerned, I recall it was created in the 1960's, but it was in 1985 that the official creation took place. The birth of the UGTE was above all the work of the student base, which tried to show that the UGET no longer responded to its needs. A union organization does not exist to engage in politics, but rather, to seek immediate solutions to problems facing the Tunisian student every day.

That is why I have always called for the unification of union work under the aegis of a single union, in an atmosphere of brotherhood and democracy. In that way, we will be a more homogeneous live force.

[El Mekki] The UGTE has issued an appeal for the unification of the two union organizations and we are awaiting a precise response. I am therefore asking Mr El Euch why they do not respond and see that the process is stepped up in the presence of a third party and by organizing a referendum among the students.

[El Euch] I do not totally agree with the general secretary of the UGTE on the recital of the history of union organizations and I will not go back to all the points, but I would draw his attention to the fact that the UGET is an organization that has its base in Tunisian universities.

The reality of the student situation today requires the unification of union unity because we believe that union pluralism is a cancer and a danger to Tunisian universities.

We have repeatedly called for it and we await the results. There are several ideological factions within the professional schools awaiting unification in order to strengthen union work by their presence. For us, it is an ideal framework for organizing all students.

[El Mekki] That is not an answer. I am asking whether the UGET is now ready to begin a dialogue and leave the refereeing up to the students in the presence of a neutral organization.

[El Euch] Our presence here in this face-off is already proof that the problem of unification exists and that we must begin the dialogue. In several of our communiques, we emphasized the importance of the subject on which the future of our universities depends. I think that we shall one day go back to the rank and file to decide that.

But today, it is still very early to return to such a process because the university is not yet ready. The majority of the students, and we must be sincere, does not belong to the two unions. The two unions do not totally organize the universities and that is why, before plunging into such a venture, we must, in my opinion, create the necessary conditions.

Sources of Funding for Student Unions Questioned

45040309 Tunis AL-NAWAR AL-TUNISIYAH in Arabic 2 Apr 89 p 5

[Interview with student union treasurer by 'Adil]

[Text] Who is financing the two student unions? This question was previously posed by AL-ANWAR to 'Abd-al-Latif al-Makki and Samir al-'Ubaydi in the context of an interview organized by us. However, that interview did not provide the opportunity for more than a brief answer.

This time, we attempted to arrange two interviews regarding rumors about the financial situation of the two unions, one with 'Abd-al-Latif al-Fakhfakh, the treasurer of the Union Generale Tunisien d'Etudiants [UGTE], and one with al-Tahir Varvurah, the treasurer of the Union Generale des Etudiants Tunisiens [UGET].

Recently, it has been frequently mentioned among students that the UGTE acquired a bus for an incredible sum. At the same time, others are saying that the bus has not yet arrived, and that final arrangements to acquire it have begun. Previously, and during the Shaykh Imam gatherings [haflat], groups of students had deliberated the topic of what the UGTE had obtained as booty from these gatherings to strengthen its financial balance, to which, they state, an unrecognized opposition movement had committed itself to paying whatever is needed!

We wanted to pose all of these points and other questions to 'Abd-al-Latif al-Fakhfakh, the treasurer. However he was not available (because of the break), and we did not find any other member willing to respond to these questions.

House on the Roof

For their part, members of the executive office of the UGET continued to grumble and register their disgust about the "emaciated" financial situation which they have been experiencing since the period of the achievements of the 18th convention, and which is mirrored in their adopted headquarters, a roof-top apartment in the capital containing nothing but two tables, four chairs, a telephone, and several documents cast onto the floor.

Treasurer al-Tahir Varvurah states: "Our income comes primarily from our (regular and honorary) membership dues [inkhiratat]. These dues have been insufficient. We rejected a suggestion to visit commercial and industrial organizations and companies which usually allocate funds in the form of aid to organizations. We did so out of a number of considerations dictated by the current phase."

Al-Tahir Varvurah adds: "We rejected the American method of advertising by distributing memberships [inkhiratat] and organizing activities, so that membership does not lose its value. For us, membership is basically a token of moral support of the struggle. Therefore, we do not distribute it commercially as others have done."

Regarding the current situation of the UGET, al-Tahir Varvurah adds: "We are not holding our hands out for help, even though a number of our programs and activities have become inactive due to the unavailability of funds. We cancelled them because we refused to accept booby-trapped aid and gifts from anyone. We consider our current situation a valuable lesson for the union's defenders."

Al Tahir Varvurah adds that "We have declined to participate in joint Arab, and even international, student programs, because we do not wish to participate without possessing our own financial capabilities. We also refused invitations from abroad, because we were unable to subsequently return them.

Invitation

"Perhaps the state of our headquarters is a significant indication of our poverty. Therefore, I issue an invitation for you to visit this headquarters, which is almost bare." Al-Tahir Varvurah told several anecdotes: "We are sometimes at a loss for transportation funds. Imagine, we once covered summer work costs by using the rent money of a member of the executive office, which caused him problems with his landlord. Likewise, at the start of each month, we are wholly engaged in coming up with the rent fee for the headquarters, without thinking about furnishing it, which is considered a luxury in view of our situation."

Finally, it should be mentioned that the supervisory authority allocated 5,000 dinars to each union after the two unions were legally recognized. Also, the field remains open to 'Abd-al-Latif al-Fakhfakh to respond to our columns dealing with various abdications of responsibility, and to address the financial situation of the union.

PEOPLE'S DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF YEMEN

Rains Destroy Houses, Crops

44040352 London AL-SHARQ AL-AWSAT in Arabic
24 Mar 89 p 1

[Article by Zaki Musa: "Torrential Rain Disaster in South Yemen: 50,000 Homeless in Aden."]

[Text] Floods and heavy rains in the governorates of Hadramawt, al-Mahrah and Shabwah in particular, and the other governorates in the PDRY [People's Democratic Republic of Yemen], left 50,000 people homeless. Floods washed away over 2,000 homes and hundreds of others were damaged. Vast areas of agricultural land were spoiled and hundreds of agricultural machines were destroyed, in addition to lines of communication being cut off, especially between the Hajar and al-Mukla districts in the Hadramawt Governorate.

The deputy prime minister appealed to Adeni interior minister Brigadier General Salih Munsir al-Sayli, who has been assigned to chair a special ministerial committee to provide emergency aid to the people immediately after an emergency meeting chaired by President Haydar Abu-Bakr al-'Attas that included leaders of pertinent agencies, and countries and humanitarian organizations offering emergency aid to the homeless inhabitants.

In a telephone conversation with AL-SHARQ AL-AWSAT, Brigadier General al-Sayli said that heavy rain was falling all over the republic, a number of inhabitants had been left homeless, hundreds of homes had been damaged and vast areas of agricultural land had been destroyed due to floods. He also said that the pertinent agencies had declared a state of emergency among their ranks in order to lessen the damage caused by the floods.

According to special reports AL-SHARQ AL-AWSAT received, damage in Hadramawt as of yesterday morning was estimated as follows:

- 592 houses completely destroyed.
- 800 houses partially destroyed.
- 150 water pumps (81 pumps in Sunnah and al-Thum alone) destroyed.
- 2,000 houses damaged.
- 2,500 feddans washed away by the floods.
- 5 schools destroyed.
- 400 agricultural machines washed away by the floods.
- 10,000 palm trees destroyed or uprooted.
- 200 vehicles damaged.
- 50,000 or more people homeless.
- Hundreds of houses and whole residential units evacuated.

Another report had mentioned that a large number of houses in Say'un District were destroyed and lines of communications were cut off in various districts, especially in the Lu'ayt area in Wadi Musilah in al-Mahrah Governorate, in addition to the destruction of 250 houses in the city of Turaym. Reports said that thousands of livestock perished as well.

Government authorities in Aden initiated a series of contacts via foreign ambassadors in Aden and via their ambassadors abroad to mobilize international organizations and relief committees and to apprise them of the extent of the damage the country has suffered in order to obtain material, technical, medical and in-kind assistance.

Prime Minister Muhammad Sa'id Na'man, who was on an official visit to Sanaa, ended his visit that began last Monday after meeting with the president, Colonel 'Ali 'Abdallah Salih, to inform him about the disaster and discussed with him other issues dealing with unification efforts between Aden and Sanaa.

It is known that the population of the Hadramawt Governorate hit by the floods is over 668,000 persons and is about 600 kms from the capital, Aden. It depends on the date harvest, vegetable farming, tobacco, fishing and an abundance of green pastures.

Col al-Sayli promised that the authorities will do their best to alleviate suffering and to rebuild what has been destroyed by the floods as soon as possible after a damage assessment.

BANGLADESH

Reportage on Aspects of Bangladesh-Soviet Trade

Barter Protocol Signed

46001456 Dhaka *THE BANGLADESH OBSERVER* in English 28 Mar 89 pp 1, 10

[Text] Bangladesh and the Soviet Union signed the 18th barter protocol in Dhaka on Monday under which Bangladesh will export for the first time telephone cables, handicrafts and sport shoes to the Soviet Union, reports BSS.

Other exports from Bangladesh include raw jute, jute cloth, jute bags, loose tea, goat skin, crust, semi-finished and finished leather, ready-made garments, books and periodicals.

The items to be imported under the barter protocol include machinery equipment including spare parts, steel rolls, tyres and tubes, raw cotton, high speed diesel, books, and periodicals.

Commerce Secretary Khorshed Alam and the visiting Deputy Minister for Foreign Economic Relations of USSR, Vladimir Fedorovitch Mordvinov, signed the protocol on behalf of their respective governments.

Under the barter provision Bangladesh will export goods worth 21 million pound sterling while its imports from the Soviet Union will [be] worth 19 million pound sterling.

The excess export of two million pound sterling as envisaged in this year's barter protocol, will go to meet the loan repayment for the current year, officials said.

The leaders of the two delegation also exchanged letters stipulating export of Bangladeshi commodities worth about 10.81 million pound sterling this year (1989) towards repayment or credit, Bangladesh owes to the Soviet Union for the purchase of machinery for Ghorasal Thermal Power Station (TPS).

The commodities to be exported towards credit repayment include traditional and non-traditional items like raw jute, jute cloth, loose tea, goat skin, semi-finished and finished leather, ready-made garments and tooth-paste.

Later talking to newsmen, Mr Khorshed Alam expressed the hope that both sides would make concerted endeavours to fully implement the barter protocol.

He said the size of the protocol was mutually satisfactory to both the countries. We have diversified the trade relations between the two countries, he added.

Replaying to a question, Mr Alam said the trade imbalance of Bangladesh with the Soviet Union amounted to 100 million pound sterling till November 1988 from 1973-74. We are trying to improve the situation, he said.

The leader of the five-member Soviet delegation, Mr Mordvinov said the economic cooperation between "our two countries as a whole has been developing dynamically."

Referring to the Soviet assistance in the Ghorasal Thermal Power Station, Mr Mordvinov said the total capacity of the station would amount to 950 megawatt after putting into operation unit numbers 5 and 6, making it the biggest station in Bangladesh.

Replying to a question, he said the Soviet Union might buy Bangladeshi goods in future on cash depending upon the items. He, however, indicated that the amount might not be big.

He said the Soviet government encourages and stimulates development of different forms of economic cooperation including foundation of joint ventures and companies and cooperation of different branches of industry with foreign partners.

Mr Mordvinov assured that his government would take all steps to fully implement the barter protocol.

Trade Deficit With USSR

46001456 Dhaka *THE NEW NATION* in English 29 Mar 89 pp 1, 8

[Article by Hassan Abul Quashem]

[Text] Bangladesh has incurred a huge deficit in its trade with the Soviet Union as the volume of imports has always been much higher than that of exports since independence with the exception of fiscal 1978-79 and 82-83 when transactions were in favour of Bangladesh.

According to official statistics, Bangladesh suffered trade deficits to the tune of U.S.\$217.63 million equivalent to Tk 480.2 crore during the last 16 years since 1973-74. It exported to the USSR commodities worth about \$527 million equivalent to Tk 1023.23 crore as against its import of commodities worth \$744.59 million equivalent to Tk 1503.43 crore over the same period.

Of the total imports, commodities worth over \$471 million were imported under cash purchase, wage earners scheme (WES) and barter while the rest over \$273 million worth of commodities imported under the loans and grants. But in fiscal '78-79 and 82-83 Bangladesh's exports were considerably higher than its imports.

Though, the bulk of bilateral trade transactions between the two countries was supposed to be made under bilateral trade protocols, the situation became different in recent years as trade under the barter agreements slowed down.

The imports under cash, WES and barter have registered decline since fiscal'82-83. In fiscal'81-82, the import under cash, barter and WES was \$41.3 million which subsequently declined to only \$28.3 million. In fiscal'84-85 the import further declined to the lowest level of \$19.2 million. The level of import was the same in fiscal'85-86. Import under loans and grants have also been declining since the early'80s.

The import under loans and grants rose as high as \$47.4 million in fiscal 86-87 and declined to \$13.18 million in the following year. The import declined further to only \$5.20 million during the first five months of the current fiscal year'88-89.

The transactions under the barter arrangement are also not satisfactory. An official review of the performance of the barter trade shows that the implementation of the barter 15, 16 and 17 are discouraging.

Meanwhile, the 18th barter protocol was signed in Dhaka on Monday.

Muslim League Concerned Over Indian Intelligence Actions

46001457 Dhaka *THE BANGLADESH OBSERVER* in English 7 Apr 89 p 1

[Text] Bangladesh Muslim League on Thursday expressed grave concern over the role of Indian Intelligence Research and Analytical Wing in the internal Affairs of Bangladesh following the killing of Sheikh Mujibur Rahman. Quoting the Indian Daily Ananda Bazar Bangladesh Muslim League was critical of India for instigating the so-called Shanti Bahini and Swadhin Bangabhumihalas.

Kazi Abdul Kader and Mr Ayenuddin, President and Secretary General of Muslim League said people of Bangladesh would unitedly foil any conspiracy against the country's interest. They were surprised over silence of the Government on such issues. If necessary steps were not taken to stop these activities against the country, the Government would remain responsible for the consequences, they said.

They were also critical of Indian role in neighbouring Nepal, Sikkim, Sri Lanka, Maldives, and Bhutan.

Planning Commission Begins Work on Fourth Plan

46001464 Dhaka *THE NEW NATION* in English 19 Apr 89 pp 1, 8

[Article by Maozzem Hossain]

[Text] The Planning Commission has started its exercise for the country's Fourth Five-Year Plan (1989-95), envisaging a new group-based approach to poverty alleviation.

This new approach will be a complementary one to the existing sector-based development approach in the preparation of the Five-Year Plan. This will be aimed at bringing the disadvantaged social groups "in the center of the planning process."

Like the ongoing Third Five-Year Plan which terminates in the next financial year, the central theme of the Fourth Plan will be on poverty alleviation. The Third Plan's outcome in terms of its stated policy objectives for poverty alleviation has however been not an encouraging one so far. A modest improvement in poverty alleviation, witnessed in the early eighties, has, of late, been reversed. The slow-down in agricultural production and investment in combination with a decline in real wages and an increase in unemployment and the direct impact of the floods of 1987 and 1988 on the poor has caused the reversal of the poverty alleviation situation. This was indicated by the World Bank in its latest appraisal report about the performance of the Bangladesh economy.

The Planning Commission under its new group approach, to be incorporated as the development strategy for the next mid-term plan, has identified the socio-economic groups in the country in ten categories. These include: Landless, small farmers (0.0-1.5 acres), medium farm owner (1.5-5.0 acres, large farmer (5.0-10.0 acres), medium farmer tenant (1.5-5.0 acres), very large farmer (greater than ten acres), rural formal (upper 40 percent of rural non-farming group), rural informal (lower 60 percent of rural non-farming group), urban formal (upper 40 percent of urban employment group) and urban informal (lower 60 percent of urban employment group).

In the new group-based approach, the four relatively poorer groups such as landless, small farmers, rural informal and urban informal would be identified clearly for making "concerted efforts" to improve their socio-economic situation.

An official document, prepared recently for this year's Aid Club meeting in Paris, said that the group-based development approach "is required in the Fourth Plan because in the sector-based approach, the relatively poor and the disadvantaged remain scattered in the economy and it is not possible to bring them together in the centre of the planning process."

The available indications suggest that the Fourth Plan would envisage a sustained development of agriculture at a rate of 3.5 percent per annum to enable the country's industrial growth to go up above ten percent through stimulation in demand.

Meanwhile, one major implication of the group-based plan would be to revise the existing project proforma for project evaluation. Each sectoral ministry will have to clearly identify how its project is going to benefit the different social groups particularly the low income ones.

The Planning Commission has felt that the division of the population into ten socioeconomic groups would enable it to study the impact of various adjustment policies particularly on the poor and disadvantaged. "This would facilitate the introduction of necessary changes in the adjustment policies to bring them closer to the objectives of increase in real sector growth and alleviation of poverty," according to the official planners. A special attention will be given on fiscal monetary and commercial policies under the new group-based development approach to ensure that the short-term financial adjustment and long-term structural change are not achieved at "the cost of the slippage of the growth in the real sector," the Planning Commission sources noted.

No Progress in Negotiations With India on Ganges Waters

46001462 Dhaka *THE NEW NATION* in English
17 Apr 89 pp 1, 8

[Article by Matiur Rahman: "Ganges Flow Falls Alarmingly"]

[Text] The flow of the Ganges has come down to an alarmingly low level during the current lean period while there has been no afresh arrangement for sharing of waters between Bangladesh and India after the expiry of the memorandum of understanding (MOU) in this regard over five months ago.

The task force formed at the Ershad-Rajiv meeting in Delhi in September last year also failed to work out any fresh arrangement for sharing the Ganges waters within the stipulated time-frame of three months that ended in December.

Official circles are keeping mum as the lean period beginning from January is passing by. The water level in the Ganges has already fallen to an unusual low level.

The memorandum of understanding signed during President Ershad's first visit to Delhi in October 1982, for three years was later extended. It expired in November last year. Earlier, Bangladesh and India had an agreement for five years from 1977 to 1982 with a '80 percent guarantee clause' for ensuring availability of adequate waters for Bangladesh during the lean period. This clause, however, was not included in the 1982 MOU.

Bangladesh Government already made a proposal to the Indian Government for a permanent sharing of the Ganges waters on the basis of the 1982 sharing formula at the secretary-level Task force meeting in Delhi in November last. India has not yet responded to it.

Bangladesh made the proposal apparently keeping in view the urgency of water sharing arrangement before the onset of lean period January 1 to May 31.

Foreign Minister Anisul Islam Mahmud recently reminded India's new High Commissioner to Dhaka, when the latter made a courtesy call on him, about the Bangladesh proposal.

Meanwhile, the dead-line for submission of reports by the secretary-level Task Force formed at the Ershad-Rajiv meeting to find out ways and means for flood control also expired quietly without any tangible outcome so far.

The Task Force is due to meet again after having several rounds of talks in Dhaka and Delhi since the two leaders had met in the Indian capital in September last following the devastating floods in Bangladesh.

The experts team under the umbrella of the Task Force had its meeting in Delhi last month for finalising technical studies on the flood control measures.

According to official sources in Dhaka, no date for the Task Force meeting due to be held in Delhi has yet been fixed. It is expected to be held later this month, they added.

Nation Seeks Bids From Foreign Oil Companies

46001461 Dhaka *THE NEW NATION* in English
16 Apr 89 pp 1, 8

[Text] Houston, Apr 15 (REUTERS)—Bangladesh will seek bids from foreign oil companies for 21 drilling blocks later this year in a move to boost its oil and gas production, Prime Minister Moudud Ahmed told REUTERS.

The Asian nation has proven reserves of 13 trillion cubic feet of gas but only one oil well producing 300 barrels a day, he said in an interview. If a sustained (exploration) effort is made, we will certainly get sufficient oil which will be economically viable to produce. Based on seismic and geologic studies, we believe we have a large deposit of oil, he said.

The government will launch a promotional effort in Houston and London this summer, then start receiving bids for the blocks—which are both onshore and off shore—before the end of the year, Ahmed said.

Terms for drilling concessions will be negotiable within government guidelines. Obviously, exploration contracts will be production sharing contracts, he said.

Ahmed was in Houston meeting with oil companies to explain his nation's economic policies.

'They showed keen interest in Bangladesh,' he said.

Key of Houston

BSS adds: Prime Minister Moudud Ahmed was presented the key of the Houston city at a colourful ceremony here on Friday.

Mayor of the city, Mrs. Caterine Whitmire, presented the key to the Bangladesh Prime Minister at the function held at the city hall.

INDIA

Refutation of U.S. Congressman's Press Release Noted

46001432 Calcutta *THE STATESMAN* in English
22 Mar 89 p 1

[Article by Warren Unna: "P. K. Kaul Pulls no Punches on U.S. Congressman"]

[Text] Washington, March 21—India's Ambassador to the USA, Mr P. K. Kaul, yesterday removed both diplomatic gloves and smiles—and let a persistently nettlesome, and meddlesome, U.S. Congressman have it.

The final straw for the Ambassador was a just-circulated Press release by Congressman Wally Herger which, according to the Indian embassy, so twisted the Ambassador's conversation with him last week that it ended up "beset with inaccurate information and innuendoes." One example cited was the Congressman putting it out that the Ambassador was contradicting his boss, Mr Rajiv Gandhi.

At the heart of the issue is Congressman Herger's authorship of a Bill which would withdraw India's "most-favoured-nation" trade treatment from the USA until it satisfies the complaints cited in last October's Amnesty International report on the treatment of Sikhs in Punjab.

The Congressman, a conservative member of the Republican Party from Northern California, includes in his district Yuba City, the biggest concentration of Sikhs in America and the seat of Didar Singh Bains, former chairman of the World Sikh Organization and the USA's biggest peach grower. Many of the 26 co-sponsors Mr Herger has lined up in support of his Bill also have politically active Sikhs as constituents.

But even though these Congressmen represent both sides of the political aisle, and even include the House Democratic Party Whip, Mr Tony Coelho, a California liberal, the Bill is conceded by legislative staffers to have "less than one percent chance of passage."

This dour prediction, however, apparently has not discouraged Congressman Herger, a 44-year-old one-term veteran who, back home, is both a cattle rancher and a propane gas company owner.

In his Press release, the Congressman began by declaring: "In an hour-long meeting (March 16), the Ambassador contradicted Prime Minister Gandhi's recent pledge to open up the (Punjab) region to foreign visitors, telling Herger that his (Kaul's) Government would continue to refuse access to Punjab for Amnesty international." The Congressman then declared that his Bill, withdrawing India's MFN trade status, "is a responsible way of demonstrating that the USA is serious about human rights, and expects other nations, especially our trading partners, to do likewise."

The Congressman then added: "India's growing relationship with the Soviet Union presents problems for many members of Congress. India voted against the USA more often in the United Nations last year than either the Soviet Union or Cuba ... Mr Gandhi's continued reliance on Soviet military assistance could present a roadblock to improve relations between our two nations."

In reply, the Ambassador, in his own Press release, declared: "In accordance with the Prime Minister's initiative on Punjab, restrictions under the Foreigner's Act on visiting that State have been removed. This would enable foreigners to visit Punjab without the need for special permits. However, as a sovereign and democratic nation, India cannot permit investigations by foreign Governments or organizations into any aspect of her domestic affairs ... India has not 'recently purchased nuclear attack submarines' from the USSR (as the Congressman charged), but leased one nuclear-powered submarine from that country. Based on the premise of non-alignment, India's relationship with both the USA and the USSR has been growing.... In this age of growing rapprochement between countries of different ideological persuasion and the ongoing dialogue between the USA and the USSR themselves, it is difficult to appreciate Congressman Wally Herger's strong resentment to India's relations with the Soviet Union."

And then, addressing India's bilateral relations with the USA Ambassador Kaul's Press release declared: "The effort of responsible people on both sides should be directed to the further improvement of these ties—and not to hamper them by spreading falsehoods and insinuations."

The Ambassador was speaking with full knowledge that the new Bush Administration, as articulated by the U.S. Department of State, is strongly behind him and firmly opposes the Herger Bill. Mr Howard Schaffer, the U.S. Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for South Asia and the department's top policy man for the region, made this undeniably clear in testimony before a House of Representatives foreign affairs sub-committee last month.

Other U.S. officials noted that if Mr Herger's Bill did manage to survive consideration by House Committee, the full House membership, Senate Committee and the full Senate membership—which is considered unlikely—it would only invite India to retaliate against her biggest trading partner, and cut off the current \$2.5 billion in U.S. products India now buys.

As for Mr Herger's crusade on behalf of Khalistan, it was noted that, last year, he was associated with a congressional resolution to have India open up the religious shrines in the Punjab—four months after they already had been opened up.

Namboodiripad on Soviet Changes, Indian Communists

46001426 Bombay *THE TIMES OF INDIA* in English
9 Apr 89 p 3

[Text] New Delhi, April 8—Barring two occasions when the Congress and the communists “came into conflict with each other, the two trends of freedom fighters” have joined in taking the country along the path of a determined struggle for “world peace, national liberation, democracy and social advance,” believes the CPM [Marxist Communist Party] general secretary, Mr E.M.S. Namboodiripad.

The two occasions are the divergent positions of the two streams on the Quit India movement, and, after the attainment of independence, on the border question between India and China, “though a section of communists, in fact, joined the nationalists in choosing the method of armed resistance to the aggressor,” said the CPM leader in a recent presentation entitled “Indian nationalism and world socialism” under the auspices of the Krishna Menon Society.

On the question of changes in the Soviet Union, initiated by Mr Mikhail Gorbachev, Mr Namboodiripad observes that while the communists in India, as in the rest of the world, have reservations of one or another type regarding the merits and demerits of one or another particular measure of reform, they support the need for a radical change in the economy, political life, education and culture and so on. “This is exactly what the Russian terms, “perestroika” and “glasnost” mean. We support it.”

This is the clearest and the most unhesitant view of the Soviet changes available from a CPM leader, though the formal party position is yet to be made public on this issue. Indeed, the CPM congress in Trivandrum three months ago evaded the question, presumably for reasons of differences within the leadership.

On the question of a peace movement, the link between national development and the international questions, Mr Namboodiripad says there exists a broad area of agreement on the basis of which a united peace movement can be built in India.

He notes the stand adopted by India on questions of world peace, anti-colonial struggle, etc., has been of great help internally, i.e., for the development of the nation on independent lines.

“It was this that enabled her, in the 1950s to begin with, to scotch the conspiracy of imperialist powers to keep India as backward as she used to be under colonialism, denying her the opportunity to industrialise her economy under the plea that for a country like India, development only of agriculture, small and cottage industries, etc., was the appropriate method of economic growth.”

“Our government could break this policy of imperialism only because of the aid rendered by the socialist countries.”

Extending the argument to the political and diplomatic fields the communist veteran notes that even sections of the “ruling circles” who, left to themselves, would have adopted anti-Soviet positions, have refrained from doing so because, primarily, it was India’s “alliance with the USSR that helped us to beat back the repeated attacks launched by a U.S.-backed Pakistan.”

Mr Namboodiripad notes that outstanding political leaders like Tilak and towering intellectuals like Tagore hailed the new Russia after 1917. This, he observes, “has since then been a continuing trend in our national movement.”

In the post-independence years, he says, this found renewed and developed expression in the foreign policy of peace, non-alignment, and co-operation with socialist countries.

“Ever since the formation of an openly functioning CPI [Communist Party of India] in 1925, down to the present day, the Congress and the communists have been co-operating with each other and at the same time fighting on the issue of how best to carry the freedom struggle forward,” the CPM general secretary states.

He says after the country became free, the two fought on “how to consolidate the freedom won and build to proceed a modern, democratic and prosperous India.”

He sums up saying, for over four decades by now, the relation between the two organisations representing the two trends the ruling Congress and the opposition Communist Party—have been of occasional co-operation, but by and large of bitter struggles.”

In an article remarkably free from self-conscious or awkward assertion of party-wise partisanship, Mr Namboodiripad refers to the Indian communist movement as being the representative of the country’s working class, and does not place only his party in this role.

Namboodiripad Article Refutes Malkani Allegations

46001428 Calcutta *THE STATESMAN* in English
24 Mar 89 pp 1, 9

[Article by E.M.S. Namboodiripad]

[Text] I am accused of "making a mountain out of a molehill" because I have been cautioning my friends of the National Front and the Janata Dal against having any association with the BJP [Bharatiya Janata Party] or similar forces. The accuser is the ideologue-in-chief of the BJP-RSS [Bharatiya Janata Party-Rashtriya Swayamsewak Sangh] outfit, Mr K.R. Malkani (EMS versus BJP Why Is the CPI(M) [Communist Party of India-Marxist] Leader angry? *THE STATESMAN*, March 17-18).

"Assuming there are some differences—as there are bound to be between any two parties, even between the CPI [Communist Party of India] and the CPI(M)"—Mr Malkani asks why should they be blown out of all proportions and made to stand in the way of that desirable political objective of the BJP, all in Opposition unity on the principle of a "one-to-one" relation between the ruling Congress(I) and the Opposition in the forthcoming elections?

Let me put it straight: the RSS-BJP concept of "Hindutwa," "Hindu Rashtra" and so on are irreconcilably opposed to the radical secular democracy for which the CPI(M) and other Left parties stand. Furthermore, the moral political values for which secular Opposition parties, like the components of the Janata Dal and the National Front, stand are opposed to the values for which the BJP-RSS outfit stands.

We Communists, therefore, consider it our duty to caution our friends belonging to the secular Opposition parties against the evil consequences of any alliance, understanding or adjustments with communal and divisive forces, including the RSS and the BJP. Let me illustrate this with three major issues raised by the BJP and the RSS and showing the total incompatibility of these forces with the secular democratic forces.

The major national political campaign run by the BJP and RSS today, a campaign which is spearheaded by the RSS mouthpiece, *Organiser*, from week to week, is the "restoration" of the Ram Janambhoomi and other "Hindu holy places" to Hindus. This, according to us Communists, and other genuinely secular forces in the country, poses such a grave threat to national unity that all patriotic forces should take a forthright stand against it, regardless [of] the outcome of an election here or an election there. For elections may come and elections may go, but the use of such issues with an eye to the coming Lok Sabha elections (as the RSS and BJP are doing) will pose the gravest threat to national unity before, during and after the elections.

Why? Is it because we Communists are opposed to Hindu temples, are unmindful of the deeply felt sentiments of devout Hindus? Do we want to wound their sentiments? On the contrary, we are aware of what the common devout Hindu feels about what he is told are his holy places. Atheists though we are, we know that the overwhelming majority of our people are religious, whether they believe in Hinduism, Islam or any other faith. We respect them.

Unlike our friends of the RSS, BJP, Vishwa Hindu Parishad and so on, however, we have equal consideration for the sentiments of devout Hindus, Muslims, Christians, Sikhs and so on. We, therefore, appeal to the millions of devout Hindus (for whom Mr Malkani and his friends speak) to give consideration to the sentiments of the non-Hindu masses, not to set the Hindus against the non-Hindus, Hindu temples against Muslim mosques, Christian churches, Sikh gurdwaras and so on. Wherever there are differences or disputes on the location of a temple, a mosque, a church or a gurdwara, the attempt should be not to set one religious community against another, but to bring them all under one umbrella—the umbrella of Indian unity.

Take the specific example of Ram Janambhoomi. There has for a long time been a dispute on whether it is the birth place of Lord Ram or a mosque built by Babar. Feelings that have been running high on both sides. Should the dispute be allowed to break out in a conflagration or settled? We Communists stand for an amicable settlement which can be brought either through:

- (1) The transformation of the whole place as a national monument, there being no temple or mosque there; or
- (2) construction side by side of a temple and mosque, so that followers of the two religions can offer prayers according to their light; or
- (3) leave the whole dispute to the judicial process of a court verdict.

It is well known that, while the friends of the Babri Masjid Committee are prepared for either of these three solutions, the Ram Janambhoomi people are not. We Communists are of the view that the stand of the latter, which Mr Malkani and his friends also unfortunately advocate, is unreasonable.

This, however, is no isolated case. The RSS-BJP has been raising this issue in place after place. A mere reference to the columns of *Organiser* will show that the RSS is deliberately whipping up the passions of Hindus, making them adopt a stand of no compromise anywhere in the country where the question of temples arises. There is an approach which makes it impossible to find a solution to the problems of communal conflict. Is this a "molehill" out of which I am making a mountain or a serious problem threatening national unity?

This is connected with the general propaganda persistently carried on by the RSS and the BJP on their concept of Hindutwa or Hindu Rashta. This land of 80-crore inhabitants, they claim, is the land of Hindus: all those non-Hindus who are living in this country should either Hinduise themselves or go out of the country. This is the ideology preached from day to day at the various RSS sakhas which are used for the training of young boys and girls in the martial arts.

A number of inquiry commissions which examined the genesis and course of riots have conclusively shown the sinister role played by this organization in organizing riots. After all, Nathuram Godsey, who fired the fatal shot at Mahatma Gandhi, was a product of these RSS sakhas. Let me ask once again, is this a "molehill" out of which I am making a mountain?

Finally, the two main slogans raised by the BJP National Executive for their national campaign to prepare for the coming Lok Sabha elections, namely the annulment of Article 370 of the Constitution and the winding up of the Minorities Commission, are clear examples of the anti-minority, Hindu chauvinist character of that organization. Any Government at the Centre to be formed after the next Lok Sabha elections which includes, or is dependent, on such a party, would be harmful not only to the minorities but to national unity.

Article 370 was written into the Constitution by the Constituent Assembly because it was considered necessary to assure the people of Kashmir that their accession to India would not be detrimental to their cherished desire to build an autonomous new Kashmir as an integral part of the Indian democratic republic. Every other political party in the country (including those Opposition parties with which the BJP is desirous of having alliances or adjustments) want this Article to continue. In the memoranda they submitted to the Sarkaria Commission, in fact, no political party except the BJP favoured the annulment of that Article.

As for the Minorities Commission, that was set up under an Act of Parliament because that august body thought it necessary to take effective steps against violations of minority rights. The National Front, which includes almost all the non-Left Opposition parties, wants that not only should the Commission continue but it should be clothed with statutory powers.

Is it a molehill, I would like Mr Malkani to answer, to raise the questions that I have mentioned here—the RSS-BJP campaign on temples, the philosophy of Hindutwa or Hindu Rashta which forms the basis of that campaign, the demand for the annulment of Article 370 of the Constitution and the insistence that the Minority Commission should be wound up. Is it not, on the other hand, that the RSS-BJP is at odds with the Left and secular Opposition parties? Am I making a mountain out of it when I caution my friends of the Janata Dal and the

National Front that, by having any alliance or adjustment with this Hindu chauvinist outfit, they will be committing themselves to positions which are contrary to the cause of national unity?

I would be failing in my duty if I do not refer to the understanding proposed between the BJP and the Shiv Sena in Maharashtra. Founded on the disruptive slogan of "Maharashtra for Maharashtrians" and running a hate campaign against the non-Maharashtrians in Maharashtra, this regional chauvinist outfit has now opted for Hindu chauvinism as well. The RSS-BJP, for its part, has agreed to restrict the operation of Hindutwa to the Hindus in Maharashtra. Is this a "molehill" out of which I am making a mountain?

I do not propose in this article to deal with the many untruths and half-truths uttered by Mr Malkani on the policies and practices of his party and mine. I disregard them all because I know he has uttered them simply because he has no answer to the questions raised by my party and its allies. I am sure that he will not dare answer the questions I have raised in this article, too, for the simple reason that he cannot answer them.

RSS Said To Train Guns on Persecution of Hindus Abroad

46001435 Calcutta THE SUNDAY STATESMAN in English 26 Mar 89 p 1

[Text] Apparently having exhausted itself on the subject of protecting Hinduism and Hindus within India, the Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh [RSS] has trained its guns on the "oppression" of Hindus outside the country. This seems to be the most significant feature of the otherwise tame annual report of the organization for the year 1988-89, in which the RSS takes the Union Government to task for "indifference" and "inaction" with regard to the plight of Hindus in Bangladesh and Fiji.

The RSS sarkaryavaha, Mr H.V. Sheshadri, presented the annual report at the recent meeting of the Akhil Bharatiya Pratinidhi Sabha at Rajkot. Incidentally, 1989 also marks the birth anniversary of Keshavrao Baliram Hedgewar, founder of the RSS.

The RSS's claim that "the increasing harassment, murders and dishonour of Hindu womenfolk in Bangladesh in the wake of its declaration as an Islamic state have resulted in their increased exodus to our country" will find sympathetic ears. Nor will many Indians disagree when the report adds: "The callous indifference and inaction of our Government with regard to their moral responsibility of ensuring a secure, just and honourable living for the Hindus there is indeed shocking."

Continuing in the same vein, it goes on to attack New Delhi for its "silent and neutral stand vis-a-vis the political and religious oppression of the majority Hindus

in Fiji." Complaining that the "Government is insensitive where Hindu interests are concerned," the document suggests that an "enlightened and powerful Hindu pressure be built in our country to make the Government wake up and discharge its bounden duty towards our Hindu brethren abroad." Perhaps the point would have been more tenable if instead of Hindus in Fiji, the RSS had spoken of ethnic Indians.

Commenting on the current political scenario, the report says, "The defeat of Congress(I) in every single major State where election to the State Assembly was held, has signalled that the four decades' sway of Congress(I) over the country is fast nearing the end. The central Congress(I) leadership is no longer in a position to carry its own State units along with it." This erosion of control, according to the RSS, is primarily responsible for "anti-national and disruptive forces raising their ugly heads—especially in the border areas and where the Hindus are in a minority."

What are these grim forces raising their ugly heads of which the RSS feels it necessary to warn us? The report lists them as the demand for an "independent Jharkhand State in Bihar and for a Bodoland in Assam, arms training to such tribal sections, increased Naxalite violence in Andhra Pradesh and Bihar, clamour for Dalitasthan..."

Calling upon all "patriotic forces committed to national unity, integrity and values of life" to "bestir themselves and see through the smokescreen of attractive 'isms' and slogans of all such inimical forces," the RSS wants to defeat "their machinations." At the other end of the political spectrum the RSS visualises a "brighter, mounting awareness among the Hindus (who have) begun to realise the urgent need to close up their ranks and play their decisive role in shaping the future destiny of the country."

But, surprisingly, the report avoids making any harsh statements on the Punjab situation. In fact, it indirectly acknowledges the Prime Minister's new package as a positive step, saying that "it needs to be followed up expeditiously." It also reiterates the demand for a security belt to seal the border with Pakistan and for an early fulfilment of the Prime Minister's promise of an all-party meeting.

The report lauds the efforts of the Akali Dal leader, Mr Jeevan Singh Umranangal, to maintain Hindu-Sikh amity. The violence at Bidar, in which Sikh students were killed by a Hindu mob, is described as "tragic" and so is the riot in Jammu.

However, and as is only to be expected, the report is silent on the communal activities of the Hindu Shiv Sena. Absolutely no mention is made of this organization.

As for the contentious Ram Janambhoomi issue, the report merely gives a recount of the sammellan at Allahabad where the Vishwa Hindu Parishad's move to build a temple on the disputed site was ratified by the heads of various Hindu sects. The low-key mention of the dispute perhaps stems from the fact that it has outlived its purpose, at least temporarily, as an issue through which to whip up mass emotion. Also, it has yet to formulate its stand with the Babari Masjid Action Committee pressing for a judicial verdict, and thus toeing a softer line than the RSS.

Having stepped up its publicity campaign to commemorate Dr Hedgewar's birth centenary, the RSS claims that there has been a tremendous response to its activities from both Hindus and non-Hindus, the latter comprising members of the lower castes as well as tribals.

Subramaniam Swamy New Janata General Secretary

46001442 Madras *THE HINDU in English*
31 Mar 89 p 9

[Text] New Delhi, March 30—The Janata Party president, Mr. Indubhai Patel, has appointed Dr. Subramaniam Swamy, MP, as general secretary of the party.

The party now has three general secretaries, the other two being Dr. Sarojini Mahishi and Mr. Mani Ram Bagri.—PTI

CPI-M Official Argues Against Unity With CPI

46001430 Calcutta *THE STATESMAN in English*
21 Mar 89 p 3

[Text] During the CPI [Communist Party of India]'s 14th party congress in Calcutta from March 6 to 12, dozen of CPI party cadres from Muzaffarpur and Hazaribagh districts visited the CPI(M) [Communist Party of India-Marxist] office expecting some kind of declaration about the uniting of the two parties. On being questioned they disclosed that they had been told before their departure for the city that the congress would formally announce the 'ekai' (unity) decision and that Mr Jyoti Basu would address the congress.

This, according to Mr Biman Bose, a central committee member of the CPI(M), displays sheer "bankruptcy" of the CPI party leadership, who had brought their cadres and supporters from other States to the party congress on false promises. Ruling out the prospect of unity of the two Communist parties, Mr Bose and several other senior leaders of the CPI(M) said such unity could take place only on the basis of party programmes and policies.

According to other CPI(M) sources, Communist unity cannot be the precondition for Left and democratic unity. Quoting from the party programmes and policies of the two parties, they point out wide differences in the

programmes and policies of the two parties. They contend that it is not the differences in the leaderships of the two parties that is stalling the process of unity.

Although not sure about the origin of the idea of Communist unity in India, the CPI(M) leaders have a suspicion that the CPSU [Communist Party of the Soviet Union] may have mooted the idea. The real intention behind the unity move is to dilute the revolutionary content of the party's programmes and a change in the tactical line of the Communist movement in the country, they argue.

A CPI(M) leader, who wanted to remain unnamed, said differences with the undivided Communist Party started surfacing as far back as 1958, when at the party congress it failed to place a unanimously accepted resolution for discussion. Only Mr Ajoy Ghosh, the then party general secretary, placed a statement at the congress on which a discussion was started. Such differences on the party's policies sharpened in the following years.

The analysis of the CPI(M) on the character of the State, the correlation of class economic policies of the Congress Government at the Centre and related issues have been proved correct, says the leader. But the CPI programmes adopted at the Bombay congress in 1958 have been proved incorrect 25 years after the split in the Communist Party. The CPI(M) also highlighted the differences between the two parties on the line to be followed for the ouster of the Congress from power. The tactical line adopted by the CPI(M) in 1964 for the purpose still holds good. The CPI, on the other hand, had to change their line and assessment of the character of the congress and its Government at the Centre, according to the CPI(M) leader.

Mr Anil Biswas, editor of GANASHAKTI, the party's Bengali organ, said in a signed editorial, "Today many reactionary leaders and their parties feel gratified calling themselves socialists. So many people and leaders even shunning all the prerequisites for becoming a Communist call themselves as belonging to a real Communist party." It is clear for whom the innuendo is meant. "The CPI can, at best, be partner of a front of Opposition parties but the CPI(M) cannot unite with it," the article said.

Another article written under a pseudonym was also published in the GANASHAKTI replying to the CPI charge that the CPI(M) maintains a big brotherly attitude towards the CPI.

The charge was repudiated forcefully. It said that the CPI(M) had been trying to bring closer all the Leftist forces and parties in the fight against the Congress(I) and the CPI is only such party in a list which includes the Forward Bloc, RSP and Peasants' and Workers' party and other groups as well.

Achievements, Problems in Food Production Reported

Rise in Foodgrains Production

46001434 Bombay THE TIMES OF INDIA in English
25 Mar 89 p 14

[Text] New Delhi, March 24 (PTI)—Foodgrains production in 1988-89, estimated at 170 million tonne rose by 24 percent over the previous year's level and exceeded the target of 166.57 million tonne.

The special foodgrains production programme (SFPP), being implemented in 169 selected districts since 1988-89, is expected to take the foodgrains production to 175 million tonne this year (1989-90), an official press release said today.

The growth in various sectors of agriculture since independence has been impressive as the production of foodgrains, oilseeds and sugarcane has risen three times, of fish four times, of eggs nine times, and milk production has more than doubled.

The country now produces about 170 million tonnes of foodgrains, 15 million tonnes of oilseeds, 210 million tonnes of sugarcane, and 48 million tonnes of milk, the release said.

Due to various steps taken by the technology mission on oilseeds, the edible oil-oilseeds import in 1988-89 came down to Rs500 crore from about Rs1,000 crore in the previous year.

A technology mission on dairy development is also being launched to take the milk production from 48 million tonne now to 70 million tonne by 2000 AD, the release said.

A major factor for this speedy growth is expansion of the input-supply system. For example, the institutional credit to agriculture has grown from Rs24.2 crore in 1950-51 to more than Rs10,000 crore in 1988-89 and fertilizer consumption has risen from 69,000 tonne to ten million tonnes.

Similarly, use of plant protection chemicals, quality seed, and implements and machinery has increased considerably. Area under irrigation has expanded, agricultural markets have developed, and a range of post-harvest technologies are being adopted by the farmers.

To protect the farmers against unremunerative prices, government announced procurement/minimum support prices for 21 major agricultural commodities and has made extensive arrangement through governmental/co-operative agencies for procurement and price support operations, the release said.

Science Council Report

46001434 New Delhi PATRIOT in English
25 Mar 89 p 5

[Text] India is likely to face a food crisis reminiscent of the 1960s if production is not stepped up to 300 million tonnes by the turn of the century, according to the Science Advisory Council to the Prime Minister, reports UNI.

In a report to the Prime Minister, the Council said production of foodgrain had to be an important mission if the country was to achieve a target of approximately 250 million tonnes a year by 2000 AD.

This could be accomplished through a series of measures like optimisation of area suited for intensive agriculture, improvement in rainfall forecasting and better water management, the Council said.

Conservation of soil and ensuring supplementation of nutrients after intensive agriculture, upgradation of the genetic productive potential of major crops and improvement in yields of fruits and vegetable were among the other steps suggested by the Council.

The Council also favoured improvements in animal husbandry, aquaculture, exploration of ocean beds for marine food reservoirs, conservation of food and improvements in the production of fertilisers with new science and technology inputs.

It also stressed on the importance of educating farmers on the new science and technology inputs to agriculture and intensive reforestation to prevent soil erosion and flooding.

The Council observed that one of the important achievements of science and technology in India has been its role in the green revolution brought about by developing high-yielding crop varieties and "the package of practices for their full expression."

"However, the scenario for the coming years is rather alarming unless food production increases from the present annual figure of 150 million tonnes to 180 million tonnes by the start of the Eighth Plan and then to 300 million tonnes by the turn of the century," it said.

"If this does not happen, India is likely to face a food crisis that will be reminiscent of the 1960s," the Council said.

It observes that higher targets in food production cannot be achieved without new scientific breakthroughs backed by an overhauled vibrant and innovative research and laboratory to land management.

Major science and technology inputs will be needed for breakthroughs to achieve higher genetic production potential, efficient use of plant nutrients, soil and water management, tissue culture and arid zone cultivation.

While expanding the irrigation facilities, greater attention will have to be paid to the improvement of drainage so that the soil-plant relationship is not lost sight of, according to the Council.

An analysis of constraints for the unsatisfactory increase of production in irrigated areas should be taken up on a priority basis, the Council said.

Urgent steps should be taken to grow crops suiting different agro-ecological conditions so that the concept of speciality agriculture can gain ground and all crops are not grown in all areas.

Improvement of productivity level of rain-fed agriculture, with emphasis on improved breeds with high genetic potential for productivity, is another crying need in these areas, the Council felt.

"Whereas the problem with oil seeds persists, the one on pulses is beginning and may need attention on a mission mode," the Council said.

Establishment of downstream food processing industries will help in preservation and value addition and in turn will lead to higher profitability for the farmer and greater opportunities for rural employment.

Modern science and technology inputs in food storage and transport are also crucial, considering the enormous losses that now occur.

Writer Analyzes Changes in Cabinet Secretariat

46001433 Madras THE HINDU in English
23 Mar 89 p 1

[Article by K.K. Katyal]

[Text] New Delhi, March 22—The "Prime Minister's Office [PMO]"—an outfit that grew in the post-Nehru era—gets a new look with the appointment of Mr. B.G. Deshmukh, Cabinet Secretary, as Principal Secretary to Mr. Rajiv Gandhi. This post has been revived after nearly four years. Between 1985 and now, the PMO was headed by a Secretary—Mrs Sarla Grewal, who is due to take over as Governor of Madhya Pradesh shortly. The revived post, along with the re-induction in the Government of Mr. R.K. Dhawan, aide to the late Prime Minister, Indira Gandhi, is seen as switchback to the past pattern.

Mr. T.N. Seshan, Defence Secretary till last month, who was inducted in the Cabinet Secretariat as an Officer on Special Duty, will succeed Mr Deshmukh. With these changes—due to take effect from March 27—the main phase of the reshuffle of senior civil servants is complete.

The last to hold the post of Principal Secretary to the Prime Minister was Dr. P.C. Alexander, at present Governor of Tamil Nadu who began his term with Indira Gandhi after her return to power in 1980. Dr. Alexander had to quite because of the involvement in his staff in a spy scandal. This nearly coincided with the change at the top, caused by Indira Gandhi's assassination. While deciding on the composition of the new set-up, Mr. Rajiv Gandhi preferred a low profile person (Mrs Grewal) as its head. There could be two reasons for it. One, Mr Gandhi, then new at the job, wanted the limelight concentrated on him. Two, a new set of advisers, including his Doon school pals, took precedence over the bureaucrats, with Mr. Arun Singh taken in the PMO as Parliamentary Secretary. That Mr. Singh was later promoted as Minister of State in the Defence Ministry and parted company with Mr. Gandhi after three years is a different story.

In 1964, when Lal Bahadur Shastri succeeded Nehru, the Prime Minister's Secretariat, as it was called then, took a formal shape for the first time, with an experienced administrator, Mr. L.K. Jha, as Principal Secretary (the first to hold that position). During the pre-Janata tenure of Indira Gandhi, the Secretariat blossomed into the main force of power, specially with another brilliant head, Mr. P.N. Haksar. During the Janata days, the then Prime Minister, Mr. Morarji Desai, converted the Secretariat into office, in a conscious bid to devalue it.

In the last four years or so, Mrs. Grewal confined herself to administrative chores, and either on her own volition, or as part of the new arrangement did not deal with political matters. The gap was filled by the then No. 2 in the PMO, Mr. Gopi Arora. He continued to discharge this role, even after his transfer to the Information and Broadcasting Ministry as its Secretary.

Arora takes over: Recently, he was moved to the Finance Ministry as Officer on Special Duty [OSD] and took over as its Secretary yesterday. Because of the heavy workload of the new post, he will have no time for any PMO-related assignments. The proximity to the seat of power enabled Mr. Arora to discharge another important function effectively—as chief spokesman of the Government. This gap is yet to be filled.

And last but not least, Mr. Dhawan. Though technically an OSD in the Cabinet Secretariat, he is very much part of the PMO with undefined duties. Mainly concerned with political-organisational work, he will have his hands full—because of the spurt of factional quarrels in the Congress(I) State units. At the moment he is the centre of the raging controversy—arising from his indictment by the Thakkar Commission. After initial resistance, the

Government has agreed to release the Commission's report—it is tabled in the Lok Sabha on Monday when Parliament meets after the Holi recess.

Chakkar Commission Investigates Bahuguna Death

46001425 Calcutta THE TELEGRAPH in English
5 Apr 89 p 7

[Article by Cho Ramaswamy]

[Text] This is explosive material. Another official secret is out. The report of Justice Chakkar, squatting judge of the Supreme Court, who was appointed as a one-man commission to go into the circumstances leading to the death of Hemvati Nandan Bahuguna, the leader of the Lok Dal (B), which has been suppressed from public view, is now on my table. It is a major leak.

Justice Chakkar's report is so voluminous that if it is serialised by Doordarshan, it would outlive the Mahabharat. As a pen pusher, Justice Chakkar is so repetitive that it would make little difference to one whether the reading is done from the first page or the last. I will restrict myself to narrating the crucial factors that he has propounded in his report.

Justice Chakkar has gone amazingly deep into the mystery of Bahuguna's death in the Cleveland Hospital, and stunningly far in constructing the case against V.P. Singh. His relentless pursuit of truth has led him to conclude that V.P. Singh has definite complicity in the murder of Bahuguna.

Justice Chakkar in his report says, "There are strong indicators and numerous factors which clearly show that V.P. Singh seems to have played a stellar role in facilitating the crime committed at the Cleveland Hospital." Significantly, he adds, "The doctors at the Cleveland Hospital must have been used as unwitting instruments by the unseen hand of V.P. Singh."

Justice Chakkar's conclusions are based on cold reasoning and merciless logic. He, as any good tailor would, has employed not only the needle of suspicion, but also the thread of fabrication, to sew up the case against V.P. Singh.

To quote Justice Chakkar, "As far as V.P. Singh is concerned Bahuguna had become a pain in the neck. A lesser man than V.P. Singh would have been stricken with spondylitis. That was the kind of pain that Bahuguna had become in the neck of V.P. Singh. If Bahuguna was removed from the scene, the first beneficiary would only be V.P. Singh. Thus, the latter had strong reasons to participate in or even initiate, any dubious scheme to get rid of Bahuguna." Having thus unassailably established motives, Justice Chakkar goes on to list the solid grounds and the liquid circumstances on which he bases his devastating conclusions.

We shall now see some extracts from the report of Justice Chakkar:

V.P. Singh's son is in the United States, and Cleveland Hospital where Bahuguna met his death is also in the same country. Could this be brushed aside as mere coincidence? Yes, but for other grounds, maidans, lawns and gardens, which cast very serious doubts on V.P. Singh.

V.P. Singh has not been able to establish that his son, who is in the United States, does not know the name of any doctor in the Cleveland Hospital. This proves beyond any reasonable doubt that V.P. Singh's son must be a close friend of all the doctors, nurses, and other attendants at the Cleveland Hospital. Why this friendship? When did it begin? How did it grow? Why does it continue? V.P. Singh's only response to these simple questions is a defiant assertion that his son does not know anyone in the Cleveland Hospital. V.P. Singh claims this to be a statement of fact. But, a statement of fact without strong supporting evidence, is, in law, only a blatant lie. (*Factotum nil evidencio, blatantis lieiotum.*)

V.P. Singh never tried to prevent Bahuguna from going to the Cleveland Hospital for the treatment of his heart ailment. If only he had persuaded Bahuguna not to go to Cleveland, the tragedy could have been averted. V.P. Singh has no explanation to offer to convince the commission that his failure to prevent Bahuguna from going to the Cleveland Hospital was not intentional. V.P. Singh does not even admit that this is a serious lapse on his part.

In his diary, V.P. Singh has made some tell-tale entries. In fact, the entries tell everything, but he tries to construct tales around them. When questioned about these entries, his replies have all been evasive, changing, and shifty.

One entry says: "Bypass—Bahuguna—Then no trouble."

When asked by the commission to explain this entry, V.P. Singh has the temerity to come out with the audacious reply that this entry was only a record of the decision taken by his party to ignore Bahuguna. If that be the fact, the diary entry should have been: "Ignore Bahuguna." But V.P. Singh's handwritten entry is: Bypass-Bahuguna—Then no trouble." Two days after the date of this entry, Bahuguna leaves for the United States to get the bypass surgery done there. It is obvious that a trap was laid and Bahuguna flew into it.

There is another sinister entry in V.P. Singh's diary. Two days after Bahuguna got himself admitted to the Cleveland Hospital, V.P. Singh makes this perfidious entry: "ABCD."

Four letters which to the uninitiated may appear to be nothing more than the beginning of the alphabet, but which alas, heralded the end of a man. V.P. Singh contradicts himself when trying to clarify this entry.

First he said: "It was a mere doodling." What a casual reply to a crucial question! When it was pointed out to him that he was not a known doodler, he went back on his statement and came out with another theory. He explains that, though he does not remember why he made that entry, it could be a reference to his programme for that day. He might, he says, have noted down the initials of Ajit Singh (A), Bommai(B), Chandra Shekhar (C), and Devi Lal(D) to remind him that he had to contact the four of them that day. All the four, when interrogated by the commission, submitted sworn statements that they met V.P. Singh so often that they cannot remember whether they met him on a particular day or not. This explodes V.P. Singh's farfetched theory about this disquieting entry in his diary.

In the context of V.P. Singh's prevarications and contradictory explanations of this entry, and taking into consideration the other crucial circumstances like the presence of V.P. Singh's son in the United States, the entry "ABCD" could very well be the abbreviation of "Assured Bahuguna's Cleveland Death." The suspicion is reinforced when one takes note of the tragic fact that Bahuguna underwent the fatal operation in the Cleveland Hospital on that very day.

Thus, there is no escape from the conclusion that there are weighty reasons to suspect the complicity and involvement of V.P. Singh in the killing of Bahuguna. The possibility of the involvement of a foreign agency in the whole affair cannot be ruled out, when one considers the fact that Bahuguna was a firm and staunch friend of the Soviet Union. This could not have been to the liking of some western powers. It is for the Government of India to pursue this angle to ensure that the efforts at destabilisation are stabilised at the national level.

The first thing that comes powerfully from the report is the revelation that Bahuguna is dead. What is indicted by Justice Chakkar is the conspiracy of innocence, truth and common sense. Justice Chakkar has raised several important questions. The nation wants to know the answers. The answers are with Bahuguna. The government must be forced to get them. May no dead person's soul rest in peace.

Science Panel Asks Overhaul of S&T Management

46001439 Bombay THE TIMES OF INDIA in English
27 Mar 89 p 4

[Text] New Delhi, Mar. 26 (UNI)—The science advisory council to the Prime Minister has called for a major restructuring and overhaul of the government's administrative and management machinery dealing with science and technology.

In a report to the Prime Minister, the council said, "if we are serious about improving the quality of life of the common man and transforming our country into an economic power, greater effort should be made by the government and all concerned, in finding better mechanisms and procedures for implementing our development plans."

Unless bureaucratic impediments, procedural delays and outdated management strategies are eliminated, no plan, however good, will have a significant effect on the country's economy, it said.

The council observed that the mechanisms available today for implementing plans were not good enough.

"We have suggested a few modalities but they alone may not suffice. What may be necessary is a major restructuring and overhauling of the administrative and management machinery dealing with science and technology," it said.

"It is the belief of the science advisory council that a time has come in our nation's life to plan for striking advances in improving the quality of life of its citizens," according to council chairman, Prof C.N.R. Rao, in a preface to the report.

The council felt that a high percentage of people were illiterate and below the poverty line, without access to drinking water, proper sanitation or adequate shelter.

"We cannot forget that the primary goals of our nation have to be to provide the basic needs for the common man and to improve the quality of his life," the council said.

Calling for examination of all feasible alternatives and setting the right priorities in programmes, the council said it was important to work out strategies which would make the country economically stronger.

"We see no real conflict in planning for a quantum leap in industrial growth and at the same time making all-out efforts in solving the pressing problems of our society."

The council observed that it must be recognised that national planning must look beyond self-reliance because the industrial scenario demands that India should be internationally competitive or significant at least in a few selected areas.

"This cannot be attained without the support provided by powerful indigenous capabilities in many areas of science and technology," it said.

"Indigenous capability is a national resource but should in particular be directed towards those industries in which we can develop our national advantages into international competitiveness.

"Even to buy advanced technology intelligently we must have done some work on it. The ultimate goal is development, which has to be interpreted in a broad sense and pursued with pragmatism in our planning," the council said.

The council noted that the country was yet to utilise adequately its potential for science and technology in key economic sectors.

"These sectors are under socio-economic ministries, many of which have scientific advisory committees but this mechanism has not been uniformly effective," it said.

Science and technology is yet to make a dent in many important sectors involving heavy investments, excluding mission-oriented and strategic areas such as atomic energy and space that have well-defined targets and formulated their needs for research and development.

Another lacuna, the council pointed out, was the absence of a working machinery for incorporating science and technology in planning at the state, district and village levels.

PAKISTAN

Party Leaders Said Inflaming Ethnic Tensions

46000137d Lahore *VIEWPOINT* in English
20 Apr 89 pp 11-12

[Text] Despite advance warnings that a massacre was being planned in Hyderabad on the pattern of the one that had taken place there on September 30, and that the atmosphere was thick with tension, intelligence and law-enforcing agencies miserably failed to prevent the gruesome incident on April 6, only a day before the advent of the holy month of Ramazan. A group of masked men descended on Hyderabad and killed 14 persons. About 42 other people were injured.

The pretext for the killing was a brawl in an academic institution when students insisted on indulging in grossly unfair means in their examination. Prevented from doing so, they staged a protest. There was an exchange of hot words between a student and a policeman, whereupon the latter is reported to have fired a shot which killed the student. This was a signal for the rioting. It is reported that a majority who died were old Sindhis.

In Sindh Assembly

On April 10 the incident was debated in the Sindh Assembly, and it was hoped that the debate would result in suggestions for reconciliation and long-term measures for establishing peace in the Province. Unfortunately, this did not happen. The speakers, instead of extinguishing the smoldering fire, poured oil on it with inflammatory speeches. PPP [Pakistan People's Party] and MQM [Muhajir Qaumi Movement] members, partners in the provincial coalition, traded accusations and threatened each other with "rivers of blood".

An MQM member said that "no one can throw us out; we have burnt out boats and we are here to stay, whether someone likes it or not." A PPP member replied: "We

can take klashnikovs in our hands as well. Do not test our patience", another MQM member angrily remarked: "Do not threaten us. We will not be cowed down." A PPP member retorted: "We are the sons of the soil; do not tease us as in the end there may ultimately be dead bodies all round." Yet another PPP member said that the MQM was trying to "grab some territory to establish their nationality."

This was a reference to the so-called "Hong Kong plan". This plan was first mooted by Mohammad Shoaib, Ayub's Finance Minister, in the context of establishing a free zone. This plan was reportedly discussed by the cabinet of that time and dropped on strong opposition, probably by the ministers from Sindh. Sindhi nationalists apprehend that the MQM's insistence on recognition of the Mohajirs as a separate nationality is a prelude to separation of lower Sindh from the rest of the Province. The MQM strongly denies any such intention.

Little Restraint

In all, 21 speakers participated in the Assembly debate but hardly anyone, except the Law Minister, exercised restraint. Inflammatory language was used with abandon. The tone for the debate was set by Makhdoom Khaliquz Zaman who, in a statement a day earlier, criticized the PPP's central leadership and the provincial Government for entering into an alliance with the MQM and demanded annulment of the accord. It appears that while Benazir Bhutto is keen to see the accord succeed, a large number of PPP extremists would like to see it terminated. They believe that with the PPP Government at the center and a dominant position in Sindh, the MQM can be ignored and the Mohajirs suppressed.

Black Day

The debate encouraged extremists to observe a black day on April 12 in the interior of Sindh against the Hyderabad killings. However the processions and meetings, as telecast on TV, did not seem to have drawn large crowds, showing that the mass of the people still have faith in the PPP leadership and would like to give it time to find a solution to the problems created and complicated by the dictatorship over the last decade. People widely believe that the ethnic killings were deliberately instigated by shadowy intelligence agencies. That they say is why the mystery of masked men has not yet been solved despite the killing of 500 citizens, since the Bushra Zaidi incident in 1985. This estimate, given by the provincial Law Minister in the Assembly, seems to be very conservative in view of what had happened in Aligarh Colony, Hyderabad (September 30) and Karachi (October 19). Masked men freely chose the time and place for their operations and the 14 intelligence agencies—who, according to Benazir Bhutto, were trained only for surveillance and hauling up politicians—seem to have made society hostage to gangsters.

The PPP high command reacted strongly to the Hyderabad events, the extremists' activities and the tone of the Assembly debate. The Federal Cabinet, in consultation with the Sindh Chief Minister, has decided to strengthen the law-enforcing agencies by recruiting 7,000 local men in police and 5,000 men in the Sindh Rangers. The strength will thus be increased 12,000 men to a total of 44,000 men. An intelligence cell will also be created to unearth the real dealers in arms, their financiers and arms stores.

On the political front, PPP members have been asked not to issue irresponsible statements on ethnic matters, and show-cause notices are reported to have been issued to PPP members who had made objectionable statements.

Not Enough

These measures, observers believe, are not enough in view of the gravity of the situation. The continuance and strengthening of the present fragile democracy depends upon the normalization of the situation in Sindh. Begum Nusrat Bhutto, Senior Minister without portfolio, should devote more of her time in finding a solution to the Sindh imbroglio. The suggestion made during the debate in the National Assembly that a roundtable conference should be convened on the Sindh situation, it is felt, also needs to be pursued vigorously. Of equal urgency is the need for normalization of the atmosphere in all academic institutions, especially in the interior, where, reports suggest, Mohajir students are finding it extremely difficult to pursue their education because of the prevailing tension.

Sharif Attacked for Insensitivity To Plight of Women

46000138b Islamabad THE MUSLIM in English
19 Apr 89 pp 4-5

[Article by Syed Akbar]

[Text] Who would associate with a name like this, and give sympathy to anyone in need there? Even if two unmarried sisters were reported to have been gang raped after the mother was beaten unconscious in their defence. The traffic incident received dismissive notice in newspapers and the audio-visual media ignored it totally.

Those who read about it accidentally accepted it as one of those things that happen in our society as they have in the past. Some even pointed out that there is improvement in the situation because incidents of this nature are on the decline. Drawing room intellectuals dismissed it as the product of a feudal society, expressing their belief that if nothing can be done now the process of dialectical materialism operating in history will take care of it. Verbal activists denounced it in private conversation and moved on to comment on other inequities of our socio political structure.

Naked Parade

All this was obviously a way of covering up our shame on the incident as well as the helplessness we have been encouraged to cultivate for the last over four decades. It has to be admitted that for most of us Machcharanwali was so unfamiliar and even distant that the members of the family who were victimized there were total strangers, and the incident having taken place was history. The news report also said that the Chief Minister of Punjab had ordered the IG Police to investigate and report to him directly. While this takes place, the poor family will have the benefit of our remote attention in its isolation ringed with fear and shame.

It would be considered very strange if we were to suggest that the Chief Minister should acknowledge responsibility for the failure of his administration. Our practice is to find fault with others and shovel garbage into somebody else's yard. If the Chief Minister was not ready to break out of tradition, he should have offered the courtesy of his personal visit to the family. It is a norm in civilized societies that extraordinary public tragedies are attended to by the chief of the government in this way. The gang rape of the girls and the gruesome humiliation of the family deserved the personal presence of the Chief Minister in the home of the victims. This would have demonstrated his sympathy for them and his commitment to ensure that justice will be done and the evil rooted out.

It is said that the girls were stripped naked, exposed to public gaze while being carried away and then raped by a gang of seventeen men led by their own uncle and cousins on rampage to avenge slight to their honor. The father of the girls, it is reported, had refused their hands in marriage according to the wish of his brother. There was a question of property also associated with the incident. The punishment for this had to be exemplary, and since law is believed to be very pliant by those who take it into their hand, the act of punishment had to be public. Terror was used, and there was no law to protect the weak. This happened in broad daylight while the villagers hid behind locked doors.

The horror of Cain doing his deed on Abel was recalled, and some of us who are curious to know what will happen next, toy with these thoughts in our mind. First, the poor girls were left to the punishing lust of men; now they are in the hands of law. This will be cold comfort to those who have suffered and cannot be sure of the speed and outcome of justice. What is horrifying, when something like this happens is to see civilization roll back to the point where we come face to face with implacable brutality and evil. Obviously not everyone is sensitive to this experience. Otherwise there should have been a national uproar, banner headlines in all newspapers, protests and processions and a visit from the Chief Minister and his high ranking officers to the family. This is the least that public opinion could have mobilized.

Women's Rights

The belief of our women's rights activists that men in Pakistan do not treat women as persons, and that sex for them is manipulative mechanism of exploitation is borne out by the silence over the machcharanwali horror. Our ulema have not spoken as if Islam too does not recognize the dignity and sanctify which women share with men as human beings. As if the respect which the Holy Prophet (PBUH) used to give to his wives and daughter, and women in general, does not mean anything to us. The PPP [Pakistan People's Party] leaders from Punjab, too, who can be said to be keen Sherlock Homes in unearthing imagined and real iniquities of the Nawaz Sharif administration, have failed to give any weight to this human tragedy, as if this was not an affront of a personal nature to the first woman Prime Minister of Pakistan. Once again we come across a complete acquiescence to silence, as if we are bound by a conspiracy not to face something unspeakably horrifying. However, the victims are out there in the cold with the police and the law court. That those who committed the crime will fight to save their skins with everything they have is beyond doubt. What we do doubt is if justice will be quick, and the punishment exemplary and in full public knowledge.

This is not the first case of its kind. There was Nawabpur where women stripped of their clothes were paraded through the village streets but not raped. In Machcharanwali the poor girls were subjected to a compounded outrage. In between, many similar cases have been reported in proforma manners by the newspapers. The conspiracy of silence referred to above has not broken, nor the ice of indifference has thawed.

The new government's programme for women's rights has yet to get off the ground for fear of expected response from the so-called fundamentalists. Afraid of losing personal and political advantages, leaders and their parties have chosen other fields to play on. While the government and some political parties are biding time for an opportune moment to develop to that they can demonstrate the virtue of caution being the better part of valor, the status on women remains a crying shame.

But what of public opinion? Here too there are other priorities in which the rights of women does not feature. The militancy among the women activists, demonstrably evident during General Zia's days in the abeyance as there appears to be a need to wait for Benazir's move. How soon this will come cannot be predicted with certainty, particularly in view of the fact that first she has to contain the religious lobby in the country.

The path she has chosen wisely is of conciliation, to swim with skill and to her advantage with the current in order to influence developments on the implementation of Shariah through an act of the National Assembly. Even when all this is conceded, there cannot be any justification for crimes like the Machcharanwali incident

to take place. All governments, federal as well as provincial, and the elected representatives of the people must agree to put a stop to them in a rare demonstration of togetherness. It is not enough that the criminals offending the soul and body of human beings be given exemplary punishment, but that it should be such as to deter others from doing it.

The Punjab government owes it to the nation to inform as to what really happened, why it happened, who are guilty and what is being done to let them face justice? According to the press report the gang has admitted to the stripping naked of the girls and carrying them away from home. No time should be lost in acting upon the confession and investigating quickly if they were raped. Whatever the result on the second part of the crime, the public humiliation and loss of name and honor suffered by the girls and their family should also weigh in the scale against the uncle and cousins who organized the raid and forced their own flesh and blood to suffer at their hands.

Talks about Islam by our political leaders, ulemas and representatives will be accepted yet again as so much empty rhetoric if we do not take steps to civilize our society, starting with something as basic as respect for law. And, the most recent pronouncement of the Punjab Chief Minister in Gujranwala that he considers politics to be an act of worship will be seen as a cynical utterance for electoral advantage of his party's candidate in a recent by-election.

The cry of a family for justice from an obscure Punjab village has put the nation on the spot.

Question of Provincial Autonomy Examined

46000136c Karachi DAWN in English 24 Apr 89 p 7

[Article by Mushtaq Ahmad]

[Text] The Elections of last November had not conferred on the elect an unqualified mandate either in the federal or the provincial sphere. The power to govern is always subject to limitations which are constitutionally defined. The polls were not a referendum on the quantum of provincial autonomy but a reference for a consensus on Government by consent.

The circumstances under which they were held were not comparable to the conditions prevalent on the eve of 1970 elections. After the abrogation of the Ayub constitution, the fundamental law of the land had to be freshly enacted. The Constituent Assembly alone had the authority to frame and formulate its provisions, including the provision to redistribute and redefine the powers of government between the federation and the provinces.

A constitutional government without a constitution was inconceivable. In the absence of an agreement on its contents and character, the very existence of the country

was put in peril, eventually leading to its dismemberment. The government that came into being following the establishment of Bangladesh, was a Martial Law government in a civilian garb. While its composition remained unchanged in conformity with the electoral verdict, its powers had to be restrained by the adoption of an interim constitution within a few weeks of its induction.

The recent elections have not invested the National Assembly with constituent functions, nor have they restored to the provinces the autonomy exercised by them under the 1973 Constitution. The authority of the Federal Government itself is confined by the constitutional legacy of the Zia regime, which had reduced them to no more than administrative divisions. If the Eighth Amendment holds good for the Center, it is equally mandatory on the provinces to abide by its provisions.

Restoration of democracy by the champions of provincial autonomy, it may be recalled, was considered synonymous with the restoration of the 1973 Constitution. Which the Eighth Amendment, whatever the professions of its author may say, had practically destroyed.

While the parties on the national plane upheld the federal principle, those at the provincial level without decrying its efficacy had placed a pronounced accent on provincial autonomy in their manifestoes which few of the electors had cared to read or had the capacity to comprehend. Protests against excessive centralization were frequently and loudly heard from the articulate sections of the population in the smaller provinces, especially because of the concentration of bureaucratic and military power in the major province. Being junior and unequal partners, they had always suffered from a sense of deprivation in political power and economic opportunity. The feeling was acute during the brief interludes of democracy, in the long periods of dictatorships they felt totally deprived and dispossessed of a right to participation. Even the doors for ventilating legitimate grievances were closed on them.

The demand for excessive decentralization was a logical and natural reaction to over-centralization. The suspicion of a strong Center stemmed from their experience of its domination—an experience that Punjab did not share with them.

Demographically the largest, agriculturally the richest, and now industrially the most advanced, in the wider context of federalism Punjab's predominance in the administration and the armed forces was too glaring to be ignored. Whether not the Prime Minister belongs to the province, Punjab is the principal power base of the party in office. Field Marshal Ayub Khan and Mr Zulfikar Ali Bhutto had hailed from the Frontier and Sindh, and so do Mr Ghulam Ishaq Khan and Benazir Bhutto. With a 60 percent majority Punjab has in the

National Assembly, they cannot hope to counteract its influence with their 40 percent minority to carry the country with it the party in power must rely on its support.

The PPP [Pakistan People's Party] had actually won more seats from the province in the National Assembly than the IJI [Islamic Jamhoori Ittehad] which controls the government of the province. The government of Punjab is, therefore, not the sole spokesman of the province, or its Chief Minister the solitary interpreter of the aspirations of its people. As it is conveniently assumed.

Decentralization has been the persistent demand of the small provinces. Nothing would please them more than its advocacy by the largest province by whose military and bureaucratic power they were always overawed and often subdued. Is Mr Nawaz Sharif a new convert to what in effect amounts to a confederal principle or is his conversion motivated by the exigencies of the political situation is a question even a lay man can answer. His tirade against the Center does not stand on par with Mr Bugti's stand on autonomy. A marriage of convenience, it is bound to be dissolved the moment the IJI government is installed at the Center. One fights for the ascendancy of his province, and the other for the recognition of identity of his own.

Punjab was always uppermost in Mr Bhutto's mind. The dismissal of the Mengal government and its repercussions on the politics of the Frontier, was a clear violation of autonomy of small provinces. To forestall its recurrence in the future, the PPP and ANP had entered into an agreement laying down that if Federal interference was found unavoidable, the Senate members of the affected province would be associated with its administration in the interim period the duration of the emergency was to be limited, and not left to be determined by the sweet will of the Center. That farsighted and statesmanlike document, will have no legal validity unless it forms part of the constitution. Alien to the spirit of the Eighth Amendment, it is germane to the concept of autonomy.

How much provincial autonomy is consistent with national, interest, however, still remains to be determined. That determination can take place only in a climate of reconciliation and not in an atmosphere of confrontation. Even the 1973 Constitution will not provide a panacea for the constitutional ills of the country, for which an effective remedy lies in more autonomy for the provinces and less authority for the federation. But that authority cannot be whittled down to paralyze the Center on whose stability rests the survival and strength of Pakistan.

The cry of Punjab for the Punjabese, Sindh for the Sindhis, Baluchistan for the Baluch, the Frontier for the Pathans now renting the political air, may have catastrophic consequences for the country and may destroy

the very fabric of the State. Although militarily more powerful and economically more developed, Pakistan is no longer ethnically a more cohesive nation-state than it was at the time of its establishment. It is more a conglomeration of provinces pulling apart rather than pulling together for the realization of its destiny. Once an invincible spiritual union, it is now held together by a slender tie of material interest. Power itself is used as a device for personal and partisan advantage by politicians who see in their own future, the future of the country, not realizing that they are its temporary custodians and not permanent heirs to State authority. Ms Benazir Bhutto, Mr Nawaz Sharif and Mr Akbar Bugti must sooner or later leave the stage and make room for others to take charge of it. The mandate they have received from the people is not to weaken the foundation of the State but to reinforce it by their combined and collective effort.

Lacking as our body-politic does strong national base, democratic centralism is no longer a practical proposition. What can hold out a hope of redemption is decentralized democracy which, it is dangerous to equate with unbridled autonomy. If one has proved destructive of the rights of the smaller provinces, the other might cause incalculable damage to national integrity. A powerful center and powerless provinces both cannot form the bedrock of a durable constitution. For its durability both must be made equally viable. The process of peaceful change does not begin and end with the elections. It must permeate the political system at all levels. At no other time and in no other field, was its operation more compelling than in the area of federal-provincial relations which seem to be strained to a breaking point. A reordering of that relationship had become inevitable through an orderly and recognized procedure of constitutional amendments and not extra-constitutional bargaining or blackmail by politicians.

Despite the claim advanced on its behalf, the 1973 Constitution had fallen short of provincial expectations. Their political autonomy was circumscribed by economic dependence on the Center. While making them responsible for the spending departments like health, education, housing and community services, the income generating departments were retained by the federal government. The present government's emphasis on provincial self-reliance can have a meaning only if they have the resources to rely upon. Not surprisingly has the demand been made for royalty on gas and oil by Sindh and Baluchistan, which might be followed by a similar request from the Frontier on power, from the Tarbela Dam.

Disputes over appointments, transfers and dismissal of administrative personnel call for a clear demarcation of jurisdiction. In the nation-building departments, policy-making must remain an exclusive federal preserve. In the field of development, federally sponsored foreign aided projects cannot be made over to the provinces for the ultimate responsibility of repayment of loans is a national obligation.

Neither industrial nor labor policies can be formulated at the provincial level in the name of autonomy, without violating our international commitments. Where the provinces must have a say is in the recruitment policy for projects located in their jurisdiction. Their right to greater autonomy has a corresponding duty to refrain from using it as lever for safeguarding vested interests. That these fears are not unfounded is obvious from the reluctance to abolish the feudal system in the three provinces, and its variant, the Sardari system in the fourth.

Planners Said Out of Touch With 'Real World'
46000138a Islamabad THE MUSLIM in English
15 Apr 89 p 6

[Article by Kaleem Omar]

[Text] Islamabad, April 14: In Pakistan the planner's world and the real world are two very different things. The planner sits in his airconditioned planning tower in Islamabad or Karachi or Lahore drawing up grandiose plans and talking about things like social safety nets for the poor and the trickle-down theory, while those he is the supposedly doing all the planning for—i.e., the poor people of the country—are forced to go on living their wretched lives in conditions that tend to go from worse to worse to worse.

In the planner's world human resource development figures as the so-called centerpiece in the national development strategy. The planner claims that this strategy lays emphasis on labor intensive techniques, incentives to production units that use labor intensive techniques, and—would you believe it?—encouragement to worker capitalism whereby the workers have shares in the company they work for and participate in policy making and decisions.

In the real world this human resource development strategy does not exist, or if it exists, the workers on whose development it is supposed to focus certainly don't know about it. As for the government encouraging worker capitalism, tell that to a worker and he is likely to give you a look of pure incredulity. "Participate in policy making!" he will exclaim. "You've got to be kidding!"

In the planner's world employment goals are linked, he says, to such basic needs as nutrition, housing, education, health, transport and other public services, including electricity, clean water and sewage facilities. The planner claims that in this endeavor, the rural areas are receiving priority. It is in the rural areas, he claims, that a larger number of "dwelling units" (the planner's jargon for houses) are being built, more schools opened, farm to market roads constructed, and basic health units established. Again, it is in the rural areas the planner claims, that modern sewage facilities are being extended to the weakest groups in society. Moreover, says the planner, priority is being given to the electrification of villages at

an accelerated pace. All of which, the planner claims, is bound to usher in a major transformation in village life styles, reduce work burdens and open up new areas of employment.

In the real world the basic needs of huge sections of the population go unattended. More than 60 percent of the people live below the absolute poverty line. Millions of people suffer from malnutrition. Educational facilities in the rural areas are wither non-existent or, where they do exist, are of such poor quality that they are not even a joke but a pantomime. If the government has built any dwelling units in the villages, the whereabouts of such villages must be a closely guarded state secret because there is no evidence of the existence of these dwelling units in any of the country's thousands of typical villages. Sewage facilities and most other civil facilities are virtually non-existent in the rural areas, and more than 25,000 villages are still without electricity. So wherever else there is a major transformation taking place in life styles, the one place where it certainly isn't taking place is in the villages.

In the planner's world the accelerated development of backward regions is claimed to be a major objective. This accelerated developments, the planner claims, is ensuring an increase in employment and the equitable development of all regions of the country. Special programmes for the development of Baluchistan and the Federally Administered Tribal Areas are being implemented and the tempo of development in Azad Kashmir and the Northern Areas has increased.

In the real world the backward regions of the country remain horrendously backward, in many cases as backward as they have been for centuries. And the backward regions one is speaking of here are not mere isolated pockets of backwardness but huge sections of the country. In the whole of Mekran division, for example, there are only 8 miles of paved roads. Numerous villages in the Tharparkar district of Sindh are eight hours or more of bone-rattling journeys over sand dunes and rocky desert away from the nearest paved road. The entire Salt Valley region in the Punjab has turned into a blighted landscape where the 300,000 inhabitants of the area have to fight a constant battle for their very survival. The so-called industrial estate near Quetta consists of one measly factory. Visiting the Federally Administered Tribal Areas is like stepping back in time 2,000 years. The Northern Areas haven't yet had even their constitutional status defined, what to speak of any meaningful development work being done there by the government.

In the planner's world the Seventh Five-Year Plan, which supposedly got underway last year, claims to provide for all such elements of policy as are gearing the economy to move towards a regime of self-reliance and self-sufficiency. The Seventh Plan claims to recognize that it is no longer feasible for the government to borrow

externally and internally to finance development expenditures in view of net flows having diminished as result of the heavy previous borrowings that have to be serviced.

In the real world self-reliance and self-sufficiency in many key areas of the economy remain a pipe-dream. This year, for example, Pakistan is importing something like 2.3 million tons of wheat, which may be the planner's idea of self-sufficiency but it certainly isn't anyone else's. And if, as the Seventh Plan asserts, it is no longer feasible for the government to borrow from other countries to meet development expenditures, would some genius of a planner care to explain why the government is going to the Aid to Pakistan Consortium countries meeting in Paris next week to borrow a whopping 3 billion dollars? Is this what the planner means by borrowing no longer being feasible? A few more years of this kind of not feasible borrowing, and we can all go home!

In the planner's world budgetary reforms are being made and efforts strengthened to significantly raise the level of domestic resources to reduce the dependence on foreign assistance.

In the real world dependence on foreign assistance is greater than ever before. In fact we are now in a negative inflow situation, meaning that the foreign aid actually coming through the pipeline each year is now less than the amount going out each year to service our ever increasing foreign debt. As a result even the servicing of our foreign debt has to be done partially by resorting to borrowing abroad. This in turn, of course, further increases our foreign debt burden, which will soon hit 20 billion dollars—a fair piece of change in anybody's book, except perhaps the planner's.

In the planner's world the division of work and cooperation between various science and research institutes is being restructured. Come to think of it, in the planner's world everything is always being restructured (restructured being a word the planner loves more than any other word). According to the planner, the decision-making powers of research units are being extended and management systems suiting the special needs of various research units are "being obtained" (whatever that means).

In the real world government-funded research units in Pakistan appear to spend most of their time in trying to re-invest the wheel. As for the decision-making powers of research units being extended, most of them don't even have the power to hire their own peons, let alone anything else. In the planner's world, in short, the sun is always shining. In the real world, on the other hand, that is to say, the world all of us except the planner inhabit, the dark clouds of poverty, illiteracy and deprivation stretch from horizon to horizon.

To paraphrase T.S. Eliot: Between the planner and the reality, falls the shadow.

Over Half of Urbanities Said Living in Slums 46000136d Karachi DAWN in English 15 Apr 89 p 1

[Article by Majid Sheikh]

[Text] As investment in housing, relative to the increase in urban population, increases at a negative rate, the population in cities living in slums and 'katchi abadis' has increased to just over 25 percent of the total.

The periodic surveys that are carried out, by the provincial and federal departments of planning and development and the housing and physical planning departments, have begun to show that 19.9 percent of the 15 most populated cities live in 'katchi abadis' or slums.

Technically the government classifies a slum as being very different from a 'katchi abadi'. In the total calculation slums are not classified as a "locality that can be classified as not suitable for normal living." A rough official estimate, therefore, puts the population living below 'acceptable housing standards' in the 15 most-populated cities as being above 57 percent.

A nationwide survey of housing completed in 1988 indicates that 32.5 percent of the population of Karachi lives in 'katchi abadis', while 25.2 percent of the residents of Lahore live in 'katchi abadis'. The trend seems to be that the bigger the city the faster is the rate of increase in 'katchi abadis'. This would seem to indicate that the provincial governments, especially those of Sindh and the Punjab, have not been able to keep pace with the growing needs for housing.

According to a housing expert in Lahore, the manner in which the city planners have tackled the housing problems of Lahore have virtually converted the city into a massive slum. The inability to implement basic civic laws have led to a situation whereby the population builds whatever they like and wherever they like, he said. The same seems to be true of the other cities. The reports, however, make a mention of the fact that the NWFP [North-West Frontier Province] government is the only one that seems to be serious about proper civic development.

The case of Lahore has been discussed at length in the report. According to official statistics the population living in 'katchi abadis' has increased from 14.7 percent in 1978 to 19.5 percent in 1983. This figure rose to 23.9 in 1986 and on to 25.2 percent in 1987. Thus the 'katchi abadi' population has been increasing at over twice the rate of the increase in the population of the city itself. Today the population of Lahore officially stands at about 3.7 million. Experts put it at well over the 4 million mark. This means that at this rate, especially given the experience of Karachi, Lahore could well have 2.5 million people living in 'katchi abadis' by the turn of the century and well over 4.5 million persons living well below 'acceptable housing standards' by the year 2000.

These frightening figures, according to a reputed Lahore architect and social scientists, are conservative. The reality, he commented, is much more grim and there is no doubt that the government is still not mentally prepared to take on the massive challenge of proper housing for the people of the growing cities of the Punjab and Sindh, the manner in which Britain reconstructed its cities after the Second World War should be studied by our experts, modified to suit our geographic and social conditions and put into action in a phased but planned manner", he said.

According to an official of the Punjab government's housing and physical planning department. Lahore has not been subjected to restrictions in housing, restriction like building schools, clinics, hospitals and parks in a planned manner. This has been the prime reason 'katchi abadis' and slums have grown at such a fantastic rate. The official further said that the belated effort to build parks has had a good effect and has simply proved the age-old rule that communities should be planned first and housing later.

Meanwhile, the latest report has been declared as "classified" and its findings restricted to a few officials only. The Federal Government, it has been learnt, has asked one of its agencies to verify the startling findings and to report back as soon as possible. The Punjab Government has, it has been reliably learnt, asked that the results be kept classified till further instructions". One Federal Government source informed that the Sindh Government is studying the latest report in its wider social context. But no matter how the findings are studied, it has been realized that matters are growing out of control in the housing sector and that urgent action is called for to avoid a dangerous spillover.

Editorial Attacks U.S. for Silence Over Nepal
46000139c Islamabad THE MUSLIM in English
17 Apr 89 p 4

[Text] The empire has struck again; this time on the (comparatively) tiny Himalayan Kingdom of Nepal, while the world looks the other way. A U.S. State Department spokesperson has refused to comment on this latest, blatant transgression of a minuscule neighboring State's universally-accepted international rights, by the regional big brother which the American establishment Press is all too keen to be accepted as the local policeman. When asked to comment on India's virtual siege of Nepal for well over three weeks now, the State Department official dismissed the affair as one between two sovereign States; adding, of course, the misplaced platitude that the concerned countries should enter into a mutual dialogue to resolve the problem. The relative position of the two sides does not seem to have occurred to the official. On the other hand, no Soviet official has, presumably, been required by a journalist so far to give Moscow's views, if any, on the new adventure undertaken by its Treaty partner in South Asia. At any rate,

Moscow's attitude towards New Delhi's increasing propensity to browbeat its smaller neighbors into accepting the regional giant's politico-economic hegemony, has continued to remain even more indulgent than that of Washington.

Thus armed with the tacit blessings of both the super-powers, India has felt no constraint on actively pursuing the doctrine of regional overlordship first enunciated by the South Block some six years ago in the wake of riots against Hindus in Sri Lanka. Although the eventual price of the big powers' complacency in the belief that New Delhi's ambitions extend only to its immediate neighborhood, may have to be paid by the world on a much larger scale; Islamabad's conspicuously consistent inertia in the matter escapes all comprehension.

Our Foreign Minister was in New Delhi in the summer of 1983 in connection with a (then) SAARC [South Asian Association for Regional Corporation] meeting when India put into operation the 'Indira Doctrine,' requiring all countries from which help had reportedly been sought by Sri Lanka—including Pakistan—to keep their hands off the Island State. The long and the short of the new dispensation was that even restoring internal 'stability' in any of the South Asian States was the exclusive prerogative of New Delhi. India was not prepared to hear of the stationing of U.S. troops either.

That India has been repeatedly successful in applying the doctrine is amply borne out by the track record of the years since, in which it has landed its forces in both Sri Lanka and Maldives.

There is, nevertheless, a qualitative difference between the earlier two scenarios and New Delhi's current bullying of Kathmandu. India had in the case of both Sri Lanka and Maldives allocated to itself the 'right' to intervene; in the first instance through extracting at gun-point an invitation from the Colombo government, and, in the second, by what is generally perceived as state-managing an improbable coup against the Maldivian President.

There is not even such a speciously redeeming aspect to the brazen display of New Delhi's imperial attitude towards Nepal these days whose only crime has been to assert its sovereign independence, in a token way, by acquiring a single consignment of small arms and primarily defensive armament from China.

The central point seems to have been overlooked by Islamabad all through this process of New Delhi's strident march to overwhelm the smaller South Asian nations through gunboat diplomacy. That is, by maintaining a studied silence, we are, unwittingly, becoming guilty not so much of facilitating the compromising of the sovereignty of our neighbors, as of undermining the long-term sovereign interests of Pakistan itself.

The sovereign independence of the smallest regional State should be as dear to Pakistan as it holds its own sovereignty. That alone can check New Delhi before we wake up to the realization that it has become too late. The disproportionate burdens reposed in a nation by immutable factors of geo-strategy and history cannot be grudged. They must be borne with dignity and grace. Being left high and dry at the mercy of New Delhi by the global powers, our South Asian neighbors look up to Pakistan as the last hope. We cannot afford to let them down. The landlocked Nepalese nation of some 17 million has not only resolutely withstood the strangulating blockade, but has also demonstrated its preparedness to face the showdown forced by the 'mini superpower' fifty times its size. But, for how long? it is about time Islamabad paid some attention also to issues more fundamental than the ICJ [International Court of Justice] seat.

Editorial Praises U.S. Stance on Aid

46000136e Karachi DAWN in English 16 Apr 89 p 7

[Text] The latest official US position on the nuclear issue in South Asia speaks of a greater sense of realism on the subject on the part of Washington. A senior State Department official, in a testimony prepared for the House of Representatives Appropriations Subcommittee, has affirmed that the US must rely on persuasion rather than restrictions on aid to prevent nuclear proliferation. In the light of misgivings prevailing in certain circles about Pakistan's peaceful nuclear programme, this perception seems to imply a sympathetic approach towards Islamabad's principled stand which supports a regional initiative to complement global non-proliferation efforts. Unfortunately in the past Pakistan had been subjected to a motivated propaganda blitz designed to scuttle its attempts endogenously to manufacture or acquire nuclear power plants in order to solve an acute energy problem. The relevance of utilizing this benign option is explained by the anticipated shortfall of 8,000 megawatts in the national grid by the turn of the century. Nuclear energy can greatly help to cover it. Even in the face of threats of aid cutoff, Pakistan remained steadfastly committed to the peaceful uses of atomic energy and the prevention of nuclear proliferation. Embodying these commitments were several proposals made on the issue, including the establishment of a nuclear weapons-free zone in South Asia, a proposal which has been overwhelmingly endorsed by the UN General Assembly since 1974. Similarly, Pakistan's offers to India of mutual inspection of each other's nuclear facilities and joint signing of the NPT [Nonproliferation Treaty] are of a piece with efforts to keep South Asia free of nuclear weapons. Pakistan would not have persisted in these efforts if it had decided to become a nuclear weapon State.

Despite the orchestrated campaign, Pakistan's strict adherence to the policy of non-proliferation had enabled the Reagan Administration annually to grant extension of the waiver to the Symington Amendment in order to

allow the flow of American aid to Islamabad. It is rather encouraging that President Bush, recognizing the additional merit of a democratic government in Pakistan and its policy of developing nuclear technology for peaceful purposes, will be able to come out with the annual certification that Pakistan does not possess a nuclear explosive device. As an earnest of its consistent efforts to promote mutual cooperation in ensuring the application of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes and developing friendly and harmonious relations, Pakistan took the initiative to conclude the recent bilateral agreement with India about non-attack on each other's nuclear facilities and installations. In this context, the US realization that "it would be counterproductive to cut off assistance to Pakistan or impose additional non-proliferation restrictions on our aid" should prove helpful. For it suggests that Pakistan's assurance about non-proliferation, coming as it does from a democratic government, is more credible and that steps for ensuring the application of nuclear energy to peaceful uses must be taken in a spirit of cooperation. Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto's forthcoming visit to the United States, it is to be hoped, would contribute to a broadening of the possibilities of such cooperation and provide the necessary stimulus for the promotion of regional stability so vital to the prevention of nuclear proliferation.

Editorial Sees Democracy Threatened

46000137a Peshawar THE FRONTIER POST in English 17 Apr 89 p 4

[Text] The newly established democracy in Pakistan is today threatened from various quarters who find democratic institutions contrary to their narrow interests. The first and most serious threat comes from the armed gangs of various types, mainly representing the warring ethnic groups in Sindh. Democracy has done little to calm down the enmities between various ethnic sections of the people of Sindh. Each group is determined to wage a war of terrorism, senseless massacres of innocent people and there appears to be no end to this underground war waged by masked men who cannot be identified and caught. Incident like the one that took many lives of a minority community in Larkana. The sudden appearance of armed men on the streets, indiscriminate shooting down of common people, found on the streets engaged in their normal business. The continued armed violence in campuses of universities and colleges is a problem that defies solution and a serious threat to any ordered governance.

There are many knights errant in search of sacred causes for which they can bring out violent crowds on the streets to confront the law enforcing agencies and place the Government in an embarrassing position. The vested interest and its allies are planning to make capital out of the economic difficulties of the people due to the rising prices and shortages either created by hoarding or because of smuggling of foodstuffs to neighboring countries. Already, plans are being talked about such a

countrywide agitation designed to topple the PPP [Pakistan People's Party] Government. Such a planned agitation and the accompanying violence can add to something that would bring down a much more popular government than the one Mohtarma Benazir Bhutto leads.

To add to these external dangers, there are forces within the PPP whose loyalty to the ideals of democracy are most doubtful, people who aspire to replace the exploiters, profiteers and unscrupulous ministers and hangers-on of the last government. There are irresponsible adventurers eager to grab power and to this end they have been giving the prime minister misleading information and engaging in activities that are steadily weakening the PPP as a political party. Then there are the opportunists, racketeers and fair weather friends of the PP, each one working for himself and his small faction. There is a host of incompetent men who have wormed their way to positions of power and influence within the PPP Government. There is a crowd of disgruntled people, who for some reason, expected to receive places in the government but were disappointed. They are hanging around the party grumbling and stirring revolt among the rank and file of the PPP activists. There are elements hostile to the PPP, who have, through devious, ways received Government's patronage on false pretenses and in this they have been helped by men of doubtful loyalties within the PPP.

Lastly, there is a small but influential group of extreme left wing elements within the party and otherwise, who are likely to act in such a manner as to aid the enemies of the PPP. Some of these elements are starting small agitational shows in order to blackmail the Government into taking notice of their presence and granting them concessions and favors that they seek with as much eagerness as the rightists. The party organization is, therefore, riddled with weaknesses and unable to perform the great tasks that confront it and its Government. The party is singularly deficient in skilled publicists and its public relations men are either asleep or quite ignorant of their job. Despite these dangers and deficiencies, there is an inexplicable complacency within the leadership of the party, who seem to think that they can handle all these problems with ease and the majority in the National Assembly, forgetting that the enemies of democracy are determined to bypass all democratic institutions including the National Assembly, the superior courts and other forums where political differences can be discussed and mistakes of commission and omission can be corrected. The Assemblies are being used to waste time or prevent legislative work with futile debates on procedures and hair-splitting arguments on technicalities. Opponents of the PPP are planning to fight it out in the streets and elsewhere.

Commentary Questions Indian Motives

46000136b Karachi DAWN in English 27 Apr 89 p 7

[Article by M. B. Naqvi]

[Text] A great deal of uncommon concern has been shown in the Pakistan Press over India's military build-up, especially during the last six or seven weeks. The

speed at which India has been militarising itself—expanding the armed forces as well as equipping them with the state-of-the-art weapons—has been, more or less, break neck. Against whom is India arming itself? is quite a relevant question. There is also the subsidiary question: what are its implications for all concerned, particularly Pakistan. This leads to another important query as to what should be Pakistan's response—which is being raised by critics of the PPP [Pakistan People's Party] Government's India policy.

As things stand, India's designated enemy remains Pakistan. It is true it has had an unsuccessful war with China, and much play is made of the threat from its northern neighbour. But an analysis of India's actual militarisation programme shows that the nexus between the effort's quantum and the goal is quite hazy. For instance, India's naval build-up, so far the most spectacular part of its endeavour, is wholly disproportionate to any possible threat from Pakistan. As for China, it is hard to visualize the Chinese mounting a naval invasion of India—or indeed any invasion at all—or even a naval blockade. The realistic chances of India doing the same vis-a-vis China are also nil.

It is, however, possible to conclude that Indian policy planners may possibly be thinking of countering China's projection of its power over Southeast Asia and, somewhat less credibly over Southwest Asia. But that would be conceivable only if both are seen to be trying to 'dominate' these regions, with India trying to neutralize Chinese influence. This does not quite click, despite the manifest fact of the Chinese presence in the north-eastern parts of Indian Ocean and the known Beijing interest in Southeast Asia. But Chinese interests would seem more likely to be focused on Vietnam and the latter's possible moves in the region, especially vis-a-vis Kampuchea. It is hard to conceive of China playing a classical great-power game of planning a domination of either Southeast Asia or its regional waters in the 1990s or even beyond. For India to feel greatly concerned with China's presence in these waters is far-fetched.

The question is: why is India acquiring this capability and where does, or can, it visualise bringing this huge power potential to bear? There are no obvious or credible answers.

In the opinion of most observers, threat to India from Pakistan is no longer serious enough to require such an order of war preparations. The true balance of power between these two old rivals has gone so far in India's favour that the latter could easily have relaxed some years ago. After the third India-Pakistan war, in 1971, the idea of Pakistan mounting an attack on India is seen by all and sundry, including Indians, as absurd. Threat from China, on both political and technical grounds, is insufficiently serious to warrant such an expenditure of treasure.

True, the processes of normalization between India and China are proceeding rather slowly. But they are seen to be genuinely intended, on both sides, especially against the backdrop of growing Sino-Soviet rapprochement. The conclusion is inevitable—and it is not Pakistanis who have arrived at it but also a large number of eminent observers elsewhere—that India's militarisation has acquired a momentum of its own and is no longer predicated on any verifiable threat; it is indeed a rogue elephant. Maybe, an Indian friend was right: the militarisation process chiefly benefits politicians in need of mobilising funds for electoral purposes; this has happened repeatedly.

Nevertheless, this build-up cannot be taking place in a state of Indian decision-makers' absentmindedness or merely for reasons of kickbacks on big purchase orders. A case of sort can be made that Indian nationalist leaders have long been under the spell of the concepts underlying classical power-politics. Whatever wisdom they may have had in the past, today these ideas operate as untested assumptions, if not mere clichés. What is, however, true is that the Indian leadership has, from the beginning, wanted to make India a great power. In classical terms, this meant its being a great military power. The assumption here is that overwhelming military strength equals national greatness and that equals political influences over weaker peoples and States.

Conversely, the same idea is repeated by advocates of militarisation among neighbours or rivals of India. Military weakness, conventional wisdom says, invites aggression and that equals loss of influence in the comity of nations, especially among neighbours, and may be independence itself. In these classical categories, India, by now, should have become a great power with much influence around and, logically, all other neighbours should have accepted its hegemony. As it happens, few neighbours of India are willing to do that. Even entertaining the idea is anathema to all or most of them.

The plain fact is that India's pre-eminence—genuine enough in classical terms—is not being acknowledged by any of its neighbours. It is true that both superpowers, for their separate reasons, do give a measure of recognition to India's big power status, if somewhat condescendingly. But there is hardly a State in Asia that would make even a minor change in its policies for the sake of pleasing India, much less in compliance with its wishes. This is certainly true of Pakistan. But that may not be conclusive because of a sense of historical rivalry between them. Take Bangladesh or Nepal. Can they be seen in any way as supplicating to India?

Sri Lanka's case is a little ambiguous because of the 1987 agreement under which an India Peace Keeping Force (IPKF) is operating in that country. But bold would be the observer who would hold that Mr J. R. Jayawardene signed that agreement under duress; arguably, it was his wily politics that he wanted to break the power of hardline Tamil separatists, especially the Tamil Tigers,

with the help of Indian troops. As President Premadasa has shown, Colombo can always turn round and ask New Delhi to pack up and go. A direct refusal by Indians to accede to such a publicly-uttered demand is inconceivable. If the IPKF is still in Sri Lanka that is because some of Colombo's purposes are still being served by it. In Nepal's case, despite obvious pressures, Kathmandu continues to be adamant and goes on refusing to do as New Delhi wants it to.

The cognisable fact is that the Indians have failed to get a pay-off for all expenditure of human energies, lost opportunities and so much treasure. The rest of the world, including weak and tiny States in its own neighbourhood, continues to cock a snook at mighty India. What is more, there is not much likelihood of the Indians being able to punish these flouters of classical theories of 'power conferring privileges on the mighty'. This is, in fact, a changed world.

After the Second World War, a new phenomenon has emerged: it is the strange fact that the acquisition of mega-power makes a country more or less politically important. The U.S. has repeatedly seen how few and elusive the fruits of power are; despite possessing terrible, awe-inspiring physical might, the Koreans, Chinese, Vietnamese, Iranians and even Palestinians (by extension) have shown that the U. S. might really be a paper tiger. The Russians have also discovered the rather new and, in some cases, severe limitations on their undoubted power. The French and the Dutch had already made that discovery long ago. The British were smart enough to sense well in advance the change that was coming and they acted accordingly—and more profitably than many others.

The Indians are sure to make this same discovery that possession of tremendous military power, whether conventional or nuclear, does not confer on its the privileges similar to what European imperialists could enjoy in times gone by. Petty aggressions and senseless nationalistic wars are still with us. But the old calculations of power politics that motivated classical empire-builder and statesmen no longer work the way they did in centuries before the twentieth.

The question, however, remains for most Pakistanis to make up their mind as to what the new power of India implies for us and others. Superpowers, European powers and the Japanese have their reasons—mostly commercial in the latter two cases—to court India. But no one in Southeast or Southwest Asia pays much attention to what India says or does. Among neighbours, India's military build-up has not produced any awe or respect, let alone a friendly feeling. Few express any admiration for Indian military prowess, though misgivings are common. Fundamentally, this accumulation of power represents lost opportunities for development and there is precious little to show for it.

More so, as no one can conceive of any circumstances in which the U.S., British, French, German, Russian, Chinese and other navies shall go away, leaving the field open to India to lord it over whichever littoral it may covet. Then, Japanese Navy is sure to register its massive presence in the 1990s, leaving little scope for Indian Navy to be dominant, reducing the cost effectiveness of India's naval and other military build-up.

Commentary Views Crisis in Punjab-Center Relations

46000138c Islamabad *THE MUSLIM in English*
23 Apr 89 p 4

[Text] The worsening trends in Punjab-Center relationship illustrate a stark reality that the hostility between the PPP [Pakistan People's Party] and IJI [Islamic Jamhoori Ittehad] has run too deep to allow any genuine reconciliation—for the time being—between the two. How quickly the high hopes generated by Benazir-Nawaz meeting in March evaporated only substantiates this disturbing factor.

Ironically, it is Punjab which has come to champion the cause of provincial autonomy. It has made demands and assumed postures, which if raised by minority provinces would have brought severe censure from all quarters. Did not Wali Khan, the ANP [Awami National Party] Chief, while commenting on the situation, sarcastically say some time back that had any of the smaller provinces taken the position which Punjab had in the present confrontation, they would have exposed themselves to a most harsh response from the Center. And it remains a fact that the Center's relations under A.A. Bhutto were less inimical with the Attaullah Mangal ruled Baluchistan than the Center-Punjab ties of today. (Who would dispute the fact that Z.A. Bhutto had dissolved the Baluchistan Assembly on much less substantive issues).

Ponderables

Some of the grievances of Nawaz Sharif led Punjab and Benazir governed Center may be genuine. But what is more important is that the two should not come out with rash responses. They should also avoid setting up precedents which could create problems for the country as well as for themselves.

Nawab Akbar Bugti, Chief Minister of Baluchistan, recently threatened to align with the Punjab if Baluchistan's demands were not met. It is widely assumed that Bugti may not have meant what he said and that he only wanted to pressurize the Center. But the crucial question is whether anybody can stop him from playing on the provincial wicket if others do the same. And it can hardly be disputed that Baluchistan has had more grievances against the Center than Punjab had at any stage.

There is a view that confrontation with the Center has gone to Nawaz Sharif's advantage and that he and the IJI have made further inroads in the Punjab. The recent IJI

[Islamic Jamhoori Ittehad] victory in the Gujranwala by-election has been of particular significance. Nawaz Sharif's style of politics, particularly his 'defiance' has appealed to the Punjabi temperament. He is viewed as a symbol of resistance and power, a trait to which Punjab has always responded.

But on the negative side an all possessive mind (as is the case with Nawaz Sharif) is also bound to make too many mistakes. His bid to bypass the Public Service Commission and retention of over 120 public servants after superannuation besides evoking strong reaction even from some IJI quarters have annoyed a majority of government servants on whose effective cooperation has depended the smooth running of the provincial administration. This lapse could have for reaching repercussions than is viewed at the moment.

Secondly, the confrontation has resulted in the near elimination of the IJI in other provinces and confined it to Punjab. Since then the IJI has identified itself with Punjab alone. If it is a part of deliberate strategy the move is not well advised. And if it is a lapse, it is a serious one. Nawaz Sharif has boasted that he rules 60 percent of Pakistan (this is the Punjab share in the country's population). But what is being forgotten is that the Punjab-confined IJI could hardly be a viable option to the nation-wide PPP.

The PPP's dilemma is no different. At the moment it remains the only country-wide party with substantial following in all the provinces. But the gradual shrinking of its base in the Punjab has confronted it with a serious challenge. The PPP's recent reverses in the province clearly show that the party lacks organization and motivation at the provincial level. Much will depend on the party's ability to check its downward trend in the power bastion of the country. Any further loss of support in Punjab will proportionately affect PPP's position in the Center.

How far the Rs 2 billion Peoples Works Programme will help the PPP to win support or broaden its base at the rural level remains to be seen. However, it is generally felt that considering the magnitude of the rural problem Rs 2 billion programme is not likely to make any visible impact on the situation. But even then Nawaz Sharif has viewed this project apprehensively and decided to approach the courts on the matter. The Muslim League government under Mohammad Khan Junejo had enjoyed an absolutely free hand to execute his five-point programme. The PPP being the party in power, also legitimately claims the same privilege.

Another irritant between the Center and Punjab is the forthcoming visit of Nawaz Sharif to the United States scheduled for next month. Now Nawaz Sharif's dual role has made thing all the more complicated. As the IJI chief his role as an opposition leader is recognized by all. But in his capacity as the Chief Minister of Punjab his

relations with the PPP or Center are viewed in a different perspective. These two roles cannot be mixed up, but that is exactly what is happening. It is feared that as a result of Nawaz Sharif's visit to the United States this dichotomy may sharpen further. Some circles are already of the view that the PPP-IJI relations are rapidly reaching a stage of no return.

Weak Wicket

But this is only one aspect of the situation. What has been overlooked is that these differences have been largely deepened and aggravated due to the shortcomings in the constitutional arrangements itself. The Prime Minister has been defined as the Chief Executive, but has hardly been vested with the necessary constitutional powers to play that role effectively. This explains that wherever Benazir Bhutto has lacked her personal leverage, as is the case in Punjab and Baluchistan, she has found herself on a very weak wicket. There was no exaggeration in Wali Khan's claim when he said a few days back that the present constitution was more presidential in nature and character. The Governor is the nominee of the President and not the Prime Minister and in the present setup and in the existing situation this matters a great deal. What this anomaly could cause to the nation is evident by the fact that the dissolution of the Baluchistan Assembly has remained a mystery to this day. This could only be described as constitutional anarchy.

Dyarchical

The distribution of power between the President and P.M. is such that the two offices have come to compete instead of complementing each other. Gen Zia-ul Haq and Muhammad Khan Junejo had all the compelling reasons to work in unison but the suspicions and doubts generated by the dyarchical arrangement made harmonious working impossible. Since then new faces have come to preside over the destiny of the country but the system has remained the same. Ishaq Khan has given a democratic look to his office, has kept his profile low and shown all the accommodation to the P.M. All this is fine, but gestures alone cannot remove constitutional imbalances. A few days back a presidential spokesman, had to quash rumors by his timely clarification about the President's meetings with certain opposition leaders last week. This distrust is the offshoot of the system itself.

The Eighth Amendment may be an effective bar to keep Benazir Bhutto within certain defined limits, but harmony is the price that is being paid in return. The key to good Center-Provinces relations partly lies in constitutional reforms. The sooner this reality is admitted the better it would be for the country and political parties as well.

Commentary Urges End To Neglect of Northern Areas

46000139a Islamabad THE MUSLIM in English
1 May 89 pp 4, 7

[Article by Ashfaq Naqvi]

[Text] The most picturesque part of the country—the Northern Areas—are in the news these days with persistent demands being made by the local population for the grant of full fledged provincial status and their democratic right of representation in the Senate and National Assembly of Pakistan. On the question of merger of these areas into Kashmir, the inhabitants appear divided. The 16-member Northern Areas Council is said to be actively engaged in deciding about the status of these areas and their future.

These mountain-locked areas, one of the most backward of the modern world, comprise three districts—Gilgit, Diamir and Baltistan. The six million population is scattered over an area of 27,000 square miles, mostly centered around the district headquarter towns of Gilgit, Skardu and Chilas. The present population of Gilgit town stands at 100,000 which is 45 percent of the total population of the district. For the facility of the population and to brace up the socio-economic condition of the populace it is proposed, and demanded by the locals, that two more districts be set up in the areas—Ghizar and Ghanche.

On the eve of Partition in 1947, Gilgit and Baltistan formed an integral part of the State of Jammu and Kashmir. Earlier in 1935, fearing the expansion of the Russians southwards, the British Government took over the administration of Gilgit sub-division under a 60-year lease agreement with the ruler of the State. This was rescinded after the announcement of the 3rd June 1947 Partition Plan. However, the valiant sons of the soil rose in revolt at that time against the Dogra ruler and liberated their territory, throwing in their lot with the people of Pakistan. Since then the area has been administered by the Federal Government.

All the same, the Northern Areas remained a victim of neglect for several years. Important issues were shelved and a policy of adhocism was followed. It was in 1982 that a non-government organization initiated the Aga Khan Rural Support Programme (AKRSP), doing useful work on self-help basis by digging irrigation channels, reclaiming land, imparting poultry training and creating a sense of self-reliance in the people.

Agriculture is the main occupation of the people. However they can have only one crop in the year as sowing can take place in the terraced fields in only April after the snows melt. Fodder for the livestock is also hard to come by.

The Government of Pakistan initiated some development schemes for the region in the fields of education, health, communication, transport, agriculture, irrigation and water supply. The development outlay in 1984-85 was Rs 200 million but it increased to Rs 500 million in 1987. Presently four colleges and a number of secondary schools are functioning in the region. The Government also provides scholarships to students for higher education in various universities and professional colleges of the country. However there is dire need of a polytechnic at a central place in the region to meet the requirements of technical manpower for the area.

The region is rich in mineral resources and high quality fruits, the exploitation of which need special attention. Fruit industry, in particular, could be developed as the region which has all the prospects of becoming a leading apricot center of the world.

Previously, cut off from the rest of the world, opening of the Karakoram Highway (KKH), also known as the Silk Route, proved a boon to the economy of the region. This road cuts through the most difficult terrain of Kohistan, Gilgit and Hunza and leads to the Khunjerab Pass beyond which lies the Chinese province of Xinjiang. Unfortunately the road is presently in a shambles mostly due to the lack of coordination between the Frontier Works Organization (FWO) which built it and the National Highway Board (NHB) which is responsible for its maintenance.

Besides power, communication is the other main problem of the region. The road journey from Rawalpindi to Gilgit takes 14 to 16 hours whereas by air it is only of one hour duration. However bad weather badly affects the regularity of flights. The Gilgit airport is now being extended and the runway strengthened to enable operation of Boeings which could brave the weather. For communication within the region there is need for more suspension bridges as the area is littered with fast flowing ravines.

In the field of agriculture, fertilizers and scientifically developed seeds are being supplied to the people. Under the Integrated Rural Development Project a hatchery was built in 1988 at a cost of Rs 49 lakh near Gilgit. It is the first project of its kind and produces more than 2000 chicks weekly for distribution in rural areas in coordination with AKRSP.

The other main problem of the Northern Areas is power. Only one megawatt is available to meet a demand of 10 MW. Power generation is mainly by hydel exploitation. In 1988 a 700 MW hydel power station was inaugurated at Budalas in Nagar Valley of Gilgit district at a cost of Rs 23 million. It is the biggest such project in the Northern Areas. To supplement the power requirements of the areas barter trade with China could be expanded

and coal imported from there. It has also been suggested by experts that all new thermal power stations should be set up in the northern parts of the country to avoid transmission losses.

The Northern Areas are also a tourists' paradise and if tourism is developed properly it could bring immense prosperity to the people. Besides scenic beauty the area is the location of K-2, the second highest mountain in the world standing at a majestic height of 28,250 feet. In addition there are other peaks, 25,000 feet and above. Broad Peak, Gasherbrum, Masherbrum and Rakaposhi are the dream of mountaineers around the world. The first beneficiary of all projects should be the local people themselves and it is in the field of tourism that they can benefit the most. It is well that a park is being developed near Gilgit town for the attraction of tourists.

During the last few years some attention has been paid to the development of the Northern Areas. A 10 KW broadcasting station of PBC is already operating from Gilgit. The feasibility of a small cement plant located in the area is being studied. In 1988 financial assistance of up to Rs 8.4 million was provided to the youth by the Youth Investment Promotion Society (YIPS) for self-employment opportunities in the fields of hotel industry, dairy and poultry farming, small business, vocational schemes and handicrafts. Still, more needs to be done.

Last year there were some unfortunate incidents in the region which created unrest and tension among the inhabitants. These were unusual as the people there have always lived in peace and amity. Could be there some hidden hands behind those outbursts of violence. The area is of immense strategic importance and the creeping in of the Indian armed forces into Siachin could not be without purpose. It is already known that a plan—Operation Trident—had been hatched for the attack first on Skardu and then on Gilgit. may be it has not yet been shelved. Whatever the threat from across the border, steps need to be taken for the populace of the areas not to feel neglected or suffer from a sense of frustration. Whatever decision is taken about the future status of the Northern Areas—whether they are converted into a fifth province of the country or merged with Azad Kashmir—the ultimate responsibility for their welfare rests upon the Government of Pakistan. It goes without saying that the people there want to join the mainstream of this country.

Commentary Calls for Effective Employment Policy

46000136a Karachi DAWN in English 3 May 89 p 7

[Article by Mushtaq Ahmad]

[Text] According to a World Bank report the magnitude of unemployment in Pakistan is in the neighborhood of 11 million and not one million as it is officially announced from time to time. With nearly 29 million

employed whatever their level of productivity, the number of the employed and the employable would work out to 40 million, which is roughly 40 percent of the population.

Against 50 percent of the West which is effectively and efficiently employed, we have a population of 21 percent which can be classified as non-productive or counter-productive because the economy can provide no fruitful means of livelihood to them.

The fact of illiteracy cannot be a bar to their absorption in the workforce since the vast majority of those a gainfully employed are not literate either. The inevitable consequence of the ratio is a precarious dependence of the household on the earnings of a single member, whose disability caused by accident, disease or unemployment can become a serious threat to the entire family, which has no alternative source of income. In a country where unemployment benefits and old-age pensions are either non-existent or where available, are as good as non-existent, employment for the unemployed has to have a top priority in development planning. Full employment or near full employment ought to be the major objective the planners should seek to achieve.

We have had six five-year plans and are now engaged in implementing the seventh one. At the end of each plan, our planners have taken credit for having accomplished the targets they had set out to achieve. The human factor has figured only peripherally in their list of accomplishments. Their primary pre-occupation is with an increase in the GNP [gross national product] and GDP [gross domestic product]. The financial allocations and their utilization are the first to be mentioned, followed by physical targets which invariably lag behind. For the failure to attain them all economic ingenuity is employed from bad weather at home to imported inflation from abroad to explain the short falls. And as for the level of employment the promise was never firm to call for an explanation. In all the plans we have had so far it was a matter of guess, one guess could be as good as another. In any case, it was never a product of the plan but its by-product.

The estimates of job opportunities each plan was expected to generate, ranged between two million in the early years to three million in later periods. Even if these estimates were accepted on their face value, the total would amount to fifteen million. It means that the growth of the economy on which colossal expenditure was incurred has had little or no impact on the living conditions of the people. At best it might have arrested a decline, which too would be a doubtful assumption. After all the strides the country has taken in the field of industrialization and by any standard, these have been rapid and striking, the industrial workers number slightly more than three million. This figure does not speak highly of our planning performance or the perceptions of our planners, including Dr. Mahbubul Haq who cannot disown responsibility for the bad shape of the

economy inherited by the present regime. If the previous government had acted on his advice he was squarely to blame, and if the plan was tailor-made on the advice of the government, he was not faithful to the profession in which he has carved out a name for himself.

The economic reasoning he had advanced that income and employment policies could not be divorced from each other without further aggravating the already acute disparities was sound and sensible. Judged by the performance of the plan his theoretical enunciations had no practical application. Between the income distribution pattern and employment level there was no significant co-relation.

Employment opportunities in the urban areas showed no noticeable improvement in the professional or the industrial sector. The swelling ranks of the educated unemployed soon found political articulation. Their voice is beginning to be heard and even partially heeded but what about the silent multitude living in the rural hinterland where seasonal and concealed unemployment are still the painful reality that relentlessly drives the surplus population in search of a livelihood to the towns and the cities. Were urbanization synonymous with modernization, it would have been a hopeful development.

Of a total population of seven million living in Karachi the industrial workers account for less than half a million. The capital intensive manufacturing plants scattered in and around the city have not furnished an answer to the problem of unemployment. The metropolis has already reached a saturation point for any more industries to be set up in or even beyond its municipal limits. The decision of the government to permit an addition to its industrial capacity will create more socio-economic problems than solve them. To the industrialists profit is a primary motive and employment a secondary concern.

The agro-based industries about which so much eloquence was poured out in the Sixth Plan, can provide part of the answer. It is on their development that the government must focus its attention. The entrepreneurs, whether they had originally belonged to Bombay or Karachi are settlers from Punjab, want to dig themselves in Karachi. They look to foreign countries for marketing their products. The diminishing purchasing power in the interior is directly traceable to lack of employment opportunities.

A development oriented policy is not necessarily an employment generating policy. In giving assurances of official encouragement to the private sector the government should therefore, make a clear distinction between the old and the new entrepreneurial class. A policy intended to grant licenses for setting up new industries to the existing entrepreneurs would tend to accentuate the process of cartelization which is not only antagonistic to

the PPP [Pakistan People's Party]'s philosophy of egalitarianism but also inconsistent with its declared objective of providing increasing employment opportunities to the people.

Examples of industrial lists satisfied with the ownership of one industry and its efficient management, are not very many. Excessive concentration of industries in Karachi is accompanied by excessive concentration of ownership in fewer hands. Like the big landlords, who can allow their lands to lie fallow, the big industrialists can conveniently let their industries fall sick. With their eggs distributed in a number of baskets, the closure of one factory does not amount to a winding up of their business. Business goes on as usual it is only the workers who are thrown out of work.

The industries that deserve encouragement have to be labor-intensive and located in rural centers of population, which alone can prevent or, at any rate, discourage the influx to the urban areas, now facing grave problems of providing basic amenities to their citizens. Preferably the new enterprises should be locally owned. The landlords have hitherto refrained from taking initiative in this field it is because they have found themselves comfortably placed in tax-free agricultural zone.

A tax holiday for the newly set-up industries in the rural areas can be an adequate compensation for any loss they might suffer on the agrarian front by the importation of a tax on agricultural incomes. Utilization of surplus lands in private possession, distribution of State lands among the landless and creation of new industrial capacity, must form part of an integrated programme. The problem of unemployment does not admit of a partial or piecemeal solution.

Even the People's Programme can only be the beginning of an effort. The enthusiasm it has aroused among the masses, is a reflection of the rising expectation of the masses and a hopeful sigh of a better tomorrow if it is faithfully implemented and does not meet the fate of similar programmes launched under the Ayub and the Zia Regimes, which were used as a means of political bribery of the basic democrats in one case and of the local councilors on the other.

The programme must aim at the provision of economic, social and community services of which the rural areas have been systematically starved. Employment of idle manpower must, however, be its centerpiece. This is possible only if the vast reservoir of human energy is pressed into constructive activity. Building of roads, canals, small dams, improvised structures for schools and health centers, and not the construction of showpieces on which billions have been squandered by the politicians and administrators in the past, intensifying the sense of frustration and futility of the masses. Their initial enthusiasm in its potentialities can only be sustained by a pursuit of its objectives.

The PWP [Public Works Program] is not one of those programmes that can be left to the tender mercies of avaricious contracting firms and profiteering construction companies. It must be undertaken with the active cooperation of the people and not their passive acquiescence, which would call for dedicated leadership at all levels from the Center through the provinces down to the local administration. We may not adopt the commune or the collective farm as a model for emulation, but the spirit that had inspired their adoption in China and Russia, must also permeate our own version. We cannot take a leaf out of their book unless the governments, both Central and provincial, are seriously interested in reforming an out-dated feudal system, which was the first step they had taken towards the revitalization of agrarian society.

Will economic and social necessity bring about a change in political realities, is a big question mark to the success of any programme intended to ameliorate the living conditions of the downtrodden and the dispossessed?

Editorial Calls for Curb on American Videos

46000137c Peshawar *THE FRONTIER POST* in English 20 Apr 89 p 4

[Text] The present American society is under a tremendous pressure owing to the massive proliferation of a new culture of video-literacy. The latest slogan is: forget books, this is the age of video-literacy. Sex, violence and the macho image of life portrayed in most video-films has brought about an unprecedented upsurge of crime in the American society. The other industrialized nations in the West are headed in the same direction. Third World nations, like ours, are definitely in danger of going the Americans' way.

The emphasis is not on video-films alone. The launch of satellite television and other changes in broadcasting envisaged by European Governments would mean a 150 percent increase in programming to a stunning 300,000 hours a year in 1990. Already, there are more video-shops in the U.S. than bookshops. The standards of morality, as a result of this revolution, have undergone a radical change. The violence spawned by the video-culture is best explained by the fact that U.S. schools have now started using metal detectors against students hiding weapons of all kinds. According to a recent report of the California-based National Safety Centre, there were 360,000 violent incidents in American schools in 1986. As many as 700,000 weapons were seized thanks to the metal detectors.

The catalogue of the violence-related woes of the American people is enormous indeed. There is a new sexual environment despite the AIDS. Parents are unsettled by the new sexual promiscuity among the teenagers. Incidentally, the rates of teenager pregnancy and abortion in the United States are considerably higher as compared to other countries of the West. One million teenage girls become pregnant every year, and remember, this is a

number which has remained constant for five years! The crime among the youth is so rampant that a legislation is now round the corner, which would seek the imposing of a night-time curfew for the teenagers in Washington.

Isn't it nightmarish enough for us to ponder over our own proliferation of video-shops. These have no checks whatsoever. The material they are dishing out to eager clients is of the same stuff that has torn the American moral fibre to shreds. The country is now formulating its first youth policy. It is time that we took the realities into serious consideration. There is little room for maneuver, of course.

Commentary Calls for Educational Reforms
4600137b Peshawar THE FRONTIER POST in English 15 Apr 89 p 4

[Excerpts] The ritual has been religiously re-enacted. The first educational conference was held in 1947 at the express desire of the Quaid-i-Azam. It was meant to be a sincere attempt to streamline the national education and to make it reflect the aspirations of an independent nation.

However, ever since, the activity has been reduced to a mere drill, rich in symbolism but scant in substance. The last one has been recently conducted once more with characteristic fanfare, extensive coverage in the electronic media and liberal employment of futuristic rhetoric.

We have had educational commissions and conferences in 1947, 1951, 1959, 1969, 1972 and in 1984. The end-product has, however, never gone and is not likely to go beyond the proverbial nashistand, guftand wa barkha-stand (they assembled, talked and dispersed)! Voluminous, scholarly, academic reports were compiled by Messrs Sharif, Nur Khan, Hafiz Pirzada and Zia-ul-Haq's blue-eyed boys. The total number of documents produced as results thereof come to fourteen! Seven of the policy documents carried over 1,000 recommendations out of which only half were ever implemented, some only partially! The proceedings and recommendations of the latest conference will add one more to these already consigned to the archives of the Ministry of Education.

Shakespeare, said, "nothing will come out of nothing" and Z.A. Bhutto remarked "Zero multiplied by zero will be zero". No amount of philosophy, demagoguery and platitudes are going to produce any output unless there is substantial input in terms of resources and expertise and their optimum utilization. We shall have to address ourselves to these areas if we wish to get beyond mere words and if we wish to pull education out of the speedily sinking morass in which it has slid owing to an unduly long and utter neglect on our part.

Economics: A vernacular aphorism says "the sweetness (in any preparation) will be directly proportionate to the sugar put into it". It emphasizes the need for adequate input and investment if we wish our projects and policies to bear fruit. Our financial allocations to education have been minimal even from the Third World standards. During the past six Five-Year Plans, we have allocated only about 1.66 percent of our GNP [gross national product] to education. Other Asian countries have been giving this sector 3 to 4 percent of their respective GNP. Indeed, our performance has been sadly retrogressive. We allocated 4.8 percent in the first Five-Year Plan of 1955-60 but later on it was decreased drastically and the latest educational conference had to recommend a "raise" to 4.5 percent of the GNP. This low rate of investment has relegated us to the very bottom of literacy ratio amongst even the developing countries as is evident from the statistics given below.

Countries	Education Participation Rate		
	Primary %	Secondary %	Higher %
Philippines	100	63	26
Japan	100	92	30
South Korea	100	85	17.5
Indonesia	99	30	3.3
Thailand	96	29	19
Iran	95	44	3.0
Malaysia	92	55	4.6
Nepal	91	21	3.1
Burma	84	20	3.0
India	79	30	7.7
Bangladesh	62	16	3
Pakistan	48	17	2

It may be interesting for our readers to know that the U.S. Government spends \$2600 per annum per pupil for the 40 million students attending the nation's public schools. The gross annual expenditure on education comes to a staggering \$175 billion p.a. [passage omitted]

With perestroika becoming the norm of the changing times, we must restructure our budgetary priorities and expenditures. Higher allocation will help us in improving both the organizational and administrative aspects of our educational process. It will allow us to establish more schools, both primary, secondary and vocational; train our teachers in a better manner, and enable us to give teachers better terms and conditions of service and to finally produce properly educated, enlightened citizens. Teachers are an extremely vital component of the educational equation. Unless they are competent and diligent, future-oriented and brokers of ideas, they are likely to do more harm than good. I was once asked why Pakistan could not produce a world class goal keeper in hockey. My oversimplistic and almost rustic explanation was that the reason lay in our attitude of sending the weakest member of a team to go and mind the goalpost. In the same way, anyone who cannot acquire a job or wishes to mark time temporarily, is assigned a teaching

job. The employers cannot be selective because they cannot offer competitive salaries and fringe benefits. The incumbents or applicants cannot dictate terms because they are easily replaceable in the absence of any premium on merit. The need of the hour is to include a Pakistan Education Service (PES) in the central superior services and to place it above all others in protocol, prestige, perks and perquisites. This should help in stemming the rot prevailing in college and university education and in research fields. Similarly elitist terms should be offered to talented F.A./F.Sc./C.T./B.A./B.Sc. B.Ed. teachers at primary and secondary levels. For the primary sector, only F.A./F.Sc./C.T. teachers should be taken. They should be posted at their villages, towns and cities. This should help in controlling unemployment, housing and transport problems for individuals as well as in economizing on these heads for the government. Their scales should be comparable with their counterparts in secondary schools so that all students do not rush en masse, as they do presently, to degree colleges and universities, only to add to the corps of unemployed degree holders. All things being equal, only really interested ones would like to invest extended amounts in finances and time to go for higher education. [passage omitted]

Editorial Urges Check on Population Explosion
46000138d Islamabad THE MUSLIM in English
22 Apr 89 p 4

[Text] If the Aid-to-Pakistan Consortium, which is meeting in Paris to consider Pakistan's request for three billion dollars for the next financial year, wants it to adopt an effective strategy to check its burgeoning population growth it is scarcely surprising. Similar demands had been made year after year by Pakistan's major aid-givers, including the World Bank and the US. But assurances given by Pakistan as well as substantial aid for checking the phenomenal population growth have produced no positive results. During the Zia years, little was done to check the population growth which instead

of decreasing from 2.9 percent to 2.7 percent, as projected earlier, shot up to 3.16 percent with the official stance being that the increase was 3.1 percent. As a result, Pakistan's population has risen from 32.5 million in 1947 to 107 million now. And if positive steps are not taken to reverse this alarming trend Pakistan may come to have 150 million people by the year 2000, along with a host of horrendous problems.

Such a large population that is overwhelmingly illiterate, and with too many among them who are sick or handicapped, will be an enormous strain on this country's limited resources. What matters however is not an ambitious plan but a realistic one, and its actual execution. Early in this decade a 20-year perspective plan was drawn up and it was then converted into five-year plan cycles and then scaled down to what was announced as "a workable pragmatic programme". Adequate funds were also earmarked, but nothing came of it despite the great stress placed on population planning by Dr Mahbubul Haq and the horror scenario he painted as the inevitable outcome of a population explosion that continued unabated.

The population explosion reflects the high birth rate and falling infant mortality as well longevity of life which has doubled since independence. The consortium countries want Pakistan to introduce effective and popular fertility control methods. Of course, it will not be difficult for the government to formulate such plans but far more important is political will and the execution of such plans after mobilizing adequate popular support for it.

Ayub Khan, a strong advocate of family planning, had spoken of the threat of man eating man if the population explosion was not checked. What we are seeing now is man killing man, woman and child in Pakistan mindlessly which is far worse as there is no limit to the number of persons a man can kill. Hence effective fertility control measures are imperative as part of a realistic population control programme. No more slackness is permissible in this explosive sector.

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